The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Political Theory of Populism *
Abstract
When voters fear that politicians may be influenced or corrupted by the rich elite, signals of integrity are valuable. As a consequence, an honest politician seeking reelection chooses “populist” policies—that is, policies to the left of the median voter—as a way of signaling that he is not beholden to the interests of the right. Politicians that are influenced by right-wing special interests respond by choosing moderate or even left-of-center policies. This populist bias of policy is greater when the value of remaining in office is higher for the politician; when there is greater polarization between the policy preferences of the median voter and right-wing special interests; when politicians are perceived as more likely to be corrupt; when there is an intermediate amount of noise in the information that voters receive; when politicians are more forward-looking; and when there is greater uncertainty about the type of the incumbent. We also show that soft term limits may exacerbate, rather than reduce, the populist bias of policies.
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Cited by
The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism
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Metadata
- Authors
- Acemoglu, D., Egorov, G., & Sonin, K.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2013-02-13
- Volume
- 128
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 771-805
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2151541968
- Cited by
- 475
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 23.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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