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The Determinants of Board Structure at the Initial Public Offering
Open accessAbstract
This paper describes board size and composition and investigates the role of venture capital in a sample of 1,116 IPO firms. First, venture capital-backed firms have fewer insider and instrumental directors and more independent outsiders. Second, we consider board composition as the outcome of a bargain between the CEO and outside shareholders. Representation of independent outsiders on the board decreases with the power of the CEO - tenure and voting control - and increases with the power of outside investors - venture capital backing and venture firm reputation. Third, within the sample of venture financed firms and also consistent with a bargaining model, the probability that a founder remains as CEO is decreasing in venture firm reputation. Finally, we examine the influence of venture capital backing and board structure on firm outcomes in the ten years after the IPO.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Baker, M., & Gompers, P. A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Law and Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2003-10
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 569-598
- ISSN
- 0022-2186 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5285
- OpenAlex
- W3123137588
- Cited by
- 624
- References
- 54
- FWCI
- 62.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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