An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science
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Abstract
We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g. philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g. junior/senior faculty and graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, encompassing both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. Further, we show which theories of consciousness are currently considered most promising by respondents and how supposedly different theories cluster together, which dependent measures are considered best to index the presence or absence of consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be the most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings provide us with a snapshot of the current views of researchers in the field and may therefore help prioritize research and theoretical approaches to foster progress.
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## TL;DR
The paper reports a survey of 166 consciousness researchers at ASSC 2018/2019 about definitions, theories, methods, and broader assumptions in consciousness science. It finds substantial disagreement on core concepts, but some common preferences: subjective report is favored as a dependent measure, predictive processing theory is rated most promising, and most respondents endorse machines, animal continuity, and extensive unconscious processing as possible.
## Key findings
- The survey analyzed responses from 166 consciousness researchers; the questionnaire had 22 main questions and was administered between June 2018 and August 2019.
- On definitions, there was no consensus on key issues: 60.6% endorsed phenomenal content beyond cognitive access, 34.5% said consciousness requires higher-order states, 24.2% said response bias is part of conscious experience, and 33.5% endorsed a sharp boundary between unconscious and conscious processing.
- On explanatory claims, 67.5% endorsed an explanatory gap, 67.3% endorsed a complete biophysical explanation of consciousness, and 71.5% endorsed the idea that consciousness evolved because it has an adaptive function.
- On theory and method, Predictive processing theory was rated most promising (61.3% promising), followed by global workspace theory (58.0%) and higher-order theories (53.8%); for measurement, respondents preferred subjective report (“whether the stimulus is seen”) over objective measures, and for neural signatures they most often chose neural integration/complexity measures, late ERP components, and long-range synchrony.
- On broader beliefs, 67.1% thought machines could have consciousness, 89.6% thought Mary learns something new, and most respondents judged consciousness to be a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom; for unconscious processing, a majority believed many functions can occur unconsciously, including some higher-level ones, though working memory (47.9% yes), thinking (31.9% yes), and metacognition (33.8% yes) were more contested.
## Methods
- Design: An online/paper survey of consciousness researchers and philosophers, focused on theoretical foundations, methodological preferences, and core issues in consciousness science.
- Sample/data: 307 total responses were received; the main analysis reported the 166 respondents who attended ASSC 2018/2019 and self-identified as consciousness researchers. The sample was a self-selected convenience sample drawn mainly from ASSC attendees.
- Analysis: The authors calculated frequencies, percentages, means, and standard deviations for Likert items; used Spearman correlations for relationships among responses; used ordinal regression to compare junior vs. senior researchers; and ran a network analysis of theory evaluations using EBICglasso plus a principal component analysis to check clustering.
## Limitations
- The paper explicitly states that the sample was a self-selected convenience sample of ASSC attendees and that it was not formally established to be representative of consciousness scientists and philosophers at large.
- The authors note that the questionnaire was shortened to limit completion time, so some potentially informative questions were omitted; they specifically mention not asking respondents about their commitments to the mind–brain relationship or asking for an explicit working definition of consciousness.
- Evident from the text: the survey mainly targeted ASSC attendees in 2018 and 2019 and thus may overrepresent people already engaged in that conference community; the paper also notes that some questions may have been ambiguous (for example, “explanatory gap” and “promising”).
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9 Valid · 2 Not valid · 12 Not checked · 127 Own results and interpretations
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“conceptual choices and assumptions about the nature of the phenomenon under study have a significant influence on which experiments are conducted and how their outcomes are interpreted (Barrett 2009; Irvine 2013; Francken and Slors 2014; Abend 2017).”
§ An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science > Introduction
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Barrett 2009 matched to “The Future of Psychology: Connecting Mind to Brain” (2009) source
The Conclusions section states that the categories used to investigate mind and behavior influence the questions researchers ask, the experiments they design, and their interpretation of data. This directly supports the paraphrase; page numbers are not supplied in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.94)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Irvine 2013 matched to “Consciousness as a Scientific Concept: A Philosophy of Science Perspective” (2013) source
- Supportedcites Francken and Slors 2014 matched to “From commonsense to science, and back: the use of cognitive concepts in neuroscience” (2014) source
Section 2.2 (p. 4) explains that cognitive concepts are operationalised through experimental tasks, shaping what researchers investigate. Section 4.4 (pp. 9–10) explains that interpreting those operationalisations as concepts such as attention or consciousness changes what conclusions are drawn from an experiment. (LLM, conf=0.89)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Interestingly, ‘Predictive processing theory’ (PPT) was in fact not an elaborate, existing theory in the scientific community of consciousness researchers when we surveyed our respondents (Williford et al. 2018; Hohwy and Seth 2020).”
