(Mis)estimating Affective Polarization
Abstract
Affective polarization—the tendency of ordinary partisans to dislike and distrust those from the other party—is a defining feature of contemporary American politics. High levels of out-party animus stem, in part, from misperceptions of the other party’s voters. Specifically, individuals misestimate the ideological extremity and political engagement of typical out-partisans. When partisans are asked about “Democrats” or the “Republican Party,” they bring to mind stereotypes of engaged ideologues and, hence, express contempt for the other party. The reality, however, is that such individuals are the exception rather than the norm. We show that when partisans learn that reality, partisan animus falls sharply; partisans do not have much animus toward the typical member of the other party. Our results suggest antidotes for vitiating affective polarization but also complicate understandings of good citizenship.
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When people evaluate rival parties, they think of those groups' most extreme ideological positions.
“As Druckman et al. (2022) demonstrate, when people evaluate rival parties, they think of those groups' most extreme ideological positions.”
From ¿Demasiado lejos? Cómo la polarización mal percibida alimenta la polarización afectiva en España (2025) · cites this paper as Druckman et al. (2022)
Which party target people are evaluating matters for affective polarization measurement.
“Which one people are evaluating matters (Druckman et al., 2022;Druckman & Levendusky, 2019).”
From Measuring affective polarization: Matching concepts to measures (2026) · cites this paper as Druckman et al., 2022
In the Druckman et al. (2022) experiment, the Moderate condition generated more positive affect toward the other party than the control condition.
“For ideology, we find that the Moderate condition generates more positive affect toward the other party, while the Ideologue condition is not significantly different from the control, suggesting that people envision”
From Measuring affective polarization: Matching concepts to measures (2026) · cites this paper as Druckman et al., 2022
In Druckman et al. (2022), typical (modal) partisans were identified as moderates who occasionally discuss politics.
“In this same study, we identified who”
From Measuring affective polarization: Matching concepts to measures (2026) · cites this paper as Druckman et al., 2022
In the Druckman et al. (2022) experiment, the Ideologue condition was not significantly different from the control condition.
“For ideology, we find that the Moderate condition generates more positive affect toward the other party, while the Ideologue condition is not significantly different from the control, suggesting that people envision”
From Measuring affective polarization: Matching concepts to measures (2026) · cites this paper as Druckman et al., 2022
More recent attempts to reduce intergroup hostility-and affective polarization-include correcting myths and misperceptions about a rival group.
“More recent attempts to reduce intergroup hostility-and, in particular, affective polarization-include correcting myths and misperceptions about a rival group (Druckman et al., 2022).”
From Measuring affective polarization: Matching concepts to measures (2026) · cites this paper as Druckman et al., 2022
The analysis in Druckman et al. (2022) suggests that people assume out-partisans talk about politics more frequently than in-partisans, which explains the difference between the effects on out- and in-party supporters.
“The analysis in Druckman et al. (2022) suggests the reason for this difference between the effects on out-and in-party supporters is that people assume out-partisans talk about politics more frequently than in-partisans.”
From Measuring affective polarization: Matching concepts to measures (2026) · cites this paper as Druckman et al. (2022)
Many people are amenable to having their misperceptions of the other side corrected, which lowers affective polarization.
“Many people, it seems, are amenable to having their misperceptions of the other side corrected, which lowers affective polarization150,153,154.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [153]
Partisans might represent their adversaries as more obstructionist, more ideologically extreme, more prejudiced against the in-group, or more violent than they actually are.
“Partisans might also represent their adversaries as more obstructionist95, more ideologically extreme122,151–153, more prejudiced against the in-group55, or more violent154 than they actually are.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [153]
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“Affective polarization refers to the tendency of partisans to like members of their own party and dislike those from the opposition (Iyengar et al. 2012).”
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Self-citation
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Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts
Jost, J. T., Baldassarri, D. S., & Druckman, J. N. (2022) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-022-00093-5 · Cited by 276 · see citing works
Self-citationHow to study democratic backsliding
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Self-citationAffective Polarization Did Not Increase During the Coronavirus Pandemic
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Self-citationCombs, A., Tierney, G., Guay, B., Merhout, F., Bail, C. A., Hillygus, D. S., & Volfovsky, A. (2022) · doi:10.31235/osf.io/cwgu5 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Wojcieszak et al No Polarization from Partisan News IJPP Forthcoming
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Measuring affective polarization: Matching concepts to measures
Druckman, J. N., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M., & Ryan, J. B. (2026) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.70152 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Self-citation¿Demasiado lejos? Cómo la polarización mal percibida alimenta la polarización afectiva en España
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- Authors
- Druckman, J. N., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M., & Ryan, J. B.
- Affiliations
- Northwestern University (US)
- University of Arizona (US)
- Stony Brook University (US)
- University of Pennsylvania (US)
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2022-04-01
- Volume
- 84
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 1106-1117
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W3172615132
- Cited by
- 243
- References
- 10
- Citations by year
- 2026: 59 · 2025: 65 · 2024: 44 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 32 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 1
- FWCI
- 98.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Journal of Politics (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Keywords
- affective polarization, stereotypes, ideological extremity, political participation, partisanship, good citizenship, American politics
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