The DOI matches its Crossref record; 60 of the 60 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Active linking in evolutionary games
Open accessOverview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Smith, J. M. (1988) · Did Darwin Get It Right? · doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-7862-4_22 · Cited by 7,906
Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173179 · Cited by 5,502
SMITH, J. M., & PRICE, G. R. (1973) · Nature · doi:10.1038/246015a0 · Cited by 5,089
Evolutionary games and spatial chaos
Nowak, M. A., & May, R. M. (1992) · Nature · doi:10.1038/359826a0 · Cited by 4,463
Self-citationThe genetical evolution of social behaviour. II
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90039-6 · Cited by 4,144
Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics
Taylor, P. D., & Jonker, L. B. (1978) · Mathematical Biosciences · doi:10.1016/0025-5564(78)90077-9 · Cited by 3,450
(2011) · SpringerReference · doi:10.1007/springerreference_60360 · Cited by 2,855
A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04605 · Cited by 2,208
Self-citationScale-Free Networks Provide a Unifying Framework for the Emergence of Cooperation
Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2005) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.95.098104 · Cited by 1,804
Self-citationA strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
Nowak, M., & Sigmund, K. (1993) · Nature · doi:10.1038/364056a0 · Cited by 1,797
Self-citationEvolution and the theory of games
Bennett, P. (1983) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/0377-2217(83)90101-7 · Cited by 1,673
Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game
Hauert, C., & Doebeli, M. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02360 · Cited by 1,582
Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations
Nowak, M. A., Sasaki, A., Taylor, C., & Fudenberg, D. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02414 · Cited by 1,399
Self-citationHofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (2003) · Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society · doi:10.1090/s0273-0979-03-00988-1 · Cited by 1,354
Evolutionary dynamics on graphs
Lieberman, E., Hauert, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2005) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature03204 · Cited by 1,337
Self-citationEvolutionary Dynamics of Biological Games
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2004) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1093411 · Cited by 1,184
Self-citationVolunteering as Red Queen Mechanism for Cooperation in Public Goods Games
Hauert, C., De Monte, S., Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (2002) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1070582 · Cited by 1,114
Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1992) · Nature · doi:10.1038/355250a0 · Cited by 1,029
Self-citationEvolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations
Santos, F. C., Pacheco, J. M., & Lenaerts, T. (2006) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0508201103 · Cited by 1,011
Self-citationNo�, R., & Hammerstein, P. (1994) · Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1007/bf00167053 · Cited by 914
Gintis, H. (2009) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctvcm4gjh · Cited by 876
Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection
Mezzetti, C., & Samuelson, L. (1998) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061220 · Cited by 806
Phase Transitions and Volunteering in Spatial Public Goods Games
Szabó, G., & Hauert, C. (2002) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.89.118101 · Cited by 660
Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation
Traulsen, A., Nowak, M. A., & Pacheco, J. M. (2006) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.74.011909 · Cited by 604
Self-citationA dynamic model of social network formation
Skyrms, B., & Pemantle, R. (2000) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.97.16.9340 · Cited by 553
Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games
Cressman, R. (2003) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2884.001.0001 · Cited by 551
Coevolutionary Dynamics: From Finite to Infinite Populations
Traulsen, A., Claussen, J. C., & Hauert, C. (2005) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.95.238701 · Cited by 508
Self-citationHelbing, D. (1995) · Quantitative Sociodynamics · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-8516-3_11 · Cited by 495
The replicator equation on graphs
Ohtsuki, H., & Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.06.004 · Cited by 460
Self-citationEvolutionary game dynamics in finite populations
TAYLOR, C., FUDENBERG, D., SASAKI, A., & NOWAK, M. (2004) · Bulletin of Mathematical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.bulm.2004.03.004 · Cited by 427
Self-citationPopulation dynamics from game theory
Zeeman, E. C. (1980) · Lecture Notes in Mathematics · doi:10.1007/bfb0087009 · Cited by 416
Graph topology plays a determinant role in the evolution of cooperation
Santos, F. C., Rodrigues, J. F., & Pacheco, J. M. (2006) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2005.3272 · Cited by 359
Self-citationThe Evolutionary Origin of Cooperators and Defectors
Doebeli, M., Hauert, C., & Killingback, T. (2004) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1101456 · Cited by 331
