Time consciousness: the missing link in theories of consciousness
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
There are plenty of issues to be solved in order for researchers to agree on a neural model of consciousness. Here we emphasize an often under-represented aspect in the debate: time consciousness. Consciousness and the present moment both extend in time. Experience flows through a succession of moments and progresses from future predictions, to present experiences, to past memories. However, a brief review finds that many dominant theories of consciousness only refer to brief, static, and discrete “functional moments” of time. Very few refer to more extended, dynamic, and continuous time, which is associated with conscious experience (cf. the “experienced moment”). This confusion between short and discrete versus long and continuous is, we argue, one of the core issues in theories of consciousness. Given the lack of work dedicated to time consciousness, its study could test novel predictions of rival theories of consciousness. It may be that different theories of consciousness are compatible/complementary if the different aspects of time are taken into account. Or, if it turns out that no existing theory can fully accommodate time consciousness, then perhaps it has something new to add. Regardless of outcome, the crucial step is to make subjective time a central object of study.
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Cites
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“cal sense of self-hood spanning longer timescales of months, years, and decades (Conway et al. 2004; Bird and Reese 2006), both types of self-awareness are central, if not necessary, to any definition of consciousness as “what it is like to be something” (Nagel 1974).”
A hierarchy of temporal receptive windows in human cortex
Hasson, U., Yang, E., Vallines, I., Heeger, D. J., & Rubin, N. (2008) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.5487-07.2008 · Cited by 874
What is consciousness, and could machines have it?
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Emotional moments across time: a possible neural basis for time perception in the anterior insula
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Cited by
Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T. (2022) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4 · Cited by 880
Negro, N. (2024) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niae012 · Cited by 21
First-person experience cannot rescue causal structure theories from the unfolding argument
Herzog, M. H., Schurger, A., & Doerig, A. (2022) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2021.103261 · Cited by 14
Why does time feel the way it does? Towards a principled account of temporal experience
Comolatti, R., Grasso, M., & Tononi, G. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2412.13198 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Kent, L., & Wittmann, M.
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2021-01-01
- Volume
- 2021
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- niab011-niab011
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3154512742
- Cited by
- 71
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 13.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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