The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 4 of the 29 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
TMS affects moral judgment, showing the role of DLPFC and TPJ in cognitive and emotional processing
Open accessAbstract
Decision-making involves a complex interplay of emotional responses and reasoning processes. In this study, we use TMS to explore the neurobiological substrates of moral decisions in humans. To examining the effects of TMS on the outcome of a moral-decision, we compare the decision outcome of moral-personal and moral-impersonal dilemmas to each other and examine the differential effects of applying TMS over the right DLPFC or right TPJ. In this comparison, we find that the TMS-induced disruption of the DLPFC during the decision process, affects the outcome of the moral-personal judgment, while TMS-induced disruption of TPJ affects only moral-impersonal conditions. In other words, we find a double-dissociation between DLPFC and TPJ in the outcome of a moral decision. Furthermore, we find that TMS-induced disruption of the DLPFC during non-moral, moral-impersonal, and moral-personal decisions lead to lower ratings of regret about the decision. Our results are in line with the dual-process theory and suggest a role for both the emotional response and cognitive reasoning process in moral judgment. Both the emotional and cognitive processes were shown to be involved in the decision outcome.
Overview
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
In a neuronavigated chronometric TMS study, disruption of right DLPFC at 2.5 s after question onset made moral-personal judgments less utilitarian, while disruption of right TPJ at the same time made moral-impersonal judgments less utilitarian, yielding a double dissociation. TMS over DLPFC also reduced regret ratings relative to TPJ, supporting dual-process accounts of moral judgment.
Key findings
- A time-specific double dissociation emerged at 2.5 s: the difference between DLPFC and TPJ stimulation sites was significant for moral-personal vs. moral-impersonal judgments (t = 2.779, p < 0.02), but not at 1.5, 2, or 3 s (all p-values not significant). DLPFC stimulation at 2.5 s increased inappropriate responses in moral-personal dilemmas to around 80%, versus around 60% at other time points; TPJ stimulation at 2.5 s affected moral-impersonal judgments.
- Post-hoc comparisons supported the dissociation: DLPFC moral-personal vs. non-moral at 2.5 s was significant (t = −2.890, p = 0.02), and DLPFC moral-personal vs. moral-impersonal was significant (t = 2.355, p = 0.05). TPJ moral-impersonal vs. non-moral showed a trend (t = 2.159, p = 0.07), and TPJ moral-personal vs. moral-impersonal was not significant (t = −1.486, p = n.s.); the authors note DLPFC results were statistically more reliable than TPJ results.
- Regret ratings were influenced by stimulation site: the main effect of stimulation site was significant (F = 7.390, p < 0.02), with lower regret after right DLPFC stimulation than after right TPJ stimulation. Regret also differed by moral condition (F = 39.960, p < 0.01), highest for moral-personal, lower for moral-impersonal, and lowest for non-moral dilemmas.
- TMS did not affect reaction time (F = 2.549, p = n.s.), confidence (F = 3.406, p = n.s.), responsibility (F = 0.053, p = n.s.), or desire to change the answer (F = 4.062, p = n.s.). Confidence differed by moral condition (F = 41.793, p < 0.01; non-moral average 5.65, moral-impersonal 5.10, moral-personal 4.78).
Methods
- Talairach-based MRI-neuronavigated, event-related chronometric TMS study. A total of 17 healthy right-handed volunteers were enrolled (8 males, 9 females; mean age 23.7 years, range 18–54 years); one participant was excluded from further analysis because of very short reaction times. Stimulation was applied over either right DLPFC or right TPJ as a between-subject factor.
- Within-subject factors were moral condition (non-moral 20 trials, moral-impersonal 19 trials, moral-personal 25 trials; 64 total) and TMS time point (first pulse at 1.5, 2, 2.5, or 3 s after onset of the question). Three TMS pulses were spaced 150 ms apart at 70% machine output.
- For response analysis, a personal-minus-impersonal difference score was calculated for each brain area and time point, with t-tests per time condition. Reaction times and evaluation ratings were collapsed over time conditions and analyzed with repeated-measures ANOVA, followed by paired-samples t-tests for significant effects.
Limitations
- Stated: the study is somewhat limited in statistical power because of the chronometric design with many levels of tested variables; the number of participants is relatively small, and larger, more diverse samples are needed to increase generalizability. The frontal TMS target did not exactly overlap with the frontal coordinates reported by Greene et al., so several frontal subregions may be involved in moral decision-making.
- Stated/evident: the authors report that DLPFC effects were statistically more reliable than TPJ effects, and the TPJ time-point comparison was less clear, with some comparisons non-significant or only trend-level (e.g., TPJ moral-impersonal vs. non-moral p = 0.07).
