Intuitive confidence: Choosing between intuitive and nonintuitive alternatives.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
People often choose intuitive rather than equally valid nonintuitive alternatives. The authors suggest that these intuitive biases arise because intuitions often spring to mind with subjective ease, and the subjective ease leads people to hold their intuitions with high confidence. An investigation of predictions against point spreads found that people predicted intuitive options (favorites) more often than equally valid (or even more valid) nonintuitive alternatives (underdogs). Critically, though, this effect was largely determined by people's confidence in their intuitions (intuitive confidence). Across naturalistic, expert, and laboratory samples (Studies 1-3), against personally determined point spreads (Studies 4-11), and even when intuitive confidence was manipulated by altering irrelevant aspects of the decision context (e.g., font; Studies 12 and 13), the authors found that decreasing intuitive confidence reduced or eliminated intuitive biases. These findings indicate that intuitive biases are not inevitable but rather predictably determined by contextual variables that affect intuitive confidence.
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Citations
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Background
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“Indeed, they may infer from their certainty about the adjustment direction that the correct answer is quite far from the anchor (cf. Simmons & Nelson, 2006), and they may often believe that they have adjusted insufficiently.”
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“This suggestion is consistent with other results that testify to the failure of beliefs and knowledge to affect metacognitive judgments (e.g., Koriat et al., 2004) and with the claim that people often choose in line with their intuitions even when other information undermines the validity of these intuitions ( Simmons…”
ResultCan we reduce facial biases? Persistent effects of facial trustworthiness on sentencing decisions
Jaeger, B., Todorov, A. T., Evans, A. M., & van Beest, I. (2020) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2020.104004 · Cited by 95
Are Sports Bettors Biased toward Longshots, Favorites, or Both? A Literature Review
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Conformity in large language models
Zhu, X., Zhang, C., Stafford, T., Collier, N., & Vlachos, A. (2025) · Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers) · doi:10.18653/v1/2025.acl-long.195 · Cited by 10
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“Simmons and Nelson (2006) found that individuals who expressed their opinions with high confidence were significantly more likely to influence the decisions or opinions of others.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Simmons, J. P., & Nelson, L. D.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Published
- 2006
- Volume
- 135
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 409-428
- ISSN
- 0096-3445 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-2222
- OpenAlex
- W2018199432
- Cited by
- 212
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 8.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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