The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Intuitive confidence: Choosing between intuitive and nonintuitive alternatives.
Abstract
People often choose intuitive rather than equally valid nonintuitive alternatives. The authors suggest that these intuitive biases arise because intuitions often spring to mind with subjective ease, and the subjective ease leads people to hold their intuitions with high confidence. An investigation of predictions against point spreads found that people predicted intuitive options (favorites) more often than equally valid (or even more valid) nonintuitive alternatives (underdogs). Critically, though, this effect was largely determined by people's confidence in their intuitions (intuitive confidence). Across naturalistic, expert, and laboratory samples (Studies 1-3), against personally determined point spreads (Studies 4-11), and even when intuitive confidence was manipulated by altering irrelevant aspects of the decision context (e.g., font; Studies 12 and 13), the authors found that decreasing intuitive confidence reduced or eliminated intuitive biases. These findings indicate that intuitive biases are not inevitable but rather predictably determined by contextual variables that affect intuitive confidence.
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Citations
Cites
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Uniting the Tribes of Fluency to Form a Metacognitive Nation
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Caring about carelessness: Participant inattention and its effects on research
Maniaci, M. R., & Rogge, R. D. (2014) · Journal of Research in Personality · doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2013.09.008 · Cited by 852
Overcoming intuition: Metacognitive difficulty activates analytic reasoning.
Alter, A. L., Oppenheimer, D. M., Epley, N., & Eyre, R. N. (2007) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/0096-3445.136.4.569 · Cited by 844
Intuition, reason, and metacognition
Thompson, V. A., Prowse Turner, J. A., & Pennycook, G. (2011) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2011.06.001 · Cited by 703
Validity and Mechanical Turk: An assessment of exclusion methods and interactive experiments
Thomas, K. A., & Clifford, S. (2017) · Computers in Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.chb.2017.08.038 · Cited by 625
Metadata
- Authors
- Simmons, J. P., & Nelson, L. D.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Published
- 2006
- Volume
- 135
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 409-428
- ISSN
- 0096-3445 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-2222
- OpenAlex
- W2018199432
- Cited by
- 212
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 8.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.