- Evident: one enrolled participant was excluded for very short reaction times, and the between-subject stimulation design with a small sample limits per-site power.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
4 of 29 cited sources checked · 2 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
The DLPFC and TPJ are involved in moral decision-making.
“the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and temporal-parietal junction (TPJ), among other areas, were found to be involved in moral decision-making”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked- cites Greene et al., 2001, 2004
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Heekeren et al., 2005
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Mendez et al., 2005 source
The Discussion (page not specified) links dorsolateral frontal regions to impersonal moral judgment and includes the dorsolateral frontal cortex in a broader network relevant to moral behavior. It does not identify the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) as part of that network, so the TPJ portion of the claim is unsupported by this paper. (LLM, conf=0.88)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
When the right TPJ is disrupted by magnetic stimulation, the role of beliefs in moral judgments is reduced.
“Young et al. (2010) have shown that when the right TPJ is disrupted by magnetic stimulation, the role of beliefs in moral judgments is reduced.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Young et al., 2010 source
- Findingown data
For the TPJ, in impersonal dilemmas, the decision outcome at TMS time 2.5 s differs significantly from 2 s.
“The comparison of the 2.5 time point against the 2 and 3 s time point is significant (t = −2.982, p = 0.02) and close to significant (t = −2.283, p = 0.06), respectively.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
For the DLPFC, in personal dilemmas, the difference between TMS time 2.5 s and 2 s is not significant.
“The difference between time point 2.5 and 2 is less pronounced (t = −1.810, p = n.s.).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
There was a main effect of stimulation site on regret ratings.
“The main effect of stimulation site was significant (F = 7.390, p < 0.02)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Findingown data
There were no time-specific effects of TMS on reaction time and evaluation of the decision.
“Because there were no time specific effects of TMS on the RT and evaluation of the decision, the data was collapsed over the four different time conditions for each moral condition”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: TMS over the right DLPFC and right TPJ disrupts neural activity in those regions.
- Findingown data
There was no effect of TMS on confidence ratings.
“There was no effect of TMS on the confidence rating (F = 3.406, p = n.s.).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The effect of moral condition on wish to change judgment is caused by higher ratings in moral-personal (average 1.50) and moral-impersonal (1.40) dilemmas compared to non-moral dilemmas (1.17).
“The paired samples t-test was used for post-hoc comparisons to show that this effect is caused by higher ratings in the moral-personal (average rating of 1.50) and moral-impersonal dilemmas (average rating of 1.40) compared to the non-moral dilemmas (average rating of 1.17) (impersonal vs. personal: t = −1.747, p = n.s.; impersonal vs. non-moral: t = 3.927, p < 0.01; personal vs. non-moral: t = 5.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
All three moral conditions differed significantly from each other in regret ratings.
“post-hoc paired samples t-test comparisons show that all three moral conditions differ significantly from each other (impersonal vs. personal: t = −3.832, p < 0.01; impersonal vs. non-moral: t = 6.278, p < 0.01; personal vs. non-moral: t = 7.001, p < 0.01).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
There was no effect of moral condition on responsibility ratings.
“There were no differences between conditions: no effect of TMS (F = 0.053, p = n.s.) and no effect of moral condition (F = 0.754, p = n.s.).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
There was no effect of TMS on responsibility ratings.
“There were no differences between conditions: no effect of TMS (F = 0.053, p = n.s.) and no effect of moral condition (F = 0.754, p = n.s.).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
For the TPJ, in impersonal dilemmas, the comparison of TMS time 2.5 s and 1.5 s is not significant.
“The comparison of the 2.5 and 1.5 is not significant (t = −1.488, p = n.s.)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
At time point 2.5, the difference between moral-personal and moral-impersonal dilemmas is not significant for TPJ (t = −1.486, p = n.s.).
“for the TPJ, this result is not significant (t = −1.486, p = n.s.).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: TMS over the right DLPFC and right TPJ disrupts neural activity in those regions.
- Findingown data
For the DLPFC, in personal dilemmas, the decision outcome at TMS time 2.5 s differs significantly from 1.5 s and 3 s.
“The comparison of time point 2.5 against the 1.5 and 3 s time point is significant (t = −2.890, p = 0.02 for time point 1.5, and t = −2.377, p = 0.05 for time point 3).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
TMS-induced disruption of DLPFC during non-moral, moral-impersonal, and moral-personal decisions leads to lower ratings of regret about the decision.
