The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentives, Targeting, and Firm Performance: An Analysis of Non-executive Stock Options
Open accessAbstract
We examine whether options granted to non-executive employees affect firm performance. Using new data on option programs, we explore the link between broad-based option programs, option portfolio implied incentives, and firm operating performance, utilizing an instrumental variables approach to identify causal effects. Firms whose employee option portfolios have higher implied incentives exhibit higher subsequent operating performance. Intuitively, the implied incentive-performance relation is concentrated in firms with fewer employees and in firms with higher growth opportunities. Additionally, the effect is concentrated in firms that grant options broadly to non-executive employees, consistent with theories of cooperation and mutual monitoring among co-workers.
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Cites
The pricing of options and corporate liabilities
Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260062 · Cited by 29,074
Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression
Stock, J. H., & Yogo, M. (2005) · Identification and Inference for Econometric Models · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511614491.006 · Cited by 7,211
Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments
Staiger, D., & Stock, J. H. (1997) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171753 · Cited by 7,081
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments
Staiger, D., & Stock, J. (1994) · doi:10.3386/t0151 · Cited by 5,302 · cited 2×
“21 Staiger and Stock (1997) note that having valid instruments that meet the exclusion restriction is not sufficient to ensure consistent two-stage estimators in finite samples.”
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00253 · Cited by 2,913
What Matters in Corporate Governance?
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn099 · Cited by 2,906
Angrist, J. D., & Krueger, A. B. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.4.69 · Cited by 2,355
Cited by
Angrist, J. D., & Krueger, A. B. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.4.69 · Cited by 2,355
Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., & Xie, F. (2012) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.12.003 · Cited by 811
Non-executive employee stock options and corporate innovation
Chang, X., Fu, K., Low, A., & Zhang, W. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.09.002 · Cited by 625
Broad‐Based Employee Stock Ownership: Motives and Outcomes
KIM, E. H., & OUIMET, P. (2014) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12150 · Cited by 307
Labor-Friendly Corporate Practices: Is What is Good for Employees Good for Shareholders?
Faleye, O., & Trahan, E. A. (2011) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-010-0705-9 · Cited by 251
Metadata
- Authors
- Hochberg, Y. V., & Lindsey, L.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2010-10-07
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 4148-4186
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W1985162420
- Cited by
- 244
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 33.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.