Theories of reasoning and the computational explanation of everyday inference
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Following Marr (1982), any computational account of cognition must satisfy constraints at three explanatory levels: computational, algorithmic, and implementational. This paper focuses on the first two levels and argues that current theories of reasoning cannot provide explanations of everyday defeasible reasoning, at either level. At the algorithmic level, current theories are not computationally tractable: they do not “scale-up” to everyday defeasible inference. In addition, at the computational level, they cannot specify why people behave as they do both on laboratory reasoning tasks and in everyday life (Anderson, 1990). In current theories, logic provides the computational-level theory, where such a theory is evident at all. But logic is not a descriptively adequate computational-level theory for many reasoning tasks. It is argued that better computational-level theories can be developed using a probabilistic framework. This approach is illustrated using Oaksford and Chater's (1994) probabilistic account of Wason's selection task.
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Cites
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Wason, P. C. (1968) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1080/14640746808400161 · Cited by 1,476
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Cited by
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
Metadata
- Authors
- Oaksford, M., & Chater, N.
- Venue
- Thinking & Reasoning
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 1995-04
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 121-152
- ISSN
- 1354-6783 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0708
- OpenAlex
- W2002702852
- Cited by
- 123
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 8.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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