“Furthermore, we find that TMS-induced disruption of the DLPFC during non-moral, moral-impersonal, and moral-personal decisions lead to lower ratings of regret about the decision.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: TMS over the right DLPFC and right TPJ disrupts neural activity in those regions.
- Findingown data
TMS over TPJ does not affect moral-personal and non-moral judgment.
“Stimulation of the TPJ does not affect the moral-personal and non-moral judgment (horizontal, parallel lines)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: TMS over the right DLPFC and right TPJ disrupts neural activity in those regions.
- Findingown data
Stimulation of the right DLPFC and right TPJ does not influence reaction time or response in the control task (non-moral judgment) in a time-specific or time-unspecific manner.
“Stimulation of the right DLPFC and right TPJ does not influence the reaction time or response in the control task (non-moral judgment) in a time-specific or time-unspecific manner.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
When stimulating the right TPJ 2.5 s after onset of the question, the decision outcome in the moral-impersonal condition becomes less utilitarian.
“When stimulating the right TPJ 2.5 s after onset of the question, the decision outcome in the moral-impersonal condition becomes less utilitarian (see Figure 3B).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
TMS did not exert an effect on reaction time (F = 2.549, p = n.s.).
“TMS did not exert an effect on reaction time (F = 2.549, p = n.s.).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: TMS over the right DLPFC and right TPJ disrupts neural activity in those regions.
- Findingown data
There was no effect of TMS on the wish to change judgment.
“There is no effect of TMS (F = 4.062, p = n.s.)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
At time point 2.5, the difference between moral-personal and moral-impersonal dilemmas is significant for DLPFC (t = 2.355, p = 0.05).
“For the DLPFC this yielded a significant result (t = 2.355, p = 0.05)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: TMS over the right DLPFC and right TPJ disrupts neural activity in those regions.
- Findingown data
At time point 2.5 for DLPFC, there is a significant difference between moral-personal and non-moral conditions (t = −2.890, p = 0.02).
“This t-test shows a significant difference between the moral personal and the non-moral condition (t = −2.890, p = 0.02).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: TMS over the right DLPFC and right TPJ disrupts neural activity in those regions.
- Findingown data
For the TPJ, in impersonal dilemmas, the decision outcome at TMS time 2.5 s is close to significantly different from 3 s.
“The comparison of the 2.5 time point against the 2 and 3 s time point is significant (t = −2.982, p = 0.02) and close to significant (t = −2.283, p = 0.06), respectively.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
TMS over right TPJ at 2.5 s after question onset increases the proportion of inappropriate responses in moral-impersonal dilemmas.
“if the TPJ is stimulated 2.5 s after onset of the moral question the number of inappropriate responses is higher in the moral-impersonal condition”
- Also stated in: § Response · plain
“the magnetic stimulation affects the moral-impersonal judgment in a time-specific manner. The proportion of appropriate and inappropriate responses is changed in late time-points.”
- Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
“TMS-induced disruption of TPJ affects only moral-impersonal conditions”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: TMS over the right DLPFC and right TPJ disrupts neural activity in those regions.
- Also stated in: § Response · plain
- Findingown data
There was a main effect of moral condition on confidence ratings.
“However, there was a main effect of moral condition (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected, F = 41.793, p < 0.01).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
There was a main effect of moral condition on regret ratings.
“The main effect of moral condition was significant (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected, F = 39.960, p < 0.01)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Regret ratings after TMS over the right DLPFC are lower than after TMS over the right TPJ.
“the pairwise comparisons between the two brain sites showed that the regret ratings after TMS over the right DLPFC are lower from the regret ratings after magnetic stimulation of the right TPJ.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
TMS over right DLPFC at 2.5 s after question onset increases the proportion of inappropriate responses in moral-personal dilemmas (to ~80% vs ~60% at other time points).
“the number of inappropriate responses is higher, around 80 percent, in the condition were the three TMS pulses were applied 2.5 s after onset of the question on the screen.”
- Also stated in: § Response · plain
“the number of inappropriate responses is higher in the moral-personal condition if TMS is applied after 2.5 s over the DLPFC”
- Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
“TMS-induced disruption of the DLPFC during the decision process, affects the outcome of the moral-personal judgment”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: TMS over the right DLPFC and right TPJ disrupts neural activity in those regions.
- Also stated in: § Response · plain
- Findingown data
At time point 2.5 for TPJ, there is a trend for a difference between moral-impersonal and non-moral conditions (t = 2.159, p = 0.07).
“This t-test shows a trend for the difference between the moral impersonal and non-moral condition (t = 2.159, p = 0.07).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: TMS over the right DLPFC and right TPJ disrupts neural activity in those regions.
