Meeting now suggests we will meet again: Implications for debates on the evolution of cooperation
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Humans are often generous, even towards strangers encountered by chance and even in the absence of any explicit information suggesting they will meet again. Because game theoretic analyses typically conclude that a psychology designed for direct reciprocity should defect in such situations, many have concluded that alternative explanations for human generosity--explanations beyond direct reciprocity--are necessary. However, human cooperation evolved within a material and informational ecology: Simply adding consideration of one minimal ecological relationship to the analysis of reciprocity brings theory and observation closer together, indicating that ecology-free analyses of cooperation can be fragile. Using simulations, we show that the autocorrelation of an individual's location over time means that even a chance encounter with an individual predicts an increased probability of a future encounter with that same individual. We discuss how a psychology designed for such an ecology may be expected to often cooperate even in apparently one-shot situations.
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Cites
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Cited by
Curry, O. S., Rowland, L. A., Van Lissa, C. J., Zlotowitz, S., McAlaney, J., & Whitehouse, H. (2018) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2018.02.014 · Cited by 528
“This can includes kindness to strangers: a kind act may be a way of making a new friend; after all, ‘ a stranger is just a friend you haven't met yet ’ (Delton, Krasnow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2011; Krasnow, Delton, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2013).”
The Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology
Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2015) · The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology · doi:10.1002/9781119125563.evpsych101 · Cited by 185
Self-citationHuman social organization during the Late Pleistocene: Beyond the nomadic-egalitarian model
Singh, M., & Glowacki, L. (2022) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2022.07.003 · Cited by 157
Metadata
- Authors
- Krasnow, M. M., Delton, A. W., Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L.
- Venue
- Scientific Reports
- Published
- 2013-04-29
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1747-1747
- ISSN
- 2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1970030343
- Cited by
- 73
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 28.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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