Confidence in judgment
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Experiments have shown that, generally, people are overconfident about the correctness of their answers to questions. Cognitive psychologists have attributed this to biases in the way people generate and handle evidence for and against their views. The overconfidence phenomenon and cognitive psychologists' accounts of its origins have recently given rise to three debates. Firstly, ecological psychologists have proposed that overconfidence is an artefact that has arisen because experimenters have used question material not representative of the natural environment. However, it now appears that some overconfidence remains even after this problem has been remedied. Secondly, it has been proposed that overconfidence is an artefactual regression effect that arises because judgments contain an inherently random component. However, those claiming this appear to use the term overconfidence to refer to a phenomenon quite different from the one that the cognitive psychologists set out to explain. Finally, a debate has arisen about the status of perceptual judgments. Some claim that these evince only underconfidence and must, therefore, depend on mechanisms fundamentally different from those subserving other types of judgment. Others have obtained overconfidence with perceptual judgments and argue that a unitary theory is more appropriate. At present, however, no single theory provides an adequate account of the many diverse factors that influence confidence in judgment.
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“The judgment and decision-making literature has independently developed indices of probability accuracy similar to G and meta- d′ in the metacognition literature.”
From How to measure metacognition (2014) · cites this paper as Harvey (1997)
Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00003435 · Cited by 2,762
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Limited attention, information disclosure, and financial reporting
Hirshleifer, D., & Teoh, S. H. (2003) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.10.002 · Cited by 2,324
Metadata
- Authors
- Harvey, N.
- Affiliations
- University College London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Harvey, Nigel
- ORCID
- Harvey, Nigel
- Venue
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1997-05
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 78-82
- ISSN
- 1364-6613 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1970027505
- Cited by
- 239
- References
- 35
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 1.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- Locations
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- overconfidence, confidence in judgments, metacognition, ecological psychology, representativeness, regression effect, perceptual judgment, underconfidence, decision bias
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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- Harvey, N. (1997). Confidence in judgment. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1364-6613(97)01014-0
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.