Transparency, Protest, and Autocratic Instability
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The collapse of autocratic regimes is often brought about through large-scale mobilization and collective action by elements of the populace. The willingness of any given member of the public to participate in actions such as strikes and protests is contingent upon her beliefs about others’ willingness to similarly mobilize. In this article, we examine the effect of a specific form of transparency—the disclosure of economic data by the government—on citizen belief formation, and consequently on collective mobilization. We present a theoretical model in which, under autocratic rule, transparency increases the frequency of protests, and increases the extent to which protest is correlated with incumbent performance. We find empirical support for these claims. Transparency destabilizes autocracies via mass protest.
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Cites
Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy
Lipset, S. M. (1959) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1951731 · Cited by 7,050 · cited 1×
“13 Our article does not speak to the expansive literature on other pressures for regime transition—e.g., structuralist accounts (Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens 1993; Lipset 1959; Moore 1966), or the voluntary extension of the franchise (e.g., Lizzeri and Persico 2004).”
BackgroundEconomic Reform and the Process of Global Integration
Sachs, J. D., Warner, A., Aslund, A., & Fischer, S. (1995) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity · doi:10.2307/2534573 · Cited by 4,950 · cited 1×
“…robustness checks, we substitute for the Exports+ImportsGDP measure using the economic restrictions component of the KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher 2006), and using an updated variant of the Sachs-Warner measure of economic openness (Sachs and Warner 1995) composed by Wacziarg and Welch (2008).”
MethodEconomic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510809 · Cited by 4,810
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217 · cited 2×
“19 In all specifications involving incidents of mass mobilization and unrest, we draw our outcome variables from the Cross National Time Series Archive (Banks, 1979), as made available by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). These data consist of counts of the number of anti-government demonstrations, strikes, riots, guer…”
MethodThe Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988
Summers, R., & Heston, A. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937941 · Cited by 3,429
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804946 · Cited by 2,845
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Svolik, M. W. (2012) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139176040 · Cited by 2,611 · cited 6×
“…parties hold positions in the legislature.20 We include this control given evidence that autocratic regimes that consist of multiple parties face substantially different risks, and exhibit different behaviors, than those that do not (Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, 2007; Svolik 2012).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialBoix, C. (2003) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804960 · Cited by 2,211
The Political Economy of the Resource Curse
Ross, M. L. (1999) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887100008200 · Cited by 1,991
Modernization: Theories and Facts
Przeworski, A., & Limongi, F. (1997) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.1997.0004 · Cited by 1,983
Cited by
Spontaneous Collective Action: Peripheral Mobilization During the Arab Spring
STEINERT-THRELKELD, Z. C. (2017) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055416000769 · Cited by 331
Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Allow Citizens to Voice Opinions Publicly?
Chen, J., & Xu, Y. (2017) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/690303 · Cited by 242
How much should we trust the dictator’s GDP growth estimates?
Martínez, L. R. (2022) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/720458 · Cited by 228
“One prominent alternative explanation for the main result revolves around limitations in statistical capacity thatmay prevent some countries, gdp growth estimates in autocracies 2749 which happen to disproportionately be dictatorships, from accurately measuring economic activity ( Jerven 2013).”
Sometimes Less Is More: Censorship, News Falsification, and Disapproval in 1989 East Germany
Gläßel, C., & Paula, K. (2020) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12501 · Cited by 98
Focal Moments and Protests in Autocracies: How Pro-democracy Anniversaries Shape Dissent in China
Carter, E. B., & Carter, B. L. (2020) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002720932995 · Cited by 35
Metadata
- Authors
- HOLLYER, J. R., ROSENDORFF, B. P., & VREELAND, J. R.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2015-11
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 764-784
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2216947226
- Cited by
- 246
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 68.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- HOLLYER, J. R., ROSENDORFF, B. P., & VREELAND, J. R. (2015). Transparency, Protest, and Autocratic Instability. American Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055415000428
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