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Cited by 874Epistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsFeminist Epistemology and Gender StudiesPhilosophical Ethics and Theory

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Epistemic Luck

Pritchard, Duncan·2005
DOI 10.1093/019928038x.001.0001
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Abstract

One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for; it is an achievement of sorts, and yet luck undermines genuine achievements. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises that tempts us to think that either scepticism is true, and we don’t know very much after all, or else knowledge is compatible with knowledge after all. My claim is that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer inspection of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren’t. We can thus do justice to the intuition that knowledge is compatible with (some forms of) luck without acceding to the sceptical claim that we do not know as much as we think we do. Nevertheless, I also claim that there is a sceptical problem lurking in the background that is related to the problem of epistemic luck, though it is not best thought of in terms of the possession of knowledge.

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Citations

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Metadata

Authors
Pritchard, D.
Affiliations
University of Stirling (GB)
Corresponding author
Pritchard, Duncan
ORCID
Pritchard, Duncan
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
Published
2005-03-10
DOI
10.1093/019928038x.001.0001
OpenAlex
W4212874497
Cited by
874
References
192
Citations by year
2026: 57 · 2025: 56 · 2024: 58 · 2023: 37 · 2022: 40 · 2021: 41 · 2020: 66 · 2019: 115 · 2018: 57 · 2017: 32 · 2016: 37 · 2015: 43 · 2014: 41 · 2013: 32 · 2012: 27
FWCI
37.39
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Digital Access to Libraries (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), l'Université de Namur (UNamur) and the Université Saint-Louis (USL-B)) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Keywords
epistemic luck, knowledge, luck, skepticism, epistemic justification

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