The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What you don’t know won’t hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games
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Citations
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Cited by
Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility
BÉNABOU, R., & TIROLE, J. (2010) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.2009.00843.x · Cited by 2,237
Social Norms and Economic Theory
Elster, J. (1989) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.3.4.99 · Cited by 2,071
Engel, C. (2011) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-011-9283-7 · Cited by 1,783
Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially
Ariely, D., Bracha, A., & Meier, S. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.544 · Cited by 1,753
Egalitarianism in young children
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dana, J., Cain, D. M., & Dawes, R. M.
- Venue
- Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-07
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 193-201
- ISSN
- 0749-5978 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2147174665
- Cited by
- 674
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 50.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.