§ An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science > Results > General questions
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites Williford et al. 2018 matched to “The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood” (2018) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The ‘PCM and the Functional Features—Active Inference and FE Minimization’ section discusses existing predictive-coding, active-inference, and Bayesian-brain approaches, but does not establish whether a theory called ‘Predictive processing theory’ was elaborated or recognized among consciousness researchers when the survey was conducted. I searched for the theory’s name and the claim about its status; the cited paper does not address that survey-time claim. (LLM, conf=0.73)
- Partly supportedcites Hohwy and Seth 2020 matched to “Predictive processing as a systematic basis for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness” (2020) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 4 says predictive processing was not first and foremost a theory of consciousness, and Section 6 describes formulations directed at consciousness as emerging and basic. These passages support the distinction from an established, elaborate consciousness theory, but do not establish its status when the respondents were surveyed. (LLM, conf=0.82)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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- Could not verify
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“As a consequence, by starting off with different conceptualizations of consciousness, researchers may not be investigating the same phenomenon even though the same overarching label is used (‘consciousness’) (Figdor 2013; Irvine 2013; Francken and Slors 2014).”
§ An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science > Discussion
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Figdor 2013 matched to “What is the “cognitive” in cognitive neuroscience?” (2013) source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Irvine 2013 matched to “Consciousness as a Scientific Concept: A Philosophy of Science Perspective” (2013) source
- Supportedcites Francken and Slors 2014 matched to “From commonsense to science, and back: the use of cognitive concepts in neuroscience” (2014) source
The Introduction (p. 3) says that researchers can arrive at incompatible operationalisations of ‘the same’ cognitive concept. The Conclusion (p. 11) specifically identifies consciousness as a broad concept whose experimental operationalisations capture only parts of it. Together, these passages support the claim that studies using the same label may investigate different aspects of consciousness. (LLM, conf=0.92)
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“despite the fact that—at the time the survey was conducted—most varieties of PPT were not first and foremost theories of consciousness (Seth and Tsakiris 2018; Williford et al. 2018; Hohwy and Seth 2020)”
§ An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science > Discussion
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Seth and Tsakiris 2018 matched to “Being a Beast Machine: The Somatic Basis of Selfhood” (2018) source
- Could not verifycites Williford et al. 2018 matched to “The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood” (2018) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Methodology section describes this paper’s Projective Consciousness Model as, above all, a theory of consciousness. Our copy does not assess whether most varieties of PPT were primarily theories of consciousness when the survey was conducted; searches for that broader comparison found no such passage. (LLM, conf=0.72)
- Partly supportedcites Hohwy and Seth 2020 matched to “Predictive processing as a systematic basis for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness” (2020) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 4, “Theories of consciousness” (page unavailable), explicitly says predictive processing is “not first and foremost a theory of consciousness.” It does not assess how many varieties of PPT fit that description or relate the point to when the survey was conducted. (LLM, conf=0.82)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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In the paper
“Interestingly, the senior researchers that we surveyed are more inclined to think of the transition between conscious and unconscious processing as a sharp boundary as compared to our sample of junior researchers, once more demonstrating a lack of consensus (senior: mean: 3.26, SD: 1.76, ‘sharp boundary’ responses: 32.6%; junior: mean: 3.75, SD: 1.67, ‘sharp boundary’ responses: 22.8%; Wald χ2 = 6”
§ An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science > Results > General questions
boostedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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“Re fi ning these theories, which are among the most in fl uential in the fi eld [12,13,35], has driven signi fi cant methodological progress [36].”
From Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems (2026) · cites this paper as [35]
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In the citing paper
“In humans, analogous subjective reports, that is to say reports in which a subject describes their own experiences, are often considered by researchers to be a gold-standard marker of consciousness (Francken et al., 2022;Overgaard and Sorensen, 2004), notwithstanding their susceptibility to error (Schwitzgebel, 2008).”
