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Cited by 1Electoral Systems and Political ParticipationSocial and Intergroup PsychologyMedia Influence and Politics

Measuring affective polarization: Matching concepts to measures

Open access
Druckman, James N., Klar, Samara, Krupnikov, Yanna, Levendusky, Matthew, Ryan, John Barry·2026·Political Psychology
DOI 10.1111/pops.70152
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Abstract

Affective polarization is the extent to which partisans like their own party relative to their dislike of opposing parties. High levels of affective polarization in the United States and many other countries have prompted widespread scholarly interest and practical concern. Yet, despite nearly 15 years of scholarship, significant uncertainty remains about how best to measure affective polarization. We offer a comprehensive review focused on the measurement of affective polarization, underscoring how seemingly innocuous choices can yield substantially different results. These include the target of evaluation (e.g., engaged ideologues, ordinary voters), the dimensions of evaluation (e.g., liking/disliking, moralization), the measurement context (e.g., whether respondents are interviewed by an interviewer or complete surveys independently) and the political context (e.g., the power relationship between parties). We conclude that the next generation of inquiry will need to more carefully align measures of affective polarization with specific research questions.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/pops.70152

Cites

166 of 166 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

39 of 139 cited sources checked · 26 supported · 2 flagged · accuracy not yet measured

  • Premisecitation

    Campos and Federico (2026) do not find systematic partisan variation in the connection between political sectarianism and support for elite anti-democratic actions or political violence.

    “Campos and Federico (2026, p. 16) do not find systematic partisan variation in the connection between political sectarianism and support for elite anti-democratic actions or political violence.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Campos and Federico (2026) source

      The Results report that associations between the affective polarization scale and anti-democratic attitudes were generally similar across parties, with exceptions. But the political-violence Results explicitly report stronger associations among Republicans than Democrats for the full scale and some subscales. Thus the paper makes a contrary finding for the violence part of the claim. (LLM, conf=0.88)

      Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Premisecitation

    While there is some work on how electoral outcomes impact affective polarization, it does not explicitly or fully interrogate the role of power.

    “While there is some work on how electoral outcomes impact affective polarization (e.g., Andrews & Huang, 2025;Gidron & Sheffer, 2024;Hamrak, 2025;Phillips & Warner, 2026), it does not explicitly or fully interrogate the role of power.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Andrews & Huang, 2025 source
    • cites Gidron & Sheffer, 2024 source

      The Theoretical expectations section confirms that the paper studies how electoral outcomes affect partisan feelings. Contrary to the claim that this work does not explicitly interrogate power, the paper identifies power sharing through co-governing as a distinct pathway, and its Results: Co-governance section tests how governing status relates to changes in partisan affect. Our copy does not establish whether it addresses every broader meaning of power. (LLM, conf=0.86)

      Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites Hamrak, 2025 source
  • Premisecitation

    When asked to rate 'the Republican Party' and 'the Democratic Party' on feeling thermometers, respondents need to conjure an image of the typical member of the group they are rating.

    “When asked to rate”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Dafoe et al., 2018 source

      The Formal Exposition (section 2; page unavailable) says survey respondents consider scenarios evoked in their minds, and section 7.1 says they may infer unspecified background features. That supports the general idea that respondents fill in details, but the paper does not address feeling-thermometer ratings of political parties or say respondents picture a typical party member. (LLM, conf=0.76)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Premisecitation

    Bailey (2021) randomly assigned UK subjects to a political or apolitical survey and found that Conservative Party backers gave more positive assessments of the economy in the political survey.

    “For instance, Bailey (2021) randomly assigned UK subjects to take either a political or an apolitical survey and then asked them about their perceptions of the economy.Those who backed the ruling Conservative Party gave more positive assessments of the economy in the political survey-the political survey cued them that they should view the economy through a partisan lens.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Bailey (2021) source
  • Premisecitation

    Moralization was in some cases associated with stronger support for democratic principles.

    “Surprisingly, moralization was in some cases associated with stronger support for democratic principles.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Campos and Federico (2026) source
  • May combine two claims. 79
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 72
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Political sectarianism better captures strong feelings that lead partisans to sacrifice democratic norms, while affective polarization captures milder forms of affect influencing social relationships.

    “The former does a better job enveloping strong feelings that lead partisans to sacrifice democratic norms such as checks and balances or obeying unfavorable court rulings.11 The latter captures milder forms of affect that influence social relationships, such as willingness to work with members of the other party (e.g., Broockman et al., 2023;Lelkes & Westwood, 2017) and cue-taking in terms of”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Broockman et al., 2023 source
    • cites Lelkes & Westwood, 2017 source
    • cites Druckman et al., 2024 source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Scholars have demonstrated partisan discrimination on dating websites, family dinners, roommate selection, spousal selection, job hiring, and pay for work.

    “In other behavioral approaches, scholars have demonstrated discrimination on dating websites (Huber & Malhotra, 2017), family dinners (Chen & Rohla, 2018), roommate selection (Shafranek, 2021), spousal selection (Iyengar et al., 2018), job hiring (Gift & Gift, 2015), and pay for work (McConnell et al., 2018).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Huber & Malhotra, 2017 source
    • cites Chen & Rohla, 2018 source
    • cites Shafranek, 2021 source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Campos and Federico (2026) derived their own sectarianism measures but analyzed the three elements separately.

    “Campos and Federico (2026) derived their own sectarianism measures but analyzed the three elements of sectarianism separately.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Campos and Federico (2026) source

      The Abstract says Campos and Federico derived a three-part measure and analyzed its subdimensions; the ‘Studies 2, 3 and 4’ section confirms that they modeled the three components as separate, correlated factors. But ‘An Updated and Expanded Model of Affective Polarization’ explicitly calls their instrument a measure of affective polarization, not a sectarianism measure, because it modifies the sectarianism model on which it draws. (LLM, conf=0.85)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Campos and Federico (2026) found a correlation between sectarianism and anti-democratic attitudes, with aversion driving the relationship.

