Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Pro-social punishment, whereby cooperators punish defectors, is often suggested as a mechanism that maintains cooperation in large human groups. Importantly, models that support this idea have to date only allowed defectors to be the target of punishment. However, recent empirical work has demonstrated the existence of anti-social punishment in public goods games. That is, individuals that defect have been found to also punish cooperators. Some recent theoretical studies have found that such anti-social punishment can prevent the evolution of pro-social punishment and cooperation. However, the evolution of anti-social punishment in group-structured populations has not been formally addressed. Previous work has informally argued that group-structure must favour pro-social punishment. Here we formally investigate how two demographic factors, group size and dispersal frequency, affect selection pressures on pro- and anti-social punishment. Contrary to the suggestions of previous work, we find that anti-social punishment can prevent the evolution of pro-social punishment and cooperation under a range of group structures. Given that anti-social punishment has now been found in all studied extant human cultures, the claims of previous models showing the co-evolution of pro-social punishment and cooperation in group-structured populations should be re-evaluated.
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Citations
Cites
Antisocial Punishment Across Societies
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Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1992) · Ethology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-y · Cited by 1,482 · cited 4×
“ered the maintenance of punishment, rather than its invasion from mutation frequency. It is already widely appreciated that punishment can be stable when common, even if it is not selected when rare (Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Lehmann et al., 2007). This is because in the standard model, the total individual cost of pu…”
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“Understanding the evolution of individually-costly cooperative behaviours is a major focus of social evolution theory (Hamilton, 1964; Wilson, 1975; Frank, 1998; Lehmann and Keller, 2006; West et al., 2007; Archetti and Scheuring, 2012).”
BackgroundInfluentialCooperation and competition in pathogenic bacteria
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“Group-structured populations are an essential component of cultural group selection, and of recent arguments about punishment promoting group-beneficial cultural norms in humans (Boyd et al., 2003; Gintis et al., 2003; Mathew and Boyd, 2011; Sober and Wilson, 1998).”
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Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
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The evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods games
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“Previous work on anti-social punishment has nevertheless suggested that group structure would favour pro-social punishment and prevent anti-social punishment from being effective (Rand et al., 2010; Rand and Nowak, 2011).”
BackgroundInfluential
Cited by
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003 · Cited by 1,308
Humans display a ‘cooperative phenotype’ that is domain general and temporally stable
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Emergence of Social Punishment and Cooperation through Prior Commitments
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Metadata
- Authors
- Powers, S. T., Taylor, D. J., & Bryson, J. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2012-10
- Volume
- 311
- Pages
- 107-116
- ISSN
- 0022-5193 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2005804328
- Cited by
- 34
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 14.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Powers, S. T., Taylor, D. J., & Bryson, J. J. (2012). Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations. Journal of Theoretical Biology. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.07.010
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