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The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States
Open accessAbstract
This article offers evidence on the ownership concentration at a representative sample of U.S. public firms. Ninety-six percent of these firms have blockholders; these blockholders in aggregate own an average 39% of the common stock. The ownership of U.S. firms is similar to and by some measures more concentrated than the ownership of firms in other countries. These findings challenge current thinking on a number of issues, ranging from the nature of the agency conflict in domestic corporations to the relationship between ownership concentration and legal protections for investors around the world. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Holderness, C. G.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2007-12-10
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1377-1408
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2120552721
- Cited by
- 656
- References
- 45
- FWCI
- 77.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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