    “And, Campos and Federico (2026) similarly found a correlation between sectarianism and anti-democratic attitudes, with aversion being the element of sectarianism driving the relationship.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Campos and Federico (2026) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Republicans share more fake news than Democrats.

    “They also find that Republicans share more fake news than Democrats.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Osmundsen et al. (2021) source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The benefit of the likes/dislikes measure is that it has been included in large surveys, offering both longitudinal and cross-national data.

    “Parallel to the use of the thermometer scale in American studies, the benefit of the likes/dislikes measure is that it has been included in large surveys, offering both longitudinal (Wagner, 2024) and crossnational data (Röllicke, 2023).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Wagner, 2024

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Röllicke, 2023 source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation

    Democrats might exhibit higher levels of social distance because they perceive many Republicans come from historically higher status groups (e.g., white men) that threaten historically disadvantaged groups (e.g., minorities).

    “We (implicitly) pointed to this in our earlier discussion of social distancing: Democrats might exhibit higher levels of social distance (e.g., have fewer friends from the other party) because they perceive many Republicans come from historically higher status groups (e.g., white men) that threaten historically disadvantaged groups (e.g., minorities) (Nair et al., 2026).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Nair et al., 2026 source

      The Discussion reports greater social-context dislike of Republicans among Democrats and links it to Democrats’ perception that Republicans may harm disadvantaged people, particularly ethnic and racial minorities. The cited paper does not establish the further explanation that Democrats see many Republicans as members of historically higher-status groups, such as white men. (LLM, conf=0.88)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Several nations are even more polarized than the United States, although the United States seems to have had the sharpest recent increase.

    “This research finds that several nations are even more polarized than the United States (Gidron et al., 2020), although the United States seems to have had the sharpest recent increase (Boxell et al., 2024;Gidron et al., 2020).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Gidron et al., 2020 source
    • cites Boxell et al., 2024 source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Multiparty systems may lead to divisions that are much more salient than those within a single party.

    “It is possible that multiparty systems may lead to divisions that are much more salient than those within a single party (Bantel, 2023;Comellas & Torcal, 2023).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Bantel, 2023 source
    • cites Comellas & Torcal, 2023 source

      The Conclusions (pp. 9–10) describe voters in multiparty systems dividing into opposing affective blocs. The paper does not compare those divisions with divisions within a single party or establish that they are more salient. (LLM, conf=0.84)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Focal issues and politicians can serve as key political dividing lines.

    “Focal issues-like, for example, Brexit in the United Kingdom (e.g., Hobolt et al., 2021) or vaccination status (Filsinger & Freitag, 2024;Wagner & Eberl, 2025)-can serve as key political dividing lines; so too can politicians-like, for example, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil (Areal, 2022).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim3 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Hobolt et al., 2021 source
    • cites Filsinger & Freitag, 2024 source
    • cites Wagner & Eberl, 2025 source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Until recently, cross-national studies were more likely to rely on the likes/dislikes measure, while social distance and trait measures were more likely to be included in single-country studies.

    “Until recently, however, data availability has meant that cross-national studies were more likely to rely on the likes/dislikes measure, while social distance and trait measures were more likely to be included in single-country studies (Röllicke, 2023).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Röllicke, 2023 source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The difference between in-party and out-party feeling thermometer ratings in the ANES increased from 20.38° in 1978 to 51.64° in 2024, a 153.34% increase.

    “The difference between the in-party and out-party rating in 1978 was 20.38°.In 2024, it had risen to 51.64°, a 153.34% increase.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Results for each affective polarization measure separately reveal important distinctions between the measures, with social distance items being unique in several ways.

    “In Table 1, we also present the results for each affective polarization measure separately.These results reveal important distinctions between the various measures, with the social distance items being unique in several ways (see also Druckman & Levendusky, 2019).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Druckman & Levendusky, 2019 source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The Rarely Discuss Politics and Occasionally Discuss Politics treatments lead people to feel more positively toward the other party.

    “We see that the Rarely Discuss Politics and Occasionally Discuss Politics treatments lead people to feel more positively.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Re-evaluating the experiment with pure independents included using the absolute difference measure yields treatment effects that are mostly the same, although stronger partisans are more polarized than independents.

    “We also, in the Appendix A, re-evaluate the experiment we described earlier, but we include pure independents, using the absolute difference measure.We find the treatment effects are mostly the same, although stronger partisans are again more polarized than independents.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In the 2024 ANES data, the difference in feeling thermometer ratings is 41.55° in the face-to-face sample and 53.06° in the online sample, an 11.51° (27.73%) increase.

    “The size of this difference is striking; in the 2024 ANES data, for example, the difference in feeling thermometer ratings in the face-to-face sample is 41.55°, but in the online sample, it is 53.06°, or 11.51° more, a 27.73% increase.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The ANES face-to-face and online samples are both drawn using high-quality random selection methods, and therefore should agree on the level of affective polarization in the American public.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The mode gap is notable, with same-party differences being modest and the out-party effect being notably large.

    “The size of this gap is notable, with the same-party differences being rather modest and the out-party effect being notably large.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The ANES face-to-face and online samples are both drawn using high-quality random selection methods, and therefore should agree on the level of affective polarization in the American public.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Online respondents are more extreme generally, but are especially hostile toward the other party.

    “Online respondents are more extreme generally, but are especially hostile toward the other party.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In the ANES, face-to-face respondents tend to give more moderate affective polarization responses than online respondents, who give more extreme ones.