- Findingown data
All three moral conditions differed significantly from each other in confidence ratings.
“The post-hoc paired samples t-test showed that all three conditions differed significantly from each other (impersonal vs. personal: t = 3.185, p < 0.01; impersonal vs. non-moral: t = −6.439, p < 0.01; personal vs. non-moral: t = −8.317, p < 0.01).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Regret ratings were influenced by magnetic stimulation.
“The regret ratings were influenced by magnetic stimulation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
TMS over DLPFC has no effect on the proportion of appropriate/inappropriate responses in moral-impersonal and non-moral judgments.
“the application of TMS on the four different time points over the DLPFC has no effect on the proportion appropriate and inappropriate responses in the moral-impersonal and non-moral judgment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: TMS over the right DLPFC and right TPJ disrupts neural activity in those regions.
- Findingown data
In all moral conditions, participants felt very responsible for their decisions, with average ratings of 5.30.
“In all moral conditions, participants felt very responsible for the decision that they made with ratings that were on average 5.30.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
There was a main effect of moral condition on the wish to change judgment.
“but the main effect of moral condition is significant (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected, F = 17.970, p < 0.01).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
When stimulating the right DLPFC 2.5 s after onset of the question, the decision outcome in the moral-personal judgment condition becomes less utilitarian.
“When stimulating the right DLPFC 2.5 s after onset of the question, the decision outcome in the moral-personal judgment condition becomes less utilitarian (see Figure 3A).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
This experiment adds to the evidence of a critical role of right DLPFC and right TPJ in moral decision-making.
“This experiment adds to the evidence of a critical role of right DLPFC and right TPJ in moral decision-making.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Our results confirm the role of DLPFC in moral decision-making.
“Our results confirm this role of DLPFC in moral decision-making.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The results for the DLPFC are statistically more reliable than the results for the TPJ.
“However, the results for the DLPFC seem to be statistically more reliable than the results for the TPJ.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
The time-point comparison shows a clearer result for the DLPFC than for the TPJ.
“The time-point comparison shows a clearer result for the DLPFC than it does for the TPJ.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
The finding that DLPFC stimulation reduces regret indicates that the right DLPFC is involved in evaluating the outcome of the decision process.
“This last finding indicates that the right DLPFC is involved in evaluating the outcome of the decision process.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
In moral-impersonal dilemmas, cognitive control over the lower emotional response leads participants to favor the utilitarian option.
“In contrast, in moral-impersonal dilemmas, cognitive control over the lower emotional response leads participants to favor the utilitarian option (Greene, 2007).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greene, 2007 source
- Interpretationown data
TMS over the right DLPFC and right TPJ in moral judgment leads to a time-specific double dissociation in the roles of these brain areas.
“TMS over the right DLPFC and the right TPJ in moral judgment leads to a time-specific double dissociation in the roles of these brain areas.”
- Also stated in: § Discussion · plain
“Our main statistical analysis showed a double dissociation between the results of the DLPFC and TPJ.”
- Also stated in: § Discussion · plain
“In conclusion, there is a double dissociation between the DLPFC and TPJ in moral decision-making.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Discussion · plain
- Interpretationreasoning
After TMS over the right DLPFC, behavior changes in a way consistent with less cognitive control over the emotional response.
“After TMS over the right DLPFC, behavior changes in such a way that is consistent with less cognitive control over the emotional response.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Any effect observed in the two experimental TMS sites can reasonably be assumed to be caused by magnetic neural stimulation, and not by general or time-specific effects such as discomfort, clicking noise, or startling effect of TMS pulses.
“Therefore, any effect observed in the two experimental TMS sites (right DLPFC and right TPJ) can reasonably be assumed to be caused by the magnetic neural stimulation, and not by any general or time-specific effect of things such as discomfort, the clicking noise of the TMS coil, or startling effect of the TMS pulses itself.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Greene et al. (2001, 2004) showed stronger activity in the frontal cortex for the moral-personal condition than in the non-moral and moral-impersonal condition.
“(Greene et al., 2001, 2004) show a stronger activity in the frontal cortex for the moral-personal condition than in the non-moral and moral-impersonal condition.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greene et al., 2001, 2004
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- It may state two separate claims as one. 22
- Probably not a substantial claim. 22
It may state two separate claims as one.
PremisecitationTPJ plays an important role in ToM, empathy, and social cognition.
