Cited by 185Bayesian Modeling and Causal InferenceDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsClinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills

The role of causality in judgment under uncertainty

Krynski, Tevye R., Tenenbaum, Joshua B.·2007·Journal of Experimental Psychology General

Abstract

Leading accounts of judgment under uncertainty evaluate performance within purely statistical frameworks, holding people to the standards of classical Bayesian (A. Tversky & D. Kahneman, 1974) or frequentist (G. Gigerenzer & U. Hoffrage, 1995) norms. The authors argue that these frameworks have limited ability to explain the success and flexibility of people's real-world judgments and propose an alternative normative framework based on Bayesian inferences over causal models. Deviations from traditional norms of judgment, such as base-rate neglect, may then be explained in terms of a mismatch between the statistics given to people and the causal models they intuitively construct to support probabilistic reasoning. Four experiments show that when a clear mapping can be established from given statistics to the parameters of an intuitive causal model, people are more likely to use the statistics appropriately, and that when the classical and causal Bayesian norms differ in their prescriptions, people's judgments are more consistent with causal Bayesian norms.

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Crossref · 10.1037/0096-3445.136.3.430

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  • Accuracy is improved in base-rate neglect studies when a causal link is provided between the individual events, and experiencing outcomes together weakens conjunction fallacies.

    “accuracy is improved in base-rate neglect studies when a causal link is provided between the individual events [55,56], and experiencing outcomes together weakens conjunction fallacies [57]”

    From Bayesian Brains without Probabilities (2016) · cites this paper as [56]

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Authors
Krynski, T. R., & Tenenbaum, J. B.
Affiliations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
Venue
Journal of Experimental Psychology General
Published
2007
Volume
136
Issue
3
Pages
430-450
ISSN
  • 0096-3445 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-2222
OpenAlex
W2000020549
Cited by
183
References
61
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 20 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 17 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 12
FWCI
7.89
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Journal of Experimental Psychology General (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
National Science Foundation
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
Keywords
judgment under uncertainty, causal models, Bayesian inference, base rate neglect, probabilistic reasoning, statistical reasoning
MeSH terms
Bayes Theorem, Breast Neoplasms, Diagnosis, Differential, False Positive Reactions, Female, Humans, Judgment, Mammography, Middle Aged, Probability Learning, Models, Statistical, Causality, Likelihood Functions, Intuition, Uncertainty

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