    “We see that indeed those interviewed in the face-to-face mode tend to offer more moderate responses, while those interviewed online offer more extreme ones.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingreasoning

    In 2004, the affective polarization score was 32.86; in 2024, the merged score was 51.64; part of the increase is due to more respondents being online, which leads to higher scores.

    “Consider that in 2004, the affective polarization score was 32.86.In 2024, the score was 51.64 when merged across modes.Yet, in 2004, it was only face-to-face.Thus, part of that increase 20 years later is from the value growing because many of the respondents were online (which leads to higher scores).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The ANES face-to-face and online samples are both drawn using high-quality random selection methods, and therefore should agree on the level of affective polarization in the American public.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The 2024 face-to-face only affective polarization score was 41.55, significantly below the merged score.

    “The 2024 face-to-face only score was 41.55-significantly below the merged score.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The ANES face-to-face and online samples are both drawn using high-quality random selection methods, and therefore should agree on the level of affective polarization in the American public.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The mode difference exists for both in-party and out-party ratings, but is particularly notable in out-party assessments.

    “While this tendency exists for both in-party and out-party ratings, it is particularly notable in out-party assessments.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingnone given

    In the 2024 ANES data, the partisan-only 'typical' affective polarization score is 51.64, while the other two respective scores are 48.82 and 50.44.

    “For instance, in the 2024 ANES data, the partisan-only”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingreasoning

    Adding pure independents slightly lowers affective polarization, as they tend not to feel strongly toward either party.

    “Generally, adding pure independents slightly lowers affective polarization, as they tend not to feel strongly toward either party.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Mode differences in affective polarization scores were 9 points in both 2016 and 2024, and 4 points in 2012.

    “In both 2016 and 2024, the mode differences in affective polarization scores were 9 points.They were smaller in 2012 (4), which could reflect that the 2012 online sample differed from the subsequent ones (see prior footnote).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In the face-to-face sample, 25% of respondents give the other party the coldest rating, compared to 38% in the online sample.

    “In the face-to-face sample, 25% of respondents give the other party the coldest rating, but that jumps to 38% in the online sample.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The overall response rate for the ANES non-response follow-up survey was 56.6%, with an 83.3% response rate among ANES respondents versus 33.5% among initial non-respondents.

    “To illustrate the challenge of contacting non-respondents, the overall response rate for the survey was 56.6%, with an 83.3% response rate among ANES respondents versus only a 33.5% response rate among the ANES initial non-respondents.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The results are robust across parties and consistent with findings on partisan symmetry.

    “Notably, although not shown, these results are robust across parties and consistent with our findings on partisan symmetry.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    58% of respondents in Democratic states perceive the Democratic party to hold more power; 21% believe they hold equal power, and just 21% perceive the Republicans as holding more power.

    “These perceptions are remarkably accurate: 58% of respondents in Democratic states perceive the Democratic party to hold more power; 21% believe they hold equal power, and just 21% perceive the Republicans as holding more power.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Among those in Republican-controlled states, 66% recognize that the Republicans hold more power; 18% see the parties as equally powerful, and just 15% believe the Democrats hold more power.

    “Among those in Republican-controlled states, 66% recognize that the Republicans hold more power; 18% see the parties as equally powerful, and just 15% believe the Democrats hold more power.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Democrats were most likely to say the Democratic Party holds power in the country, but only 27% expressed this view; more than twice as many said Republicans are in control.

    “Democrats were most likely to say the Democratic Party holds power in the country, but only 27% expressed this view; more than twice as many said Republicans are in control.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Overall, 470 respondents live in states where their preferred party is in control; 370 respondents do not.

    “Overall, 470 respondents live in states where their preferred party is in control; 370 respondents do not.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingnone given

    In 2019, the partisan difference on the social distance measure was .08 whereas the differences on the other measures were .02 to .04.

    “In 2019, the partisan difference on the social distance measure was .08 whereas the differences on the other measures were .02 to .04.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Out-party power in a like-minded state has no association with out-party affect; the main effect and interactive effect cancel one another out.

    “Out-party power in a like-minded state has no association with out-party affect-the main effect and interactive effect cancel one another out.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingnone given

    In 2021, the partisan difference on the social distance measure was .08 whereas the differences on the other measures were .01 to .04.

    “In 2021, the partisan difference on the social distance measure was .08 whereas the differences on the other measures were .01 to .04.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    58% of Democrats, 42% of independents, and 78% of Republicans felt that the balance of power tips toward Republicans.

    “58% of Democrats, 42% of independents, and 78% of Republicans felt that the balance of power tips toward Republicans.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Findingnone given

    Independents are typically less affectively polarized than partisans.

    “yet one could include independents, which would lead to a distinct characterization of a political system since independents are typically less affectively polarized.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Findingnone given

    Power and perceptions of power condition affective polarization.

    “We detailed how power and perceptions of power condition affective polarization.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    On the 0 to 1 scale, the estimated unconditional polarization scores in the Discuss Rarely and Moderate treatments are .25 for strong partisans and .10 for pure independents.

    “On the 0 to 1 scale, the estimated polarization score for strong partisans in the Discuss Rarely and Moderate treatments-that is, the unconditional polarization scores-are .25 for strong partisans and .10 for pure independents.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data

    The actual average Democratic rating of Republicans on the feeling thermometer scale is approximately 20°.

    “The open circle shows the actual average Democratic rating of Republicans on the feeling thermometer scale-approximately 20°.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Identifying with a party produces positive attachment to one's own in-group and can generate negative sentiment toward the out-group.

    “As such, identifying with a party not only produces positive attachment to one's own in-group (their own party) but can also generate negative sentiment toward the out-group (the other party or parties).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    Since 1978, the ANES has asked respondents to rate the Democratic and Republican Parties on a 0-100 feeling thermometer, allowing researchers to track affective polarization over almost 50 years.