“TPJ plays an important role in ToM, empathy, and social cognition (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Carter et al., 2012; Santiesteban et al., 2012; Van Overwalle and Vandekerckhove, 2013).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 3 sources checked- cites Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003 source
- cites Carter et al., 2012 source
In the section labeled Abstract (no page available), the paper describes a specific TPJ role in social cognition and links it to mental inference, supporting the social-cognition and ToM portions of the claim. Our copy does not address a TPJ role in empathy; its finding is also limited to decisions involving socially relevant agents. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Santiesteban et al., 2012 source
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Findingown dataParticipants were very confident about their decisions, with average confidence ratings between four and six across all three moral conditions and two stimulation sites.
“Overall, the participants were very confident about their decisions and they rated their level of confidence on average between four and six for all three moral conditions and two stimulation sites.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataDisrupting activity in the DLPFC leads to lower feelings of regret after the decision, indicating that the DLPFC is involved in the evaluation of the decision.
“Disrupting activity in the DLPFC lead to lower feelings of regret after the decision, indicating that the DLPFC is involved in the evaluation of the decision.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataDisruption of the DLPFC during the decision makes the outcome of moral-personal judgment less affirmative, while disruption of TPJ affects moral-impersonal conditions.
“Whereas disruption of the DLPFC during the decision makes the outcome of moral-personal judgment becomes less affirmative, disruption of TPJ affects moral-impersonal conditions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataRegret ratings were highest in moral-personal dilemmas, lower in moral-impersonal dilemmas, and very low in non-moral control questions.
“The highest regret rating was observed in the moral-personal dilemmas, lower ratings were observed in the moral-impersonal dilemmas, and very low ratings were observed in the non-moral control questions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataThere is a time-specific double dissociation between DLPFC and TPJ for moral-personal and moral-impersonal judgment, with a significant difference between stimulation sites at 2.5 s but not at 1.5, 2, or 3 s.
“The statistical test of the within-subjects contrast reveals a time-specific double dissociation between the two stimulation sites (DLPFC and TPJ) for the moral-personal and moral-impersonal judgment as shown by a significant difference between the two stimulation sites when stimulated at 2.5 s (t = 2.779, p < 0.02), and not for the other three time points”
- Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
“we find a double-dissociation between DLPFC and TPJ in the outcome of a moral decision.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: TMS over the right DLPFC and right TPJ disrupts neural activity in those regions.
- Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
It may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataConfidence ratings were highest for non-moral decisions (average 5.65), followed by moral-impersonal (5.10), and lowest for moral-personal (4.78).
“Participants showed the highest confidence levels for non-moral decisions (average rating of 5.65), followed by their confidence in the moral-impersonal condition (average rating of 5.10), finally participants showed the lowest confidence levels in the moral-personal condition (average rating of 4.78).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Findingown dataParticipants indicated that they do not wish to change their judgment.
“For the last question, participants indicate that they do not wish to change their judgment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Findingown dataAlthough TMS changes participants' moral judgment in a time-specific way, in hindsight they do not change their response, they feel confident about their judgment, and they take full responsibility for their actions.
“We observed that, although we change the participants' moral judgment in a time-specific way, in hindsight, they do not change their response, they feel confident about their judgment, and they take full responsibility for their actions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Interpretationown dataBy influencing either the emotional response or the reasoning process in an online event-related TMS paradigm, we showed that the outcome of the moral decision could be influenced.
“By influencing either the emotional response or the reasoning process in an online event-related TMS paradigm, we showed that the outcome of the moral decision could be influenced.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Study design and conductnone givenThe number of study participants is relatively small.
“Furthermore, the number of study participants is relatively small and in any case, it would be interesting to examine a larger subject pool to increase the generalizability of our findings.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Study design and conductown dataOne participant was excluded from further analysis because of very short reaction times.
“One participant was excluded from further analysis because of very short reaction times, (i.e., most responses were given before TMS was applied).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Interpretationown dataOur results are in accordance with the dual-process theory, which distinguishes an initial emotional response and a more elaborative cognitive reasoning that can both influence the decision outcome.
“Our results are in accordance with the dual-process theory, which distinguishes an initial emotional response and a more elaborative cognitive reasoning that can both influence the decision outcome.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductnone givenAll trials with reaction times <3.3 s or >20 s were removed from the data.
“All the trials in which reaction times were too short (<3.3 s) or too long (>20 s) were removed from the data.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
PremisecitationAnother area conjectured to be associated with the emotional response is the temporal cortex.
“Another area that is conjectured to be associated with the emotional response is the temporal cortex (Heekeren et al., 2005; Moll et al., 2005).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Heekeren et al., 2005
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Moll et al., 2005 source
Probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationPrevious research has shown that the DLPFC plays a role in reasoning and decision-making.
