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Cited by 146Electoral Systems and Political ParticipationTerrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political ViolenceSocial and Intergroup Psychology

Correcting inaccurate metaperceptions reduces Americans’ support for partisan violence

Open access
Mernyk, Joseph S., Pink, Sophia L., Druckman, James N., Willer, Robb·2022·Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
DOI 10.1073/pnas.2116851119PMC PMC9169855
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Abstract

Significance: Prominent events, such as the 2021 US Capitol attack, have brought politically motivated violence to the forefront of Americans’ minds. Yet, the causes of support for partisan violence remain poorly understood. Across four studies, we found evidence that exaggerated perceptions of rival partisans’ support for violence are a major cause of partisans’ own support for partisan violence. Further, correcting these false beliefs reduces partisans’ support for and willingness to engage in violence, especially among those with the largest misperceptions, and this effect endured for 1 mo. These findings suggest that a simple correction of partisans’ misperceptions could be a practical and scalable way to durably reduce Americans’ support for, and intentions to engage in, partisan violence.

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  • Many people are amenable to having their misperceptions of the other side corrected, which lowers affective polarization.

    “Many people, it seems, are amenable to having their misperceptions of the other side corrected, which lowers affective polarization150,153,154.”

    From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [154]

    The Discussion reports that correcting misperceptions about out-party support for violence reduced support for partisan violence, but had no effect on measures of affective polarization in Study 3. The claimed reduction in affective polarization is therefore contrary to this paper’s finding. (LLM, conf=0.91)

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  • People tend to overestimate animosity between political groups.

    “People also tend to overestimate the degree of polarization (Levendusky & Malhotra 2016, Westfall et al. 2015) and animosity (Mernyk et al. 2022, Ruggeri et al. 2021) between political groups, which may be exacerbated by the abundance of divisive content they see online.”

    From Social Media and Morality. (2024) · cites this paper as Mernyk et al. 2022

    The Results (Studies 1 and 2) show that Democrats and Republicans overestimated rival partisans’ support for violence. That supports an overestimation of a specific hostile attitude, but the paper does not establish that people generally overestimate animosity between political groups. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Mernyk et al. (2022) report that partisans overestimate the average amount of support for partisan violence by out-partisans by between 245% and 442%.

    “Mernyk et al. (2022) report that partisans overestimate the average amount of support for partisan violence by out-partisans by between 245% and 442%.”

    From How to study democratic backsliding (2024) · cites this paper as Mernyk et al. (2022)

    The Results (Studies 1 and 2; page numbers unavailable) report that partisans overestimated out-partisans’ support for partisan violence. The Discussion gives the range as 245% to 317%, not 245% to 442%; it reports a separate 368% to 441% range for willingness to engage in violence. (LLM, conf=0.92)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • In the contemporary United States, partisans vastly misperceive outpartisans' antidemocratic attitudes and support for partisan violence.

    “In the contemporary United States, partisans vastly misperceive outpartisans' antidemocratic attitudes and support for partisan violence.”

    From How to study democratic backsliding (2024) · cites this paper as Mernyk et al. (2022)

  • Partisans might represent their adversaries as more obstructionist, more ideologically extreme, more prejudiced against the in-group, or more violent than they actually are.

    “Partisans might also represent their adversaries as more obstructionist95, more ideologically extreme122,151–153, more prejudiced against the in-group55, or more violent154 than they actually are.”

    From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [154]

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 18

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Authors
Mernyk, J. S., Pink, S. L., Druckman, J. N., & Willer, R.
Affiliations
  • Stanford University (US)
  • Northwestern University (US)
Corresponding author
  • Mernyk, Joseph S.
  • Pink, Sophia L.
ORCID
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Publisher
National Academy of Sciences
Published
2022-04-11
Volume
119
Issue
16
Pages
e2116851119-e2116851119
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
DOI
10.1073/pnas.2116851119
PMC
PMC9169855
OpenAlex
W4225906895
Cited by
146
References
9
Citations by year
2026: 21 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 32 · 2023: 42 · 2022: 16 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 1
FWCI
98.81
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Northwestern University
  • Stanford Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
Keywords
metaperception, political violence, partisanship, 2020 US presidential election, political polarization
MeSH terms
Humans, Politics, United States, Violence

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