    “Since 1978, the ANES has asked respondents to rate the Democratic Party and the Republican Party on this 0-100 scale, giving researchers the ability to track affective polarization over almost 50 years.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The social distance items may bring clearer examples to mind from everyday social life, indicating that question wording influences findings.

    “This may be because the social distance items bring clearer examples to mind from everyday social life, another reminder that question wording influences what we find.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Measurement choices about affective polarization reflect decisions about the underlying construct and affect the conclusions scholars reach.

    “We explain how this and other measures of affective polarization, as with any measure, reflect a set of crucial decisions about the underlying construct.These decisions, in turn, affect the conclusions scholars reach.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    When asked about a child marrying someone from the opposing party, few people likely imagine an elected official, but many may envision a political activist or engaged partisan.

    “When asked how happy or unhappy they would be if their child married someone from the opposing political party, few people likely imagine their child will marry an elected official from the other party, but many may envision their child marrying a political activist or an engaged partisan.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    When asked to evaluate other partisans generally, respondents like this person less than one who talks about politics rarely or occasionally, but more than someone who talks about politics frequently.

    “This means that when asked to evaluate other partisans generally (”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    The most common approach to measuring affective polarization is the difference between a respondent's rating of their own party and their rating of the other party, although some focus strictly on the other-party rating.

    “The most common approach is to take the difference between the respondent's rating of their own party (e.g., the Democratic Party for Democrats) and their rating of the other party (e.g., the Republican Party for Democrats), although some focus strictly on the other party rating.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data

    Relative to other measures, social distance items lead people to imagine someone who talks about politics less (rarely to occasionally) and who is not as extreme.

    “Relative to the other measures, people seem to be imagining someone who talks about politics less (e.g., rarely to occasionally) and who is not as extreme.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Which party target people are evaluating matters for affective polarization measurement.

    “Which one people are evaluating matters (Druckman et al., 2022;Druckman & Levendusky, 2019).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Druckman et al., 2022 source
    • cites Druckman & Levendusky, 2019 source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Conceptualizing affective polarization requires considering at least five interrelated core components.

    “A deeper examination, however, reveals that conceptualizing affective polarization means considering at least five interrelated core components:”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisenone given

    Pure independents are typically excluded from measures of affective polarization.

    “Pure independents are typically excluded, a point we discuss further below.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    When asked to rate the parties on feeling thermometers, respondents tend to think more about party elites than of typical voters, although differences in ratings of voters vs. elites are not large.

    “Druckman and Levendusky (2019) suggest that when asked this question, respondents tend to think more about party elites than of typical voters, although the differences in ratings of the two groups (voters vs. elites) are not large.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Druckman and Levendusky (2019) source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Finkel et al. (2023) developed items tapping all three dimensions of political sectarianism but found that their items load onto one dimension.

    “Finkel et al. (2023) developed a set of items tapping all three dimensions but found that their items load onto one dimension.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Finkel et al. (2023)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Just how much partisan discrimination occurs generally is difficult to estimate, especially because people often put politics aside to maintain social relationships.

    “Just how much partisan discrimination occurs generally is difficult to estimate, especially given that people will often put politics aside to maintain their social relationships (Carlson & Settle, 2022;Cowan & Baldassarri, 2018).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Carlson & Settle, 2022 source
    • cites Cowan & Baldassarri, 2018 source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Aversion is stronger than social distance measures because aversion implies complete avoidance while social distance implies discomfort with a social interaction.

    “For instance, aversion is stronger than social distance measures, as the former implies complete avoidance, while the latter simply implies discomfort with a social interaction.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The former tends to have predictable social consequences, while the latter seems to affect beliefs about established political principles.

    “The former tends to have predictable social consequences, while the latter seems to affect beliefs about established political principles.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    All three elements of political sectarianism capture relatively severe evaluations.

    “All three elements capture what could be considered relatively severe evaluations.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationnone given

    Someone with high affective polarization may or may not treat an out-party person with fairness and kindness in day-to-day life.

    “This is useful since someone with high affective polarization, when faced with a person in day-to-day life, may or may not treat them with fairness and kindness.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Political surveys such as the ANES may prime people with highly partisan content, biasing how they think about the other party.

    “An obvious concern is that political surveys, such as the ANES, prime people with highly partisan content, which then biases how they think about the other party (Zaller, 1992).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Zaller, 1992 source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Political sectarianism and affective polarization are highly related but distinct constructs.

    “Political sectarianism and affective polarization thus appear to be highly related but distinct constructs (also see Bankert, 2024 on negative partisanship).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Bankert, 2024 source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Political sectarianism includes three elements: othering, aversion, and moralization.

    “Political sectarianism includes three specific elements: (1) othering, (2) aversion, and (3) moralization.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Finkel et al., 2020 source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    There was still a large increase in affective polarization over time, but an accurate portrait requires keeping the mode constant.

    “Clearly, there was still a large increase in affective polarization over time, but an accurate portrait requires keeping the mode constant.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The ANES face-to-face and online samples are both drawn using high-quality random selection methods, and therefore should agree on the level of affective polarization in the American public.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Tyler and Iyengar (2024) show no support for the political priming hypothesis: GSS respondents who answered few political questions were no less polarized than ANES respondents who answered many political questions.

    “Relying on the GSS respondents who completed the ANES items, Tyler and Iyengar (2024) show no support for the political priming hypothesis.The GSS respondents, who answered very few political questions before answering the affective polarization battery, were no less polarized than the ANES respondents who had responded to numerous questions about politics.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Tyler and Iyengar (2024) source
    • Rests on an assumption: The GSS is a high-quality social science study that is largely apolitical.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Tyler and Iyengar (2024) show that while the ANES overestimates the share of strong partisans relative to the GSS, that too has little effect on the level of affective polarization reported in the ANES.

