Abusing the notion of what-it's-like-ness: A response to Block
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Ned Block argues that the higher order (HO) approach to explaining consciousness is ‘defunct’ because a prominent objection (the ‘misrepresentation objection’) exposes the view as ‘incoherent’. What’s more, a response to this objection that I’ve offered elsewhere (Weisberg 2010) fails because it ‘amounts to abusing the notion of what-it’s-like-ness’ (Block 2011: 427).1 In this response, I wish to plead guilty as charged. Indeed, I will continue herein to abuse Block’s notion of what-it’s-like-ness. After doing so, I will argue that the HO approach accounts for the sense of what-it’s-like-ness that matters in a theory of consciousness. I will also argue that the only incoherence present in the HO theory is that generated by embracing Block’s controversial notion of what-it’s-like-ness, something no theorist of any stripe ought to do. Block is famous for (among other things) having introduced the notion of ‘phenomenal consciousness’ into contemporary philosophy of mind (Block 1995). This term is widely employed in the philosophical literature and it even appears in the empirical literature. But widespread usage has brought about divergent interpretations of the term. We can distinguish a ‘moderate’ and a ‘zealous’ reading of ‘phenomenal consciousness’. On the moderate reading, ‘phenomenal consciousness’ just means ‘experience’. Many people have embraced this sense of the term and use it to roughly pick out conscious experience involving sensory quality (states like conscious visual experiences or conscious pains, for example).2 On the zealous reading, however, phenomenal consciousness is held to be ‘distinct from any cognitive, intentional, or functional property’ (Block 1995: 234). That is, any explanation of phenomenal consciousness in exclusively cognitive, intentional or functional terms will fail to capture, without remainder, what is really distinctive about phenomenal consciousness. Block, of course, is fully clear about embracing the zealous reading; indeed, his initial introduction of the notion is in those terms.
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Citations
Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364 · cited 3×
“Block is famous for (among other things) having introduced the notion of ‘phenomenal consciousness’ into contemporary philosophy of mind (Block 1995).”
BackgroundInfluentialRelative blindsight in normal observers and the neural correlate of visual consciousness
Lau, H. C., & Passingham, R. E. (2006) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0607716103 · Cited by 518 · cited 1×
“See Lau and Passingham 2006: 18765ff: ‘. . . a significantly higher level of subjective awareness . . . was associated with a significant increase in activity in the left mid-dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (mid-DLPFC) (coordinates 46, 48, 14).’ neuro-stimulators.”
BackgroundPurple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness
Byrne, A., & Levine, J. (2002) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/1556435 · Cited by 266
The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct
Block, N. (2011) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anr037 · Cited by 144 · cited 6×
“For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com 1 Unchaperoned references are to Block 2011.”
BackgroundInfluentialWeisberg, J. (2011) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9567-3 · Cited by 83 · cited 3×
“What’s more, a response to this objection that I’ve offered elsewhere (Weisberg 2010) fails because it ‘amounts to abusing the notion of what-it’s-like-ness’ (Block 2011: 427).1 In this response, I wish to plead guilty as charged.”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Cited by
Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness
Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009 · Cited by 869
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367
Consciousness doesn't overflow cognition
Brown, R. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01399 · Cited by 16
“…the conscious experience of subjects by interfering with areas of the brain thought to be involved in higher-order cognition while simultaneously leaving first-order processing unchanged or alternatively to produce conscious experience by directly stimulating the relevant areas (Weisberg, 2011).”
BackgroundAn embarrassment of richnesses: the PFC isn’t the content NCC
Kozuch, B. (2024) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niae017 · Cited by 9
Neuroscience undermines the higher-order theorists' preferred solution to the targetless HOT problem
Kozuch, B. (2026) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2026.2629514
Metadata
- Authors
- Weisberg, J.
- Venue
- Analysis
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-05-16
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 438-443
- ISSN
- 0003-2638 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8284
- OpenAlex
- W2028306007
- Cited by
- 73
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 4.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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