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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 114 of the 115 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Security Dilemma Revisited

Glaser, Charles L. · 1997 · World Politics

Abstract

Robert Jervis's article “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” is among the most important works in international relations of the past few decades. In it, Jervis develops two essential arguments. First, he explains that the security dilemma is the key to understanding how in an anarchic international system states with fundamentally compatible goals still end up in competition and at war. The security dilemma exists when “many of the means by which a state tries 1 to increase its security decrease the security of others.” It provides the rational foundation for what Jervis termed the “spiral model,” which describes how the interaction between states that are seeking only security can fuel competition and strain political relations.2 Second, Jervis explains that the magnitude and nature of the security dilemma depend on two variables: the offense-defense balance and offense-defense differentiation.3 As a result, the security dilemma can vary across space and time. Although states exist in a condition of international anarchy that does not vary, there can be significant variation in the attractiveness of cooperative or competitive means, the prospects for achieving a high level of security, and the probability of war.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/s0043887100014763

Cites

114 of 114 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 15

  1. Huntington, 1987, American Defense Annual, 1987–1988, 36
  2. Eden, 1989, Nuclear Arguments
  3. Schultz, 1996, “Domestic Political Competition and Bargaining in International Crises”
  4. Lynn-Jones, 1995, The Perils of Anarchy, xi
  5. Posen, 1991, “Crisis Stability and Conventional Arms Control,”, Daedulus, 120
  6. Fearon, 1992, “Threats to Use Force: The Role of Costly Signals in International Crises”
  7. Schelling, 1975, “A Framework for the Evaluation of Arms-Control Proposals,”, Daedulus, 104
  8. 1988, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 44
  9. 10.2307/2538961 · DOI
  10. 1959, Man, the State and War
  11. Gray, 1993, Weapons Don't Make War, 174
  12. 1986, “Deterrence or National Interest? Reflections on the Origins of War,”, Orbis, 30
  13. Glaser, 1997, “Correspondence: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter,”, International Security, 21
  14. Evera, 1988, “Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and Society”
  15. Mercer, 1996, Refutation and International Politics

Cited by

See all 675

Metadata

Authors
Glaser, C. L.
Affiliations
University of Chicago (US)
Corresponding author
Glaser, Charles L.
Venue
World Politics
Publisher
Project MUSE
Published
1997-10
Volume
50
Issue
1
Pages
171-201
ISSN
  • 0043-8871 (ISSN-L)
  • 1086-3338
OpenAlex
W2125044185
Cited by
675
References
115
Citations by year
2026: 45 · 2025: 52 · 2024: 46 · 2023: 42 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 28 · 2020: 45 · 2019: 34 · 2018: 28 · 2017: 28 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 26 · 2014: 25 · 2013: 21 · 2012: 16
FWCI
24.85
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • World Politics (publishedVersion)
  • Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Global Security and Public Health
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Global Peace and Security Dynamics
Keywords
security dilemma, Robert Jervis, spiral model, offense-defense balance, international anarchy, interstate competition, war, state security, international cooperation

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.