The Unit of Selection in Viscous Populations and the Evolution of Altruism
van Baalen, M., & Rand, D. A. (1998) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1006/jtbi.1998.0730 · Cited by 308
A note on evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics
Hofbauer, J., Schuster, P., & Sigmund, K. (1979) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(79)90058-4 · Cited by 304
Altruism through beard chromodynamics
Jansen, V. A. A., & van Baalen, M. (2006) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04387 · Cited by 300
Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation
Aktipis, C. A. (2004) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.06.020 · Cited by 298
Epidemic spreading and cooperation dynamics on homogeneous small-world networks
Santos, F. C., Rodrigues, J. F., & Pacheco, J. M. (2005) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.72.056128 · Cited by 288
Self-citationAssortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness
Eshel, I., & Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. (1982) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.79.4.1331 · Cited by 281
Cooperation and the Emergence of Role Differentiation in the Dynamics of Social Networks
Eguíluz, V. M., Zimmermann, M. G., Cela‐Conde, C. J., & Miguel, M. S. (2005) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/428716 · Cited by 270
Coevolutionary games on networks
Ebel, H., & Bornholdt, S. (2002) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.66.056118 · Cited by 267
Spatial evolutionary game theory: Hawks and Doves revisited
(1996) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.1996.0166 · Cited by 235
Ohtsuki, H., & Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2006.3576 · Cited by 230
Self-citationEvolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
Imhof, L. A., & Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Journal of Mathematical Biology · doi:10.1007/s00285-005-0369-8 · Cited by 229
Self-citationHauert, C., & Szabó, G. (2003) · Complexity · doi:10.1002/cplx.10092 · Cited by 177
Effects of neighbourhood size and connectivity on the spatial Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma
Ifti, M., Killingback, T., & Doebeli, M. (2004) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.06.003 · Cited by 161
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation
Fudenberg, D., Nowak, M. A., Taylor, C., & Imhof, L. A. (2006) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2006.07.006 · Cited by 158
Self-citationConformism and diversity under social learning
Bala, V., & Goyal, S. (2001) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/pl00004094 · Cited by 133
Stochasticity and evolutionary stability
Traulsen, A., Pacheco, J. M., & Imhof, L. A. (2006) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.74.021905 · Cited by 132
Self-citationScore-dependent Fertility Model for the Evolution of Cooperation in a Lattice
Nakamaru, M., Nogami, H., & Iwasa, Y. (1998) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1006/jtbi.1998.0750 · Cited by 96
Nakamaru, M., & Iwasa, Y. (2005) · Evolutionary ecology research · Cited by 95
The Evolution of Helping Behavior in Large, Randomly Mixed Populations
Peck, J. R., & Feldman, M. W. (1986) · The American Naturalist · doi:10.1086/284479 · Cited by 88
Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates
Taylor, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2005.06.009 · Cited by 84
Self-citationEvolution of Altruism in Stepping-Stone Populations with Overlapping Generations
Irwin, A. J., & Taylor, P. D. (2001) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1006/tpbi.2001.1533 · Cited by 77
The prisoner’s dilemma on co-evolving networks under perfect rationality
Biely, C., Dragosits, K., & Stefan Thurner, A. (2007) · Physica D Nonlinear Phenomena · doi:10.1016/j.physd.2007.02.004 · Cited by 57
麻由子, 中. (2005) · Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB) · Cited by 27
Nakamaru, M., & Iwasa, Y. (2006) · Tokyo Tech Research Repository (Tokyo Institute of Technology) · Cited by 24
Cited by
Szabó, G., & Fáth, G. (2007) · Physics Reports · doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2007.04.004 · Cited by 2,974
Coevolutionary games—A mini review
Perc, M., & Szolnoki, A. (2010) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2009.10.003 · Cited by 1,971
Human strategy updating in evolutionary games
Traulsen, A., Semmann, D., Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., & Milinski, M. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0912515107 · Cited by 412
Self-citationEvolution of public cooperation on interdependent networks: The impact of biased utility functions
Wang, Z., Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2012) · EPL (Europhysics Letters) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/97/48001 · Cited by 354
Roles of mixing patterns in cooperation on a scale-free networked game
Rong, Z., Li, X., & Wang, X. (2007) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.76.027101 · Cited by 338
Metadata
- Authors
- Pacheco, J. M., Traulsen, A., & Nowak, M. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-12
- Volume
- 243
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 437-443
- ISSN
- 0022-5193 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2105053492
- Cited by
- 258
- References
- 60
- FWCI
- 48.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.