From Does It Make Sense to Speak of Introspection in Large Language Models? (2025) · cites this paper as Francken et al., 2022
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In the citing paper
“Such advantages may be particularly apt for driving progress in a field such as consciousness science (Corcoran et al., 2023), where there is widespread disagreement about the way consciousness should be operationalised and the kinds of data that are relevant for theory development and critique (Francken et al., 2022; Irvine, 2017; Yaron et al., 2022).”
From Integrated information and predictive processing theories of consciousness: An adversarial collaborative review (2026) · cites this paper as Francken et al., 2022
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- Consistentr(52) = 0.96reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“r(52) = 0.96, p < .001”
- Consistentr(52) = 0.93reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“r(52) = 0.93, p < .001”
- Consistentr(52) = 0.92reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“r(52) = 0.92, p < .001”
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What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?
Chalmers, D. J. (2000) · Neural Correlates of Consciousness · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4928.003.0004 · Cited by 273
Toward a theory of visual consciousness.
Zeki, S., & Bartels, A. (1999) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1006/ccog.1999.0390 · Cited by 271
The “correlates” in neural correlates of consciousness
de Graaf, T. A., Hsieh, P.-J., & Sack, A. T. (2012) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.05.012 · Cited by 268
Yes It Can: On the Functional Abilities of the Human Unconscious
Hassin, R. R. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460684 · Cited by 263 · cited 2×
“…et al. 2021) and the depth and scope of unconscious processes is debated (Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Kunde et al. 2012; van Gaal and Lamme 2012; Hassin 2013; Newell and Shanks 2014; Beauny et al. 2020; Meyen et al. 2021), it seems that at present at least some members of the consciousness…”
BackgroundOn the inter-relatedness of theory and measurement in the study of unconscious processes
REINGOLD, E. M., & MERIKLE, P. M. (1990) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1990.tb00150.x · Cited by 255
Northoff, G., & Lamme, V. (2020) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.07.019 · Cited by 247
Animal consciousness: a synthetic approach
Edelman, D. B., & Seth, A. K. (2009) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2009.05.008 · Cited by 241
Self-citationWorking memory without consciousness
Soto, D., Mäntylä, T., & Silvanto, J. (2011) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2011.09.049 · Cited by 233 · cited 1×
“2019) and unconscious working memory (Soto et al. 2011; Stein et al. 2016; Trübutschek et al. 2017).”
BackgroundMelloni, L., Schwiedrzik, C. M., Müller, N., Rodriguez, E., & Singer, W. (2011) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.4570-10.2011 · Cited by 231
A theory of working memory without consciousness or sustained activity
Trübutschek, D., Marti, S., Ojeda, A., King, J.-R., Mi, Y., Tsodyks, M., & Dehaene, S. (2017) · eLife · doi:10.7554/elife.23871 · Cited by 219
A neural correlate of sensory consciousness in a corvid bird
Nieder, A., Wagener, L., & Rinnert, P. (2020) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.abb1447 · Cited by 218 · cited 3×
“Because consciousness is not considered a uniquely human characteristic, this implies that integrating human and non-human animal studies is important to come to a full understanding of the phenomenon, in line with several recent proposals (Edelman and Seth 2009b; Birch et al. 2020; Nieder et al. 2020).”
BackgroundResultDetecting awareness after severe brain injury
Fernández-Espejo, D., & Owen, A. M. (2013) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn3608 · Cited by 210
Brain Mechanisms Underlying the Brief Maintenance of Seen and Unseen Sensory Information
King, J.-R., Pescetelli, N., & Dehaene, S. (2016) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2016.10.051 · Cited by 206
Shanks, D. R. (2017) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/s13423-016-1170-y · Cited by 201 · cited 2×
“…methodological caveats have been identified over the years in the study of unconscious cognition (Schmidt and Vorberg 2006; Newell and Shanks 2014; Shanks 2017; Meyen et al. 2021; Stein et al. 2021) and the depth and scope of unconscious processes is debated (Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Kunde et…”
BackgroundBifurcation in brain dynamics reveals a signature of conscious processing independent of report
Sergent, C., Corazzol, M., Labouret, G., Stockart, F., Wexler, M., King, J.-R., Meyniel, F., & Pressnitzer, D. (2021) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-021-21393-z · Cited by 200 · cited 1×
“Interestingly, empirical evidence for early versus late signatures is currently hotly debated (compare, for example, Dembski et al. 2021; Sergent et al. 2021).”
