The DOI matches its Crossref record; 67 of the 67 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The neural correlates of conscious experience: an experimental framework
Abstract
Demonstrating that neural activity 'represents' physical properties of the world such as the orientation of a line in the receptive field of a nerve cell is a standard procedure in neuroscience. However, not all such neural activity will be associated with the mental representations that form the contents of consciousness. In some cases, such as when patients with blindsight correctly 'guess' the location of a stimulus, neural activity is associated with physical stimulation and with appropriate behaviour, but not with awareness. To identify the neural correlates of conscious experience we need to identify patterns of neural activity that are specifically associated with awareness. Experiments aimed at making such identifications require that subjects report some aspect of their conscious experience either verbally or through some pre-arranged non-verbal report while neural activity is measured. If there is some characteristic neural signature of consciousness, then this should be distinguishable from the kinds of neural activity associated with stimulation and/or behaviour in the absence of awareness. It remains to be seen whether the neural signature of consciousness relates to the location of the neural activity, the temporal properties of the neural activity or the form of the interaction between activity in different brain regions.
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“They show that in normal experimental setups such as the ones commonly used in neuroscientific research into consciousness (Frith et al. 1999), inference and prediction data are indeed independent, and dependency is not investigated nor properly considered.”
From Falsification and consciousness (2021) · cites this paper as Frith et al. 1999
In the citing paper
“For example, when self-reports of the stimulus are compromised by using subliminal stimulation procedures, such as masking (63), areas of the visual cortex (including primary and secondary areas) are functionally active, but when participants are able to consciously report seeing a visual stimulus, additional cortical areas become active (47,54,(64)(65)(66)(67)(68)(69)(70)(71).”
From A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness (2017) · cites this paper as [47]
In the citing paper
“Introspection, in turn, is believed to involve such cognitive processes as attention, working memory, and metacognition (51-53), processes that are called upon in cognitive theories of consciousness (47,(54)(55)(56)(57).”
From A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness (2017) · cites this paper as [47]
Citations
Cites
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Cited by
How do you feel — now? The anterior insula and human awareness
(Bud) Craig, A. D. (2009) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2555 · Cited by 6,657
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924
A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
O'Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x01000115 · Cited by 3,126
Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework
Dehaene, S. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2 · Cited by 2,498
Rethinking the Emotional Brain
LeDoux, J. (2012) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.02.004 · Cited by 1,594
“…representation of experience in a cognitive workspace involving neocortical areas, especially prefrontal and parietal cortical areas (Crick and Koch, 1990, 2004, Dehaene and Changeux, 2004, Baars, 2005; Frith and Dolan, 1996; Frith et al., 1999; Frith, 2008; Shallice, 1988; Shallice et al., 2008).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Frith, C., Perry, R., & Lumer, E.
- Affiliations
- National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Frith, Chris
- Venue
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1999-03
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 105-114
- ISSN
- 1364-6613 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2075796617
- Cited by
- 250
- References
- 67
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 12 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 15 · 2012: 7
- FWCI
- 7.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- Locations
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
- Keywords
- neural correlates of consciousness, subjective experience, blindsight, awareness
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- Frith, C., Perry, R., & Lumer, E. (1999). The neural correlates of conscious experience: an experimental framework. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01281-4
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.