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Confidence in judgment

Harvey, Nigel · 1997 · Trends in Cognitive Sciences

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Experiments have shown that, generally, people are overconfident about the correctness of their answers to questions. Cognitive psychologists have attributed this to biases in the way people generate and handle evidence for and against their views. The overconfidence phenomenon and cognitive psychologists' accounts of its origins have recently given rise to three debates. Firstly, ecological psychologists have proposed that overconfidence is an artefact that has arisen because experimenters have used question material not representative of the natural environment. However, it now appears that some overconfidence remains even after this problem has been remedied. Secondly, it has been proposed that overconfidence is an artefactual regression effect that arises because judgments contain an inherently random component. However, those claiming this appear to use the term overconfidence to refer to a phenomenon quite different from the one that the cognitive psychologists set out to explain. Finally, a debate has arisen about the status of perceptual judgments. Some claim that these evince only underconfidence and must, therefore, depend on mechanisms fundamentally different from those subserving other types of judgment. Others have obtained overconfidence with perceptual judgments and argue that a unitary theory is more appropriate. At present, however, no single theory provides an adequate account of the many diverse factors that influence confidence in judgment.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/s1364-6613(97)01014-0

Cites

35 of 35 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Verification

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Citations

Cites

Show all 35 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Juslin P., Olsson H. and Björkman M. J. Behav. Decis. Making (in press)
  2. Budescu D.V., Wallsten T. and Au W.T. J. Behav. Decis. Making (in press)
  3. Juslin P. and Olsson H. Psychol. Rev. (in press)

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Harvey, N.
Affiliations
University College London (GB)
Corresponding author
Harvey, Nigel
Venue
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1997-05
Volume
1
Issue
2
Pages
78-82
ISSN
1364-6613 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1970027505
Cited by
239
References
35
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 12
FWCI
1.71
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Trends in Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
overconfidence, confidence in judgments, metacognition, ecological psychology, representativeness, regression effect, perceptual judgment, underconfidence, decision bias

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Confidence in judgment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/s1364-6613(97)01014-0
The paper
Harvey, N. (1997). Confidence in judgment. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1364-6613(97)01014-0

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.