    “Likewise, Tyler and Iyengar (2024) show that while the ANES overestimates the share of strong partisans relative to the GSS (likely because strong partisans are more interested in taking an hour-long political survey), that too has little effect on the level of affective polarization reported in the ANES.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Tyler and Iyengar (2024) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    The characterization of the group-and what people imagine of the group-matters for measuring affective polarization.

    “First, the characterization of the group-and what people imagine of the group-matters.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    In the field of intergroup conflict, scholars often assume equal status between groups.

    “In the field of intergroup conflict, scholars often assume equal status between groups.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Democrats and Republicans in the mass public are roughly equal in number, and the electorate has become increasingly evenly divided over time.

    “It is indeed the case that Democrats and Republicans in the mass public are roughly equal in number, and the electorate has become increasingly evenly divided over time.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Pew Research Center, 2024

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    If weak partisans who are less affectively polarized systematically did not respond to surveys, then the survey would overstate levels of affective polarization, unless addressed with weighting.

    “For instance, if weak partisans who are less affectively polarized (Abramowitz, 2010;Druckman et al., 2024) systematically did not respond to surveys, then the survey would overstate levels of affective polarization: it would be missing a part of the less polarized population (unless it could be addressed with weighting).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Abramowitz, 2010

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Druckman et al., 2024 source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Mere numerical equality among voters does not necessitate equal status or power between the two parties.

    “Yet mere numerical equality among voters does not necessitate equal status or power between the two parties.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Parties at their core are about people seeking power.

    “This is sensible insofar as parties at their core are about people seeking power (Downs, 1957)”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Downs, 1957

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Within the study of affective polarization, there is scant discussion of status imbalances between the two parties.

    “Within the study of affective polarization, there is scant discussion of status imbalances between the two parties.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Reluctant respondents resemble the respondents who are dropping out of academic studies-they are the people who do not want to take part and require large financial incentives and considerable time and effort to recruit.

    “It is likely that these reluctant respondents resemble the respondents who are dropping out of academic studies-they are the people who do not want to take part and require large financial incentives and considerable time and effort to recruit.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Political engagement could contribute to affective polarization, at least in theory.

    “The more eager respondents do indeed tend to be more politically engaged which, as explained, could contribute to affective polarization, at least in theory (Bilgen et al., 2018).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Bilgen et al., 2018

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The Common Ingroup Identity Model requires equal status, opportunities for personal interaction, co-operative interdependence, and supportive norms.

    “In the case of the Common Ingroup Identity Model, the assumption is, in fact, quite explicit: it requires “equal status, opportunities for personal interaction, co-operative interdependence, and supportive norms” (Gaertner et al., 1993, p. 2).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Gaertner et al., 1993 source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    The contact hypothesis assumes that the status of participants from the two social groups must be equal in the situation in which the contact occurs.

    “Similarly, the related contact hypothesis assumes that “the status of the participants from the two social groups must be equal in the situation in which the contact occurs” (Cook, 1985, p. 453).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Cook, 1985 source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    If non-respondent Trump voters have more (or less) affective polarization than their Republican respondent counterparts, there may be recent asymmetries (with greater Republican polarization) hidden by non-response.

    “If these non-respondent Trump voters have more (or less) affective polarization than their Republican respondent counterparts, there may be recent asymmetries (with greater Republican polarization) hidden by non-response”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Trump voters are less likely to take or complete surveys.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    More recent attempts to reduce intergroup hostility-and affective polarization-include correcting myths and misperceptions about a rival group.

    “More recent attempts to reduce intergroup hostility-and, in particular, affective polarization-include correcting myths and misperceptions about a rival group (Druckman et al., 2022).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Druckman et al., 2022 source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data

    The evidence suggests that it is difficult to explain away the mode gap, though this is not definitive because it would require random assignment to mode.

    “Simply put, while this is not definitive (as it would require random assignment to mode), the evidence suggests that it is difficult to explain away the mode gap.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisereasoning

    There is a deeper lacuna in the measurement of affective polarization, as almost no studies-including our own-address the limitation of power/status.

    “This is perhaps a deeper lacuna in the measurement of affective polarization, as almost no studies-including our own-address this limitation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Hostility between groups can arise based on minimal group distinctions, but shared goals can unite those groups and reduce intergroup animus.

    “Seminal studies on intergroup rivalry, most notably the Robbers Cave experiment (Sherif, 1954), noted that hostility between groups can arise based on minimal group distinctions, but shared goals can unite those groups and reduce intergroup animus.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Sherif, 1954

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Discussions of affective polarization make rare mention of how parties compare in terms of power, status, and control.

    “Discussions of affective polarization, though, make rare mention of how those parties compare in terms of power, status, and control.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    Moniz et al. (2024a) is a large meta-analysis of different sorts of studies, many of them not related to politics.

    “Moniz et al. (2024a) is a large meta-analysis of different sorts of studies, many of them not related to politics.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Moniz et al., 2024a

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Some work on reducing polarization with shared goals and common identities shows promising effects.

    “While some work on reducing polarization with shared goals and common identities shows promising effects (e.g., Huddy & Yair, 2021;Levendusky, 2018a)”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Huddy & Yair, 2021 source
    • cites Levendusky, 2018a

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    To understand feelings about the parties, one needs to consider the contextual power dynamics.

    “and thus to understand feelings about the parties, one needs to consider the contextual power dynamics.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Gaertner et al. (1993) argued that shared identities could have a similar impact by motivating rival groups to broaden their concept of an ingroup to include one another.