BackgroundHard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness
Doerig, A., Schurger, A., & Herzog, M. H. (2021) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588928.2020.1772214 · Cited by 194 · cited 2×
“how it should be operationalized), what would constitute an explanation, and how valid experiments should be designed (Block 1995; Chalmers 1995, 2000; Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Dennett 2001; Lamme 2006; Tononi 2008; Dehaene and Changeux 2011; Doerig et al. 2020; Hohwy and Seth 2020); see Seth and Bayne (2022) for a…”
BackgroundPhilosophers on Philosophy: The 2020 PhilPapers Survey
Bourget, D., & Chalmers, D. J. (2023) · Philosophers' Imprint · doi:10.3998/phimp.2109 · Cited by 194
Roediger, H. L., Dudai, Y., & Fitzpatrick, S. M. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310443.001.0001 · Cited by 187 · cited 1×
“For example, in the field of memory science, it has been recognized that the alignment of cross-disciplinary understanding of key concepts (e.g. learning and retrieval) is critical for a successful science of memory (Roediger et al. 2007).”
Backgroundvan Gaal, S., & Lamme, V. A. F. (2012) · The Neuroscientist · doi:10.1177/1073858411404079 · Cited by 181
What is wrong with the no-report paradigm and how to fix it
Block, N. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2019.10.001 · Cited by 176 · cited 1×
“…the contrast between seen and unseen conditions includes neural processes that correlate with but are not part of the underlying neural mechanism of consciousness because they include—for example—report-related neural activity (for discussion on this issue, see Tsuchiya et al. 2015b; Block 2019).”
BackgroundPredictive processing as a systematic basis for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness
Hohwy, J., & Seth, A. (2020) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.64 · Cited by 170
Self-citationExpectations accelerate entry of visual stimuli into awareness
Pinto, Y., van Gaal, S., de Lange, F. P., Lamme, V. A. F., & Seth, A. K. (2015) · Journal of Vision · doi:10.1167/15.8.13 · Cited by 159 · cited 1×
“2018; Hohwy and Seth 2020), although many studies have been performed examining the relation between predictions and conscious perception and access (e.g. Melloni et al. 2011; Pinto et al. 2015; Stein and Peelen 2015; Meijs et al. 2018, 2019).”
BackgroundSelf-citationPerceptual awareness negativity: a physiological correlate of sensory consciousness
Dembski, C., Koch, C., & Pitts, M. (2021) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2021.05.009 · Cited by 157
Criteria for unconscious cognition: three types of dissociation
Schmidt, T., & Vorberg, D. (2006) · Perception & Psychophysics · doi:10.3758/bf03193692 · Cited by 151 · cited 1×
“Thus, even though several methodological caveats have been identified over the years in the study of unconscious cognition (Schmidt and Vorberg 2006; Newell and Shanks 2014; Shanks 2017; Meyen et al. 2021; Stein et al. 2021) and the depth and scope of unconscious processes is debated (Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Kunde…”
BackgroundA Neurofunctional Theory of Visual Consciousness
PRINZ, J. J. (2000) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1006/ccog.2000.0442 · Cited by 135 · cited 2×
“…0.83, ‘promising’ responses: 16.8%; (Dennett 1991)], ‘attended intermediate level representation theory (AIRT)’ [mean: 3.05, SD: 0.69, ‘promising’ responses: 15.0%; (Prinz 2000)], and ‘microconsciousness theory (MCT)’ [mean: 3.32, SD: 0.86, ‘promising’ responses: 14.4%; (Zeki and Bartels 1999)].”
InfluentialPitts, M. A., Lutsyshyna, L. A., & Hillyard, S. A. (2018) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0348 · Cited by 135
The global workspace needs metacognition
Shea, N., & Frith, C. D. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2019.04.007 · Cited by 130
Dualism persists in the science of mind
Demertzi, A., Liew, C., Ledoux, D., Bruno, M., Sharpe, M., Laureys, S., & Zeman, A. (2009) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2008.04117.x · Cited by 124 · cited 2×
“It has also been shown that taking different positions towards the mind–brain relationship has implications for both scientific practice and clinical work (Demertzi et al. 2009).”
BackgroundResultThe Hard Problem of Consciousness
Chalmers, D. (2017) · The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness · doi:10.1002/9781119132363.ch3 · Cited by 118
(1996) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/s0166-2236(96)20049-9 · Cited by 117 · cited 11×
“Finally, still most respondents believe that separating NCC’s components is necessary for progress (‘NCC necessary’; mean: 2.25, SD: 1.13, ‘yes’ responses: 64.6%).”
