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Tax evasion and social interactions
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Cited by
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fortin, B., Lacroix, G., & Villeval, M.-C.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-12
- Volume
- 91
- Issue
- 11-12
- Pages
- 2089-2112
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2150630895
- Cited by
- 359
- References
- 55
- FWCI
- 22.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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