    “Decades later, Gaertner et al. (1993) argued that shared identities could have a similar impact by motivating rival groups to broaden their concept of an ingroup to include one another.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Gaertner et al. (1993) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    According to the Pew Research Center, Democrats and Republicans are now almost evenly split.

    “According to the Pew Research Center, Democrats and Republicans are now almost evenly split (Pew Research Center, 2024).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Pew Research Center, 2024

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Premisecitation

    The diversity of party systems means that it may make sense to focus on partisan animosity towards each party separately, so the extent to which their supporters are disliked or not.

    “The diversity of party systems also means that it may make sense to focus on partisan animosity towards each party separately, so the extent to which their supporters are disliked or not.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Wagner (2024)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Political identities and affective evaluations can be based on ideological identities, issue preferences, Brexit stances, or preferences for regional independence.

    “Hence, political identities and affective evaluations can be based on ideological identities, issue preferences, Brexit stances, or preferences for regional independence.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Wagner (2024)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    One consideration is the degree to which the parties view one another as equals.

    “One consideration is the degree to which the parties view one another as equals.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The former result may reflect partisans' frustration with their party holding formal power, accompanied by the perception that the out-party is powerful.

    “The former result may reflect partisans' frustration with their party holding formal power, accompanied by the perception that the out-party is powerful.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    The measure of state control is crude because state legislatures and local officeholders might represent a different party than the governor and senators.

    “This is an admittedly crude measure, as state legislatures and local officeholders might represent a different party than the governor and senators.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    The American case is arguably the most straightforward case for group-centered theories and measures of affective polarization.

    “Indeed, Wagner (2021, p. 1) notes that the American case is”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Wagner (2021, p. 1) source
    • Rests on an assumption: In the American two-party system, identity with one party signals the other party as a clear out-group.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    It is difficult to determine the causal relationship from these results; the perception of out-party power might not cause out-party animosity, and out-party animus might increase the perception of out-party power.

    “It is difficult to determine the causal relationship from these results-the perception of out-party power might not cause out-party animosity; indeed, it is certainly plausible that outparty animus might increase the perception of out-party power.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: At the national level, Republicans control the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, making the U.S. a one-party-dominance setting.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation

    One possible explanation is the rise of identity politics, where conflict over cultural issues such as immigration, race, and abortion has strengthened since 2010.

    “One possible explanation is the rise of identity politics, where: “[s]ince 2010, the political systems of the United States and other advanced democracies have undergone a momentous change… conflict over cultural issues such as immigration, race, and abortion has strengthened” (Bonomi et al., 2021(Bonomi et al., , p. 2371)).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Bonomi et al., 2021 source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Complex party systems mean that Europeans are not faced with two partisan groups of roughly equal size, but with a sometimes dizzying array of unstable and ephemeral parties.

    “Wagner (2024, p. 379) explains: Complex party systems mean that Europeans are not faced with two partisan groups of roughly equal size, but with a sometimes dizzying array of unstable and ephemeral parties.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Wagner (2024, p. 379)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    When competing groups are not on equal footing, this might asymmetrically influence intergroup evaluations.

    “When competing groups are not on equal footing, this might asymmetrically influence intergroup evaluations.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data

    Our data suggest that partisans are in tune with the power imbalance between parties and that those perceptions are related to out-party affect.

    “Our data suggest that partisans are in tune with the power imbalance between parties and that those perceptions are related to out-party affect.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: At the national level, Republicans control the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, making the U.S. a one-party-dominance setting.
    • Rests on an assumption: Across U.S. states, there is greater variation in the balance of power than at the national level.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    It is the latter, second decision point that may introduce the most cross-national variation and measurement complexity.

    “It is the latter, second decision point that may introduce the most cross-national variation and measurement complexity.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In such contexts, affective polarization is best conceived of as either the average dislike of out-party supporters (compared to one's sympathy for the most favored party), or as the overall spread of affect across all partisans.

    “In such contexts, affective polarization is best conceived of as either the average dislike of out-party supporters (compared to one's sympathy for the most favored party), or as the overall spread of affect across all partisans.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Wagner (2024, p. 379)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation

    The result somewhat aligns with Phillips and Warner's (2026) finding that members of the losing party after an election feel less warmth toward their own party.

    “The result somewhat aligns with Phillips and Warner's (2026) finding that members of the losing party after an election feel less warmth toward their own party.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Phillips and Warner's (2026) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Perceptions of power may affect levels of affective polarization.

    “And, as we will later discuss, perceptions of power may affect levels of affective polarization.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    They do not like an out-party with formal and perceived power and do not attribute the perceived power situation, per se, to their own party.

    “Here, they do not like an out-party with formal and perceived power and do not attribute the perceived power situation, per se, to their own party.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisereasoning

    Status is tricky to gauge, given that it varies across domains.

    “Of course, status is tricky to gauge, given that it varies across domains.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    The broader research agenda requires a translation of measurement from the American case to a cross-national perspective.

    “The broader research agenda requires a translation of measurement from the American case to a cross-national perspective-a challenge for affective polarization research.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Affective polarization is not limited to the United States.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Iyengar et al. (2012) found that the difference in social distance between the parties was highly significant (p < .01) and Republicans maintain greater social distance from Democrats.

    “they find “The difference in social distance between the parties was highly significant (p < .01)…Republicans maintain greater social distance from Democrats” (418).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Iyengar et al. (2012) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    If so, the latter result suggests that people hold their own party more accountable in such situations than the out-party.

    “If so, the latter result suggests that people hold their own party more accountable in such situations than the out-party.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The out-group may not be a party but those who are not in the governing coalition.

