The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives
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Citations
Cites
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497 · cited 1×
“First, explicit incentives may frame a decision setting as one in which self-interested optimization rather than ethical behavior is appropriate (Hoffman et al., 1994; Irlenbusch and Sliwka, 2005; Cardenas et al., 2000; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).”
Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.6.627 · Cited by 7,176
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00253 · Cited by 2,913 · cited 2×
“Second, the incentives adopted by a principal unavoidably provide information about the principal's preferences as well as the nature of the task to be done and his beliefs about the trustworthiness of the agent or other aspects of the agent's likely behavior ( Benabou and Tirole, 2003; Seabright, 2004).”
Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All*
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554917 · Cited by 2,175 · cited 3×
“Not all of the complex psychological mechanisms accounting for non-separability are captured by this simple formulation; for example it precludes plausible cases in which simply the presence of the incentive has a substantial effect on values even if the incentive is arbitrarily small (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b) or…”
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/468061 · Cited by 1,816
Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1056 · Cited by 1,674
Bowles, S. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1152110 · Cited by 833 · cited 1×
“The underlying social and psychological mechanisms accounting for non-separability include the following ( Bowles (in press) and Frey and Jegen (2001) survey the experimental and other evidence).”
Self-citationPervasive negative effects of rewards on intrinsic motivation: The myth continues
Cameron, J., Banko, K. M., & Pierce, W. D. (2001) · The Behavior Analyst · doi:10.1007/bf03392017 · Cited by 574
More order with less law: On contract enforcement, trust and crowding
Bohnet, I., Frey, B. S., & Huck, S. (2001) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055401000211 · Cited by 391
A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence
Falkinger, J., Fehr, E., Gächter, S., & Winter-Ebmer, R. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.247 · Cited by 338
Cited by
Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?
Bowles, S., & Polanía-Reyes, S. (2012) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.50.2.368 · Cited by 917
Self-citationThe Brave New World of Carbon Trading
Spash, C. L. (2010) · New Political Economy · doi:10.1080/13563460903556049 · Cited by 327
Metadata
- Authors
- Bowles, S., & Hwang, S.-H.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2008-08
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 8-9
- Pages
- 1811-1820
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2011909006
- Cited by
- 172
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 26.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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