Judgment before principle: engagement of the frontoparietal control network in condemning harms of omission
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Ordinary people make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical and legal principles. Do those judgments derive from the controlled application of principles, or do the principles derive from automatic judgments? As a case study, we explore the tendency to judge harmful actions morally worse than harmful omissions (the 'omission effect') using fMRI. Because ordinary people readily and spontaneously articulate this moral distinction it has been suggested that principled reasoning may drive subsequent judgments. If so, people who exhibit the largest omission effect should exhibit the greatest activation in regions associated with controlled cognition. Yet, we observed the opposite relationship: activation in the frontoparietal control network was associated with condemning harmful omissions-that is, with overriding the omission effect. These data suggest that the omission effect arises automatically, without the application of controlled cognition. However, controlled cognition is apparently used to overcome automatic judgment processes in order to condemn harmful omissions.
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Citations
Cites
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“Among the regions preferentially engaged during omission trials was the DLPFC, the region most closely associated with controlled cognition (Miller, 2000).”
BackgroundEvidence for a Frontoparietal Control System Revealed by Intrinsic Functional Connectivity
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Method
Cited by
Action, Outcome, and Value: A Dual-System Framework for Morality
Cushman, F. (2013) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868313495594 · Cited by 473
Self-citationBeyond point-and-shoot morality: why cognitive (neuro)science matters for ethics
Greene, J. D. (2014) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/675875 · Cited by 375
Self-citationShenhav, A., & Greene, J. D. (2014) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.3390-13.2014 · Cited by 254
Self-citationReasoning supports utilitarian resolutions to moral dilemmas across diverse measures.
Patil, I., Zucchelli, M. M., Kool, W., Campbell, S., Fornasier, F., Calò, M., Silani, G., Cikara, M., & Cushman, F. (2021) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/pspp0000281 · Cited by 133
Self-citationTMS affects moral judgment, showing the role of DLPFC and TPJ in cognitive and emotional processing
Jeurissen, D., Sack, A. T., Roebroeck, A., Russ, B. E., & Pascual-Leone, A. (2014) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2014.00018 · Cited by 93
“…(TPJ), among other areas, were found to be involved in moral decision-making (Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Heekeren et al., 2005; Mendez et al., 2005; Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007, 2008; Moll and de Oliveira-Souza, 2007; Young and Koenigs, 2007; Kahane and Shackel, 2008; Prehn et…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Cushman, F., Murray, D., Gordon-McKeon, S., Wharton, S., & Greene, J. D.
- Venue
- Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-11-22
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 888-895
- ISSN
- 1749-5016 (ISSN-L)
- 1749-5024
- OpenAlex
- W2110337457
- Cited by
- 59
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 1.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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