BackgroundInfluentialContent-specific expectations enhance stimulus detectability by increasing perceptual sensitivity
Stein, T., & Peelen, M. V. (2015) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000109 · Cited by 115
Cognitive ontologies for neuropsychiatric phenomics research
Bilder, R. M., Sabb, F. W., Parker, D. S., Kalar, D., Chu, W. W., Fox, J., Freimer, N. B., & Poldrack, R. A. (2009) · Cognitive Neuropsychiatry · doi:10.1080/13546800902787180 · Cited by 112 · cited 1×
“As a consequence, empirical findings will not easily build on each other towards a unified understanding, meta-analyses become difficult to perform and interpret, and misunderstanding might occur when communicating scientific findings both inside and outside of the community (Bilder et al. 2009).”
BackgroundOn demonstrating unconscious perception: comment on Draine and Greenwald (1998)
Merikle, P. M., & Reingold, E. M. (1998) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/0096-3445.127.3.304 · Cited by 108 · cited 1×
“…argued in the past that subjective measures of consciousness are more susceptible to criterion shifts and response biases than objective measures striving for zero sensitivity (d′ = 0; Reingold and Merikle 1990; Holender 1992; Merikle and Reingold 1998; Duscherer and Holender 2005; Schmidt 2015).”
BackgroundPerceptual integration without conscious access
Fahrenfort, J. J., van Leeuwen, J., Olivers, C. N. L., & Hogendoorn, H. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1617268114 · Cited by 94
Self-citationConsciousness and cognitive control
Kunde, W., Reuss, H., & Kiesel, A. (2012) · Advances in Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.5709/acp-0097-x · Cited by 85
Consciousness as a Scientific Concept: A Philosophy of Science Perspective
Irvine, E. (2013) · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-5173-6 · Cited by 84 · cited 4×
“4, ‘task’), in line with the wide-ranging conceptual definitions of consciousness, allowing for manipulations targeting multiple, different aspects of consciousness (Hulme et al. 2009; Irvine 2013).”
BackgroundInfluentialSchmidt, T. (2015) · Advances in Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.5709/acp-0169-3 · Cited by 81 · cited 4×
“…tension because the latter approach attempts to exclude prerequisites and consequences of consciousness (e.g. report-related processes), which are often impossible to rule out using subjective measures in combination with post hoc trial sorting (Schmidt 2015; King et al. 2016; Shanks 2017).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood
Williford, K., Bennequin, D., Friston, K., & Rudrauf, D. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02571 · Cited by 78 · cited 12×
“Interestingly, out of all theories, PPT received most positive responses, despite the fact that—at the time the survey was conducted— most varieties of PPT were not first and foremost theories of consciousness (Seth and Tsakiris 2018; Williford et al. 2018; Hohwy and Seth 2020), although many studies have been perform…”
BackgroundInfluentialConsciousness and cognitive control.
Kunde, W., Reuß, H., & Kiesel, A. (2012) · PubMed · doi:10.2478/v10053-008-0097-x · Cited by 70
Dynamic Interactions between Top–Down Expectations and Conscious Awareness
Meijs, E. L., Slagter, H. A., de Lange, F. P., & van Gaal, S. (2018) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.1952-17.2017 · Cited by 64
Self-citationThe human visual system differentially represents subjectively and objectively invisible stimuli
Stein, T., Kaiser, D., Fahrenfort, J. J., & van Gaal, S. (2021) · PLOS Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.3001241 · Cited by 62 · cited 1×
“Thus, even though several methodological caveats have been identified over the years in the study of unconscious cognition (Schmidt and Vorberg 2006; Newell and Shanks 2014; Shanks 2017; Meyen et al. 2021; Stein et al. 2021) and the depth and scope of unconscious processes is debated (Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Kunde…”
BackgroundSelf-citationCan working memory be non-conscious?
Stein, T., Kaiser, D., & Hesselmann, G. (2016) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niv011 · Cited by 61
What’s the Use of Consciousness?
Frith, C., & Metzinger, T. K. (2016) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262034326.003.0012 · Cited by 58
Advancing research on unconscious priming: when can scientists claim an indirect task advantage?
