Cited by 173Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolution and Genetic Dynamics

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 92 of the 92 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation

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Szolnoki, Attila, Perc, Matjaž·2013·Journal of Theoretical Biology

Abstract

Collective actions, from city marathons to labor strikes, are often mass-driven and subject to the snowball effect. Motivated by this, we study evolutionary advantages of conditional punishment in the spatial public goods game. Unlike unconditional punishers who always impose the same fines on defectors, conditional punishers do so proportionally with the number of other punishers in the group. Phase diagrams in dependence on the punishment fine and cost reveal that the two types of punishers cannot coexist. Spontaneous coarsening of the two strategies leads to an indirect territorial competition with the defectors, which is won by unconditional punishers only if the sanctioning is inexpensive. Otherwise conditional punishers are the victors of the indirect competition, indicating that under more realistic conditions they are indeed the more effective strategy. Both continuous and discontinuous phase transitions as well as tricritical points characterize the complex evolutionary dynamics, which is due to multipoint interactions that are introduced by conditional punishment. We propose indirect territorial competition as a generally applicable mechanism relying on pattern formation, by means of which spatial structure can be utilized by seemingly subordinate strategies to avoid evolutionary extinction.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.02.008

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  1. Nakamaru, 2005, Evolution of altruism by costly punishment in lattice-structured population, Evol. Ecol. Res., 7, 853

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Metadata

Authors
Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M.
Affiliations
  • Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science (HU)
  • University of Maribor (SI)
Corresponding author
Szolnoki, Attila
Venue
Journal of Theoretical Biology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2013-05
Volume
325
Pages
34-41
ISSN
0022-5193 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2100165388
Cited by
173
References
91
Citations by year
2026: 13 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 16 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 12 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 8
FWCI
42.18
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Theoretical Biology (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Repository of the Academy's Library (Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
Keywords
public goods game, evolution of cooperation, spatial games, phase transitions, tricritical point, pattern formation, collective action, coexistence of strategies
MeSH terms
Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Humans, Models, Genetic, Models, Psychological, Punishment, Social Justice

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