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Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: Generous tit-for-tat prevails

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Rand, David G., Ohtsuki, Hisashi, Nowak, Martin A. · 2009 · Journal of Theoretical Biology
Cited by 153

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

The standard model for direct reciprocity is the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, where in each round players choose between cooperation and defection. Here we extend the standard framework to include costly punishment. Now players have a choice between cooperation, defection and costly punishment. We study the set of all reactive strategies, where the behavior depends on what the other player has done in the previous round. We find all cooperative strategies that are Nash equilibria. If the cost of cooperation is greater than the cost of punishment, then the only cooperative Nash equilibrium is generous-tit-for-tat (GTFT), which does not use costly punishment. If the cost of cooperation is less than the cost of punishment, then there are infinitely many cooperative Nash equilibria and the response to defection can include costly punishment. We also perform computer simulations of evolutionary dynamics in populations of finite size. These simulations show that in the context of direct reciprocity, (i) natural selection prefers generous tit-for-tat over strategies that use costly punishment, and (ii) that costly punishment does not promote the evolution of cooperation. We find quantitative agreement between our simulation results and data from experimental observations.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.09.015

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Metadata

Authors
Rand, D. G., Ohtsuki, H., & Nowak, M. A.
Venue
Journal of Theoretical Biology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2009-01
Volume
256
Issue
1
Pages
45-57
ISSN
0022-5193 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1995714727
Cited by
153
References
24
FWCI
25.55
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: Generous tit-for-tat prevails. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.09.015
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Rand, D. G., Ohtsuki, H., & Nowak, M. A. (2009). Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: Generous tit-for-tat prevails. Journal of Theoretical Biology. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.09.015

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