“Previous research has shown that the DLPFC plays a role in reasoning and decision-making (Baraclough et al., 2004; Ernst and Paulus, 2005; Van't Wout et al., 2005; Fleck et al., 2006).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Baraclough et al., 2004
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Ernst and Paulus, 2005 source
- cites Van't Wout et al., 2005
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Study design and conductreasoningThe current study is somewhat limited in statistical power because of the chronometric study design that includes many levels of the tested variables.
“Beyond such considerations, the current study is somewhat limited in statistical power because of the chronometric study design that includes many levels of the tested variables.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
Study design and conductnone givenThe presentation order of the different moral conditions and the time point of stimulation were both randomized for each participant.
“The presentation order of the different moral conditions and the time point of stimulation were both randomized for each participant.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
PremisecitationActivity in the prefrontal cortex is important for the cognitive reasoning process, which can counteract the emotional response.
“Specifically, the activity in the prefrontal cortex is thought to be important for the cognitive reasoning process, which can counteract the emotional response.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greene et al., 2001, 2004
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
PremisecitationMoral decision-making involves an automatic emotional response and a controlled application of a utilitarian decision-rule (dual-process theory).
“According to this theory, moral decision-making involves an automatic emotional response and a controlled application of a utilitarian decision-rule.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greene et al., 2001, 2004
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Interpretationown dataOur results show an important role of the TPJ in moral judgment and are in line with earlier findings.
“Our results show an important role of the TPJ in moral judgment and are therefore in line with earlier findings.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
PremisereasoningTMS allows establishing a causal link between brain activity and behavior, whereas neuroimaging only correlates.
“Additionally, whereas neuroimaging correlates activity to behavior, TMS allows us to establish a causal link between the two.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
PremisecitationBoth feelings of empathy and TOM are related to activity in TPJ.
“Both feelings of empathy and TOM are related to activity in TPJ (Saxe, 2006; Young et al., 2010).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Study design and conductcitationOur frontal TMS target area does not exactly overlap with the coordinates of the frontal areas reported by Greene et al.
“Furthermore, given that our frontal TMS target area does not exactly overlap with the coordinates of the frontal areas reported by Greene et al. (see for example Greene et al., 2001, 2004), it could be the case that there are several sub regions within the frontal cortex which are involved in moral decision making.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greene et al., 2001, 2004
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
PremisecitationIn earlier studies, the cingulate cortex was found to be involved in the emotional response.
“In earlier studies, the cingulate cortex was found to be involved in the emotional response (Greene et al., 2001; Moll et al., 2005).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedIt may state two separate claims as one.
InterpretationreasoningAlthough moral-impersonal dilemmas elicit a weaker emotional response than moral-personal dilemmas, TMS over the right TPJ seems to boost the emotional response in moral-impersonal dilemmas.
“Although the moral-impersonal dilemmas do in itself elicit a weaker emotional response when compared to moral-personal dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001, 2004), the decision outcome of the moral-impersonal dilemmas changes in such a way that TMS seems to “boost” the emotional response in these dilemmas.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greene et al., 2001, 2004
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Study design and conductown dataThe TMS target point for DLPFC is not exactly the same as coordinates found by Greene et al. (2001, 2004), but chosen because preliminary fMRI showed a difference in BOLD response between moral personal and moral impersonal dilemmas.
“Although the TMS target point for the DLPFC is not exactly the same as the coordinates found for the frontal regions by Greene et al. (2001, 2004), we chose this area because our preliminary fMRI results showed a difference in BOLD response between the moral personal and the moral impersonal dilemmas.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greene et al., 2001, 2004
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Study design and conductnone givenThe position of the TMS coil with respect to the TMS target-areas were monitored online using Brainsight neuronavigation software.
“The position of the TMS coil with respect to the TMS target-areas were monitored online using Brainsight neuronavigation software (version 2.0, Rogue Research).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
Interpretationown dataThe results support the dual-process theory and indicate that both emotional response and cognitive reasoning processes are involved in moral judgment/decision outcome.
“Our results are in line with the dual-process theory and suggest a role for both the emotional response and cognitive reasoning process in moral judgment.”
- Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
“Both the emotional and cognitive processes were shown to be involved in the decision outcome.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: TMS over the right DLPFC and right TPJ disrupts neural activity in those regions.
- Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
Probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationIn moral-personal dilemmas, the emotional response is too strong to be overruled by the cognitive system.
“In moral-personal dilemmas, this emotional response is thought to be too strong to be overruled by the cognitive system.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greene, 2007 source
Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
PremisecitationThe dual-process theory predicts that the emotional response in the trolley dilemma is lower than in the footbridge dilemma and cognitive control generally overrules the non-utilitarian emotional response.