    “This would mean that the out-group is not a party but, rather, those who are not in the governing coalition.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    How macro-level affective polarization ebbs and flows depends on the distribution of power within a given political entity (e.g., nation).

    “How macro-level affective polarization ebbs and flows depends on the distribution of power within a given political entity (e.g., nation).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The second decision point must address the specific political context of a given country.

    “This second decision point necessarily must address the specific political context of a given country.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Considering measurement in a multi-party context opens new possibilities for advancing research on affective polarization.

    “Although a direct translation has been challenging, considering measurement in a multi-party context opens new possibilities for advancing research on affective polarization.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In the United Kingdom, multiple parties exist, but two have typically been dominant: the Conservatives and Labour.

    “Consider, for example, the United Kingdom, where multiple parties exist, but two have typically been dominant-the Conservatives and Labour (Down & Han, 2024).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Down & Han, 2024 source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    A person's affect toward Labour may carry more consequences for political behavior than their affect for the Green Party, which is unlikely to win control of the government.

    “A person's affect toward Labour may, in theory, carry more consequences for someone's political behavior than their affect for the Green Party, a party that is unlikely to win control of the government (Down & Han, 2024).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Down & Han, 2024 source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The potential importance of camps introduces necessary variation into the measurement of affective polarization cross-nationally and underscores the conceptual challenge of understanding what an affective polarization measure captures in any context.

    “The potential importance of camps not only introduces necessary variation into the measurement of affective polarization cross-nationally, but also underscores the conceptual challenge of understanding what, exactly, an affective polarization measure captures in any context.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    A multi-party system means numerous out-parties: any party with which a person does not identify could be an out-group.

    “At baseline, a multi-party system means numerous out-parties: any party with which a person does not identify could be an out-group.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    In multi-party contexts, question wording remains pivotal, but the context introduces the complication of deciding how to construct a level of affective polarization.

    “First, while just as in the American context, question wording remains pivotal, the multi-party context introduces the complication of deciding how to construct a level of affective polarization.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationcitation

    Considering how people understand the divisions within the political world could be a step toward addressing the psychological reductionism of assuming partisanship is the singular dominant identity.

    “At the very least, considering how people understand the divisions within the political world could be a step toward addressing what Baldassarri (2025) terms the”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Baldassarri, 2025

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisereasoning

    In the United States, the partisan divide is the most salient political divide.

    “Given its origins in the American context, the partisan divide is the most salient political divide.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    New coalitions may form and new dividing lines may emerge within a country, leading to changes in political disagreements and discourse, which is less likely in a rigid two-party context such as the United States.

    “New coalitions may form, and new dividing lines may emerge within a country, which leads to changes in political disagreements and discourse, something less likely to be apparent in a rigid two-party context such as the United States.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Altering any of the measurement decisions would alter the precise metric and its relationship with other variables, even if it may not change the time trend.

    “While these are reasonable decisions and altering any of them may not change the time trend, they would alter the precise metric and its relationship with other variables.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In the United States, affective polarization is a gap between the in-group and the outgroup; this measure implicitly assumes equal weight (size) for both groups.

    “In the United States, affective polarization is a gap between the in-group and the outgroup; this measure implicitly assumes equal weight (size) for both groups (Reiljan, 2020;Wagner, 2021).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Reiljan, 2020 source
    • cites Wagner, 2021 source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    People who do not identify with either Labour or the Conservatives in the United Kingdom nonetheless have strong affectively polarized attitudes about the two dominant parties.

    “Elsewhere, Down and Han (2024) show that people who do not identify with either Labour or the Conservatives in the United Kingdom do, nonetheless, have strong”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Down & Han, 2024 source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    The absolute difference between in- and out-party ratings is lower in the Discuss Frequently treatment because, among partisans, the Discuss Frequently treatment lowers evaluations of both out-party supporters and in-party supporters.

    “The absolute difference between in-and out-party ratings is lower in this treatment because, among partisans, the Discuss Frequently treatment lowers evaluations of both out-party supporters and in-party supporters.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    When the research goal is to describe macro conditions, it matters substantially whether one asks about engaged ideologues or ordinary voters.

    “In the former case it will matter substantially whether one asks about engaged ideologues or ordinary voters.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    The merged score is much closer to the on-line score because the on-line sample is substantially larger than the face-to-face sample.

    “The merged score is much closer to the on-line score because the on-line sample is substantially larger than the face-to-face sample.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Study design and conductnone given

    All figures that use ANES data use sample weights as advised by the relevant codebooks.

    “All figures that use ANES data use sample weights as advised by the relevant codebooks.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    The ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior does not include the 2012 affective polarization scores.

    “Indeed, the ANES itself does not include the 2012 affective polarization scores in its Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior (see the sources & notes section of: https:// elect ionst udies. org/ data-tools/ anes-guide/ anes-guide. html? chart = affec tive_ polar izati on_ parties).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    The related construct of political sectarianism encompasses more severe evaluative dimensions (e.g., aversion), leading to distinct relationships with outcomes such as antidemocratic attitudes.

    “The related construct of political sectarianism encompasses more severe evaluative dimensions (e.g., aversion), leading to distinct relationships with outcomes such as antidemocratic attitudes.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The analysis in Druckman et al. (2022) suggests that people assume out-partisans talk about politics more frequently than in-partisans, which explains the difference between the effects on out- and in-party supporters.

    “The analysis in Druckman et al. (2022) suggests the reason for this difference between the effects on out-and in-party supporters is that people assume out-partisans talk about politics more frequently than in-partisans.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Druckman et al. (2022) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    When the research goal is micro-level prediction, it matters whether one employs classical affective polarization items or the political sectarianism scales, and whether the measure is in a social context with fellow partisans or non-partisan observers.