Meyen, S., Zerweck, I. A., Amado, C., von Luxburg, U., & Franz, V. H. (2022) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0001065 · Cited by 57
Identifying neural correlates of visual consciousness with ALE meta-analyses
Bisenius, S., Trapp, S., Neumann, J., & Schroeter, M. L. (2015) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.07.070 · Cited by 54 · cited 1×
“This explication will enable readers to decide whether they share the authors’ definition or not and will facilitate a more meaningful integration of empirical results because it will be clear which experiments study similar ‘kinds’ of consciousness (Bisenius et al. 2015).”
BackgroundThe science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model
Wiese, W. (2020) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niaa013 · Cited by 52 · cited 2×
“…several attempts have been made to look for commonalities between the main theories in the field (Shea and Frith 2019; Northoff and Lamme 2020; Wiese 2020; Seth and Bayne 2022), and our approach of assessing commonalities in the evaluation of theories might be informative for such efforts to…”
BackgroundWhat are neural correlates neural correlates of?
Abend, G. (2017) · BioSocieties · doi:10.1057/s41292-016-0019-y · Cited by 51 · cited 2×
“Despite this progress, it is essential to recognize that conceptual choices and assumptions about the nature of the phenomenon under study have a significant influence on which experiments are conducted and how their outcomes are interpreted (Barrett 2009; Irvine 2013; Francken and Slors 2014; Abend 2017).”
BackgroundConsciousness, Representation, Action: The Importance of Being Goal-Directed
Pennartz, C. M. A. (2018) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2017.10.006 · Cited by 49
Quantum approaches to consciousness
Stapp, H. (2007) · The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511816789.032 · Cited by 49
Dynamics and Hierarchical Encoding of Non-Compact Acoustic Categories in Auditory and Frontal Cortex
Yin, P., Strait, D. L., Radtke‐Schuller, S., Fritz, J. B., & Shamma, S. (2019) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2020.02.047 · Cited by 49
Qualia: The Knowledge Argument
Nida‐Rümelin, M., & Conaill, D. Ó. (2002) · Cited by 46
An Informal Internet Survey on the Current State of Consciousness Science
Michel, M., Fleming, S. M., Lau, H., Lee, A. L. F., Martinez-Conde, S., Passingham, R. E., Peters, M. A. K., Rahnev, D., Sergent, C., & Liu, K. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02134 · Cited by 37 · cited 1×
“2009; Bourget and Chalmers 2014, 2020) and funding and job opportunities in the field of consciousness science (Michel et al. 2018).”
BackgroundFrom commonsense to science, and back: the use of cognitive concepts in neuroscience
Francken, J. C., & Slors, M. (2014) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.08.019 · Cited by 36
Self-citationFrith, C. (2010) · Pragmatics & Cognition · doi:10.1075/pc.18.3.03fri · Cited by 31 · cited 1×
“…and fundamental questions about consciousness, such as whether machines may have it (Dehaene et al. 2017), whether it has an evolutionary advantage (Frith 2010; Frith and Metzinger 2016; Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019), and whether it is presence or absence in other species (Birch et al. 2020; Edelman…”
BackgroundNeural Correlates of Stimulus Reportability
Hulme, O. J., Friston, K. F., & Zeki, S. (2009) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn.2009.21119 · Cited by 27 · cited 1×
“4, ‘task’), in line with the wide-ranging conceptual definitions of consciousness, allowing for manipulations targeting multiple, different aspects of consciousness (Hulme et al. 2009; Irvine 2013).”
BackgroundMeijs, E. L., Mostert, P., Slagter, H. A., de Lange, F. P., & van Gaal, S. (2019) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niz011 · Cited by 25
Self-citationQuantum Approaches to Consciousness
Atmanspacher, H. (2017) · Cited by 25
Unconscious categorization of sub-millisecond complex images
Beauny, A., de Heering, A., Muñoz-Moldes, S., Martin, J., Beir, A. D., & Cleeremans, A. (2020) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0236467 · Cited by 24 · cited 1×
“2021) and the depth and scope of unconscious processes is debated (Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Kunde et al. 2012; van Gaal and Lamme 2012; Hassin 2013; Newell and Shanks 2014; Beauny et al. 2020; Meyen et al. 2021), it seems that at present at least some members of the consciousness research community are convinced of…”
BackgroundA direct replication: Unconscious arithmetic processing
Karpinski, A., Briggs, J. C., & Yale, M. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2390 · Cited by 19
McComas, A. J. (2022) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192868244.003.0032 · Cited by 16
Beliefs About Consciousness and Reality of Participants at ‘Tucson II’
Barušs, I., & Moore, R. J. (1998) · Scholarship@Western (Western University) · Cited by 15
Theories and methods in the scientific study of consciousness
Klink, P. C., Self, M. W., Lamme, V. A. F., & Roelfsema, P. R. (2015) · Advances in consciousness research · doi:10.1075/aicr.92.02kli · Cited by 13
An informal internet survey on the current state of Consciousness SciencePreprint
Michel, M., Fleming, S. M., Lau, H. C., Lee, A., Martínez‐Conde, S., Passingham, R. E., Peters, M. A. K., Rahnev, D., Sergent, C., & Liu, K. (2018) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/gc2x4 · Cited by 12
The Role of Decision Biases in Semantic Priming Effects
Duscherer, K., & Holender, D. (2005) · Swiss Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1024/1421-0185.64.4.249 · Cited by 11 · cited 1×
“2), and it has been argued in the past that subjective measures of consciousness are more susceptible to criterion shifts and response biases than objective measures striving for zero sensitivity (d′ = 0; Reingold and Merikle 1990; Holender 1992; Merikle and Reingold 1998; Duscherer and Holender 2005; Schmidt 2015).”
