The DOI matches its Crossref record; 189 of the 192 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Epistemic Luck
Abstract
One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for; it is an achievement of sorts, and yet luck undermines genuine achievements. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises that tempts us to think that either scepticism is true, and we don’t know very much after all, or else knowledge is compatible with knowledge after all. My claim is that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer inspection of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren’t. We can thus do justice to the intuition that knowledge is compatible with (some forms of) luck without acceding to the sceptical claim that we do not know as much as we think we do. Nevertheless, I also claim that there is a sceptical problem lurking in the background that is related to the problem of epistemic luck, though it is not best thought of in terms of the possession of knowledge.
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“The Safety Requirement S knows that p only if there are no nearby worlds in which (i) she does not have a correct belief as to whether p and (ii) she uses the same method of beliefformation as the one we actually used to determine whether p is true.”
From Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces (2022) · cites this paper as Pritchard 2005
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Metadata
- Authors
- Pritchard, D.
- Affiliations
- University of Stirling (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Pritchard, Duncan
- ORCID
- Pritchard, Duncan
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2005-03-10
- OpenAlex
- W4212874497
- Cited by
- 874
- References
- 192
- Citations by year
- 2026: 57 · 2025: 56 · 2024: 58 · 2023: 37 · 2022: 40 · 2021: 41 · 2020: 66 · 2019: 115 · 2018: 57 · 2017: 32 · 2016: 37 · 2015: 43 · 2014: 41 · 2013: 32 · 2012: 27
- FWCI
- 37.39
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Digital Access to Libraries (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), l'Université de Namur (UNamur) and the Université Saint-Louis (USL-B)) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- epistemic luck, knowledge, luck, skepticism, epistemic justification
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