Judgment dissociation theory: An analysis of differences in causal, counterfactual and covariational reasoning.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Research suggests that causal judgment is influenced primarily by counterfactual or covariational reasoning. In contrast, the author of this article develops judgment dissociation theory (JDT), which predicts that these types of reasoning differ in function and can lead to divergent judgments. The actuality principle proposes that causal selections focus on antecedents that are sufficient to generate the actual outcome. The substitution principle proposes that ad hoc categorization plays a key role in counterfactual and covariational reasoning such that counterfactual selections focus on antecedents that would have been sufficient to prevent the outcome or something like it and covariational selections focus on antecedents that yield the largest increase in the probability of the outcome or something like it. The findings of 4 experiments support JDT but not the competing counterfactual and covariational accounts.
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Citations
Cites
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“Ad hoc categories (e.g., things to bring to today's meeting) are constructed in response to specific, short-term goals that, once satisfied, do not require the category to be maintained (Barsalou, 1983, 1991).”
BackgroundRoese, N. J. (1997) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.121.1.133 · Cited by 1,156 · cited 2×
“Over the past two decades, a great deal of psychological research has examined the determinants, consequences, and functions of counterfactual thinking (for a review, see Roese, 1997).”
BackgroundResult"Spontaneous" causal thinking.
Weiner, B. (1985) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.97.1.74 · Cited by 998
Explaining the evidence: Tests of the Story Model for juror decision making.
Pennington, N., & Hastie, R. (1992) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.62.2.189 · Cited by 761 · cited 1×
“In virtually every sphere of human interest, our abilities to learn and categorize (Rehder & Hastie, 2001); to explain the past, predict the future, and exert control in the present (Weiner, 1985); and to construct meaning and make decisions by synthesizing coherent stories ( Pennington & Hastie, 1992; Read, 1987) dep…”
BackgroundConversational processes and causal explanation.
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Contrastive and counterfactual reasoning in causal judgment.
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“…information when asked to judge the magnitude of a causal relation show that people assign greater weight to cases in which the proposed cause is present rather than absent (Anderson & Sheu, 1995; Cheng, 1997; Kao & Wasserman, 1993; Mandel & Lehman, 1998; McGill, 1998; McGill & Klein, 1993).”
Background
Cited by
Causal Models: How People Think about the World and Its Alternatives
Sloman, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183115.001.0001 · Cited by 677
Judgments of cause and blame: The effects of intentionality and foreseeability
Lagnado, D. A., & Channon, S. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.06.009 · Cited by 346
Causal–explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions
Lombrozo, T. (2010) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2010.05.002 · Cited by 313
Sloman, S. A., & Lagnado, D. (2015) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015135 · Cited by 210
“People do not automatically assign causality when the counterfactual condition is met (Walsh & Sloman 2011); moreover, they do assign causality when it is not met, such as in overdetermination and preemption cases (Mandel 2003, Spellman & Kincannon 2001).”
BackgroundNormality and actual causal strength
Icard, T. F., Kominsky, J. F., & Knobe, J. (2017) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2017.01.010 · Cited by 155
Metadata
- Authors
- Mandel, D. R.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Published
- 2003
- Volume
- 132
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 419-434
- ISSN
- 0096-3445 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-2222
- OpenAlex
- W2070341805
- Cited by
- 119
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 8.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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