BackgroundWhat is the “cognitive” in cognitive neuroscience?
Figdor, C. (2013) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-012-9157-5 · Cited by 10 · cited 2×
“As a consequence, by starting off with different conceptualizations of consciousness, researchers may not be investigating the same phenomenon even though the same overarching label is used (‘consciousness’) (Figdor 2013; Irvine 2013; Francken and Slors 2014).”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Block, 1996, How can we find the neural correlate of consciousness?, Trends Neurosci, 19, 456
- Edelman, 2009, Animal consciousness: a synthetic approach, Trends Neurosci, 32, 476, 10.1016/j.tins.2009.05.008 · DOI · Paper page
- Kirk, 2019, Zombies
- Tsuchiya, 2015, No-report paradigms: extracting the true neural correlates of consciousness, Trends Cogn Sci, 19, 757, 10.1016/j.tics.2015.10.002 · DOI · Paper page
Cited by
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Butlin, P., Long, R., Elmoznino, E., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Constant, A., Deane, G., Fleming, S. M., Frith, C., Ji, X., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.08708 · Cited by 196
Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond
Bayne, T., Seth, A. K., Massimini, M., Shepherd, J., Cleeremans, A., Fleming, S. M., Malach, R., Mattingley, J. B., Menon, D. K., Owen, A. M., et al. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.01.010 · Cited by 198
Self-citationMelloni, L., Mudrik, L., Pitts, M., Bendtz, K., Ferrante, O., Gorska, U., Hirschhorn, R., Khalaf, A., Kozma, C., Lepauvre, A., et al. (2023) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0268577 · Cited by 113
Consciousness in the cradle: on the emergence of infant experience
Bayne, T., Frohlich, J., Cusack, R., Moser, J., & Naci, L. (2023) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2023.08.018 · Cited by 106
“This failure of theoretical convergence would not be problematic if the field were moving towards consensus, but that does not appear to be the case [22,23].”
The Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness as Pseudoscience
IIT-Concerned, Fleming, S. M., Frith, C. D., Goodale, M., Lau, H., LeDoux, J. E., Lee, A. L. F., Michel, M., Owen, A. M., Peters, M. A. K., et al. (2023) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/zsr78 · Cited by 81
Metadata
- Authors
- Francken, J. C., Beerendonk, L., Molenaar, D., Fahrenfort, J. J., Kiverstein, J. D., Seth, A. K., & van Gaal, S.
- Affiliations
- Radboud University Nijmegen (NL)
- University of Amsterdam (NL)
- Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (NL)
- Amsterdam UMC Location University of Amsterdam (NL)
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Francken, Jolien C
- van Gaal, Simon
- ORCID
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2022-01-01
- Volume
- 2022
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- niac011-niac011
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC9374479
- OpenAlex
- W4291127700
- Cited by
- 136
- References
- 117
- Citations by year
- 2026: 41 · 2025: 37 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 10
- FWCI
- 87.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Sussex Research Online (University of Sussex) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion)
- VU Research Portal (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (Research Talent Grant 406.17.109)
- Universiteit van Amsterdam (Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Talent Grant)
- European Research Council (ERC Starting Grant 715605)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
- Keywords
- consciousness studies, theory of consciousness, definition of consciousness, artificial consciousness, unconscious processes, consciousness assessment, researcher attitudes
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-01, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-01 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.