“The dual-process theory (Greene et al., 2001, 2004) predicts that the emotional response in the trolley dilemma is lower than in the footbridge dilemma and cognitive control generally overrules the non-utilitarian emotional response.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greene et al., 2001, 2004
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationIncreased activity in DLPFC is related to increased cognitive effort put in counteracting the (non-utilitarian) emotional response.
“Increased activity in DLPFC is thought to be related to the increased cognitive effort that is put in counteracting the (non-utilitarian) emotional response (Greene et al., 2004).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greene et al., 2004 source
Checked before — its earlier verdict is held back until a new check runs.
It may state two separate claims as one.
Interpretationown dataThe double dissociation seems to be driven by results obtained in both the DLPFC and TPJ conditions, but the post-hoc analysis shows the results for DLPFC are statistically more reliable than those for TPJ.
“However, although this double dissociation seems to be driven by the results obtained in both the DLPFC as well as in the TPJ condition, we would like to point out that the post-hoc statistical analysis also shows that the results for the DLPFC are statistically more reliable than those for the TPJ.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
PremisecitationExperiments using fMRI have found the cingulate cortex to be involved in moral judgment.
“Experiments using fMRI (Greene et al., 2004), have found the cingulate cortex to be involved in moral judgment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greene et al., 2004 source
Checked before — its earlier verdict is held back until a new check runs.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
Study design and conductown dataReaction times below 3.3 s were considered too short because on these trials the TMS pulses were not applied for the last time condition.
“Reaction times below 3.3 s were considered to be too short because on these trials the TMS pulses were not applied for the last time condition.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimIt may state two separate claims as one.
InterpretationreasoningEffects of TMS on the evaluation questions can be caused by either a direct TMS effect on evaluation or, more likely, an indirect effect caused by changing the decision process with TMS.
“Effects of TMS on the evaluation questions can be caused by either a direct TMS effect on the evaluation, or, more likely, an indirect effect on the evaluation that is caused by changing the decision process with TMS.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
InterpretationreasoningIt could be the case that there are several subregions within the frontal cortex involved in moral decision making.
“Furthermore, given that our frontal TMS target area does not exactly overlap with the coordinates of the frontal areas reported by Greene et al. (see for example Greene et al., 2001, 2004), it could be the case that there are several sub regions within the frontal cortex which are involved in moral decision making.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greene et al., 2001, 2004
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
Study design and conductcitationThe questionnaire is designed such that participants respond "appropriate" and "inappropriate" equally often and has been validated in earlier experiments.
“The questionnaire is designed such that participants respond “appropriate” and “inappropriate” equally often and has been validated in earlier experiments (the entire questionnaire is available in the supplementary material of Greene et al., 2001).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Greene et al., 2001 source
Probably not a substantial claim.
PremisereasoningThe TMS design does not suffer from the disadvantages of lesion studies (non-focal lesions, compensatory strategies, difficult comparison).
“Whereas lesions are often not focal, patients may develop compensatory strategies, and results across patients are difficult to compare, our TMS design does not suffer from these disadvantages.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
TMS over the right DLPFC and right TPJ disrupts neural activity in those regions.
“aimed at disrupting the activities in the DLPFC or the TPJ (between-subject factor)”
“TMS-induced disruption of the DLPFC”
The paper relies on this without support.
The situations described in moral-personal dilemmas are more emotionally salient than dilemmas in the non-moral and moral-impersonal dilemmas.
“The situations described in moral-personal dilemmas are more emotionally salient than dilemmas in the non-moral and moral-impersonal dilemmas.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
When individuals make moral decisions, the bilateral TPJ is centrally involved in understanding others by reasoning about the content of mental states.
“When individuals make moral decisions, the bilateral TPJ is centrally involved in understanding others by reasoning about the content of mental states (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Jeurissen et al., 2014).”
From tDCS Over DLPFC Leads to Less Utilitarian Response in Moral-Personal Judgment (2018) · cites this paper as Jeurissen et al., 2014
Jeurissen et al. (2014) revealed that TMS-induced disruption of the DLPFC in moral-personal decisions leads to less utilitarian decisions.
“In contrast, Jeurissen et al. (2014) revealed that TMS-induced disruption of the DLPFC in moral-personal decisions leads to less utilitarian decisions, which supported the dual-process theory.”
From tDCS Over DLPFC Leads to Less Utilitarian Response in Moral-Personal Judgment (2018) · cites this paper as Jeurissen et al. (2014)
All trials in which reaction times were too long (>30 s) were excluded from data analysis.