    “In the latter case, it matters if one employes classical affective polarization items or the political sectarianism scales, as well as whether the measure is in a social context with fellow partisans or non-partisan observers.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductcitation

    The 2012 ANES data were not a fresh probability draw but came from a probability-based internet panel, making it difficult to interpret the impact of mode versus sample.

    “Additionally, the 2012 data were different than subsequent online collections: it was not a fresh probability draw (but rather came from a probability-based internet panel) and thus it is difficult to interpret the impact of mode versus sample (seeValentino et al., 2020).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Valentino et al., 2020 source
130 of 130

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The ANES face-to-face and online samples are both drawn using high-quality random selection methods, and therefore should agree on the level of affective polarization in the American public.

    “Both of them are drawn using high-quality random selection methods, and as such, they should agree on the level of affective polarization in the American public.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The GSS is a high-quality social science study that is largely apolitical.

    “The GSS is a high-quality social science study that is largely apolitical.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Political attentiveness, voter registration, turnout, major-party identification, and having a bachelor's degree tend to increase affective polarization.

    “all of which tend to increase affective polarization”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    At the time of the survey, the Republicans controlled every branch of the federal government.

    “At the time of this survey, the Republicans controlled every branch of the federal government”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Trump voters are less likely to take or complete surveys.

    “Second, as explained, there is evidence that Trump voters are less likely to take or complete surveys.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    At the national level, Republicans control the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, making the U.S. a one-party-dominance setting.

    “Furthermore, we are conducting these analyses in a one-party-dominance setting: at the national level, Republicans control the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, a fact readily apparent to our respondents.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Across U.S. states, there is greater variation in the balance of power than at the national level.

    “Across states, however, there is greater variation in the balance of power.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Affective polarization is not limited to the United States.

    “Affective polarization is, of course, not limited to the United States.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    In the American two-party system, identity with one party signals the other party as a clear out-group.

    “In the American two-party system, identity with one party signals the other party as a clear out-group.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The political process in the U.S. reinforces the division between the two parties, with elections and most political debates centering on the partisan divide.

    “The political process further reinforces this division: elections-as well as most other political debates-center on the partisan divide.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    In the U.S. context, the political system is structured so that most people identify with one party or the other, creating a clear in-group and out-group.

    “In the U.S. context, the political system is structured so that most people identify with one party or the other, creating a clear in-group and out-group.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    A direct translation of measures of affective polarization, as implemented in the United States, into multi-party contexts has been challenging.

    “Although a direct translation has been challenging, considering measurement in a multi-party context opens new possibilities for advancing research on affective polarization.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Question wording remains pivotal in measuring affective polarization.

    “First, while just as in the American context, question wording remains pivotal, the multi-party context introduces the complication of deciding how to construct a level of affective polarization.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Affective polarization is a concept that has had an impact across the social sciences and entered public discourse.

    “Affective polarization is a rare concept that has had an impact across the social sciences and entered public discourse.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Affective polarization shapes social life: people make social and economic decisions based on how they feel about the parties.

    “Affective polarization shapes social life-people make social and economic decisions based on how they feel about the parties.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    In the United States, the typical approach gauges how partisans feel about the two major parties overall and considers the relative gap between them, often without explicit consideration of the social or political context.

    “in the United States, the typical approach gauges how partisans feel about (like/dislike) the two major parties overall and considers the relative gap between them.”
16 of 16

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Two different 2024 survey-mode gaps are reported

    Minor

    The text reports an 11.51° online-versus-face-to-face gap in 2024, but a later note says the 2024 gap was 9 points.

1 of 1

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 14

  1. Abramowitz A. I., 2010, The disappearing center: Engaged citizens, polarization, and American democracy
  2. Baldassarri D., 2025, We are many: A structural critique of partisan identities (and identity politics), Sociologica, 19, 51
  3. Bogardus E. S., 1926, Social distance in the City, Proceedings and Publications of the American Sociological Society, 20, 40
  4. Bougher L., 2017, Issue (dis)agreement and intergroup bias in affective polarization
  5. Brown A., 2020, Nearly half of U.S. adults say dating has gotten harder for Most people in the last 10 years
  6. Busby E., 2018, Not all stereotypes are equal: Consequences of partisan stereotypes on polarization [data set]
  7. Connors E. C., 2022, Examining motivations in interpersonal communication experiments
  8. Cox D. A., 2021, The state of American friendship: Change, challenges, and loss
  9. Green D. P., 2004, Partisan hearts and minds: Political parties and the social identities of voters
  10. Jost J. T., 2021, Left and right: The psychological significance of a political distinction
  11. Key V. O., 1964, Politics, parties & pressure groups
  12. Moniz P., 2024, Replication data for: Generalizing toward nonrespondents: Effect estimates in survey experiments are broadly similar for eager and reluctant participants (version 1.0) [Data set]
  13. Sherif M., 1954, Experimental study of positive and negative intergroup attitudes between experimentally produced groups: Robbers cave study
  14. Tajfel H., 1979, The social psychology of intergroup relations, 33

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Druckman, J. N., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M., & Ryan, J. B.
Affiliations
  • University of Rochester (US)
  • University of Arizona (US)
  • University of Michigan (US)
  • University of Pennsylvania (US)
Corresponding author
Druckman, James N.
ORCID
Venue
Political Psychology
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2026-07-26
Volume
47
Issue
S1
ISSN
  • 0162-895X (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-9221
DOI
10.1111/pops.70152
OpenAlex
W7171356505
Semantic Scholar
da48b68d7cef055919915d6bd5741cfbd50a814c
Cited by
1
References
141
Citations by year
2026: 1
FWCI
21.73
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
Political Psychology (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
Keywords
affective polarization, partisan affect, party identification, moralization, interviewer effects

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