To qualify as a social partner, humans hide severe punishment, although their observed cooperativeness is decisive
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Conflicts of interest between the community and its members are at the core of human social dilemmas. If observed selfishness has future costs, individuals may hide selfish acts but display altruistic ones, and peers aim at identifying the most selfish persons to avoid them as future social partners. An interaction involving hiding and seeking information may be inevitable. We staged an experimental social-dilemma game in which actors could pay to conceal information about their contribution, giving, and punishing decisions from an observer who selects her future social partners from the actors. The observer could pay to conceal her observation of the actors. We found sophisticated dynamic strategies on either side. Actors hide their severe punishment and low contributions but display high contributions. Observers select high contributors as social partners; remarkably, punishment behavior seems irrelevant for qualifying as a social partner. That actors nonetheless pay to conceal their severe punishment adds a further puzzle to the role of punishment in human social behavior. Competition between hiding and seeking information about social behavior may be even more relevant and elaborate in the real world but usually is hidden from our eyes.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Revisiting the commons: local lessons, global challenges.
Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Field, C. B., Norgaard, R. B., & Policansky, D. (1999) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.284.5412.278 · Cited by 2,798
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
Antisocial Punishment Across Societies
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1153808 · Cited by 2,038
The eyes have it: the neuroethology, function and evolution of social gaze
Emery, N. J. (2000) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/s0149-7634(00)00025-7 · Cited by 2,037
The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good.
Yamagishi, T. (1986) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110 · Cited by 1,359
Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting
Bateson, M., Nettle, D., & Roberts, G. (2006) · Biology Letters · doi:10.1098/rsbl.2006.0509 · Cited by 1,304
Haley, K. J., & Fessler, D. M. T. (2005) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2005.01.002 · Cited by 1,073
The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions
Gürerk, O., Irlenbusch, B., & Rockenbach, B. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1123633 · Cited by 997
Self-citationDreber, A., Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A. (2008) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06723 · Cited by 718
Audience effects on moralistic punishment
Kurzban, R., DeScioli, P., & O'Brien, E. (2007) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.06.001 · Cited by 360
Fehr, E. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/432449a · Cited by 219
Cooperators benefit through reputation-based partner choice in economic games
Sylwester, K., & Roberts, G. (2010) · Biology Letters · doi:10.1098/rsbl.2010.0209 · Cited by 206 · cited 1×
“, choice of partners (23)]: An observer selects her partners for a follow-up game, and the observed players have a potential conflict between qualifying for that follow-up game and competing successfully in the present game.”
BackgroundSocial attention and the brain
Klein, J. T., Shepherd, S. V., & Platt, M. L. (2009) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2009.08.010 · Cited by 196 · cited 1×
“Even a mechanistic origin of recognizing watchful eyes in the brain has been described as cortical orienting circuits that mediate nuanced and context-dependent social attention (9, 10).”
Cited by
Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments
Fischbacher, U., & Gächter, S. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.1.541 · Cited by 1,316
A mutualistic approach to morality: The evolution of fairness by partner choice
Baumard, N., André, J.-B., & Sperber, D. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11002202 · Cited by 668
Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions
Al-Shawaf, L., & Lewis, D. M. G. (2017) · Encyclopedia of Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-28099-8_516-1 · Cited by 549
Inference of trustworthiness from intuitive moral judgments.
Everett, J. A. C., Pizarro, D. A., & Crockett, M. J. (2016) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000165 · Cited by 317
Direct and indirect punishment among strangers in the field
Balafoutas, L., Nikiforakis, N., & Rockenbach, B. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1413170111 · Cited by 194
“This increases the punisher’s benefit from enforcing cooperation and may help offset the associated costs (4, 5, 24).”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Rockenbach, B., & Milinski, M.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2011-10-10
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 45
- Pages
- 18307-18312
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2033431905
- Cited by
- 63
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 10.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.