“All trials in which reaction times were too long (>30 s) were excluded from data analysis (Jeurissen et al., 2014).”
From tDCS Over DLPFC Leads to Less Utilitarian Response in Moral-Personal Judgment (2018) · cites this paper as Jeurissen et al., 2014
Jeurissen et al. (2014) revealed that disrupting the function of TPJ affects only moral-impersonal conditions in moral dilemmas.
“Using moral dilemma tasks, Jeurissen et al. (2014) revealed that disrupting the function of TPJ affects only moral-impersonal conditions in moral dilemmas.”
From tDCS Over DLPFC Leads to Less Utilitarian Response in Moral-Personal Judgment (2018) · cites this paper as Jeurissen et al. (2014)
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Methods refer to three target areas but identify only two
MinorThe methods identify the right DLPFC and right TPJ as the only stimulation targets, but then refer to finding the crucial time point for "these three areas."
“In order to find the crucial time point at which these three areas are involved in moral judgment, different time points of TMS application were tested as a within-subject factor.”
“In each participant, magnetic stimulation was applied over only one of these two target sites: right DLPFC or right TPJ.”
Citations
Cites
An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1062872 · Cited by 4,561
The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027 · Cited by 2,620
People thinking about thinking peopleThe role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind”
Saxe, R., & Kanwisher, N. (2003) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/s1053-8119(03)00230-1 · Cited by 2,316 · cited 3×
“TPJ plays an important role in ToM, empathy, and social cognition (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Carter et al., 2012; Santiesteban et al., 2012; Van Overwalle and Vandekerckhove, 2013).”
BackgroundInfluentialDamage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements
Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Damasio, A. (2007) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature05631 · Cited by 1,545
The neural basis of human moral cognition
Moll, J., Zahn, R., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Krueger, F., & Grafman, J. (2005) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn1768 · Cited by 930 · cited 2×
“Another area that is conjectured to be associated with the emotional response is the temporal cortex (Heekeren et al., 2005; Moll et al., 2005).”
BackgroundUniquely human social cognition
Saxe, R. (2006) · Current Opinion in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.conb.2006.03.001 · Cited by 919
Prefrontal cortex and decision making in a mixed-strategy game
Barraclough, D. J., Conroy, M. L., & Lee, D. (2004) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn1209 · Cited by 678
Young, L., Camprodon, J. A., Hauser, M., Pascual-Leone, A., & Saxe, R. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0914826107 · Cited by 584
Dissociable prefrontal brain systems for attention and emotion
Yamasaki, H., LaBar, K. S., & McCarthy, G. (2002) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.182176499 · Cited by 489
Neurobiology of Decision Making: A Selective Review from a Neurocognitive and Clinical Perspective
Ernst, M., & Paulus, M. P. (2005) · Biological Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2005.06.004 · Cited by 469
Selective deficit in personal moral judgment following damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex
Ciaramelli, E., Muccioli, M., Làdavas, E., & di Pellegrino, G. (2007) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsm001 · Cited by 436
Why are VMPFC patients more utilitarian? A dual-process theory of moral judgment explains
Greene, J. D. (2007) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2007.06.004 · Cited by 394
An Investigation of Moral Judgement in Frontotemporal Dementia
Mendez, M. F., Anderson, E., & Shapira, J. S. (2005) · Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology · doi:10.1097/01.wnn.0000191292.17964.bb · Cited by 360
Santiesteban (2012) · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2012.10.018 · Cited by 357
The Role of the Human Prefrontal Cortex in Social Cognition and Moral Judgment
Forbes, C. E., & Grafman, J. H. (2010) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev-neuro-060909-153230 · Cited by 331
Moral judgments, emotions and the utilitarian brain
Moll, J., & de Oliveira‐Souza, R. (2007) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2007.06.001 · Cited by 326
Dorsolateral and ventromedial prefrontal cortex orchestrate normative choice
Baumgärtner, T., Knoch, D., Hotz, P., Eisenegger, C., & Fehr, E. (2011) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn.2933 · Cited by 307
Steinbeis, N., Bernhardt, B. C., & Singer, T. (2012) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.12.027 · Cited by 298
Theory of mind and neurodevelopmental disorders of childhood
KORKMAZ, B. (2011) · Pediatric Research · doi:10.1203/pdr.0b013e318212c177 · Cited by 249
Fleck, M. S. (2005) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhj097 · Cited by 239
A Distinct Role of the Temporal-Parietal Junction in Predicting Socially Guided Decisions
Carter, R. M., Bowling, D. L., Reeck, C., & Huettel, S. A. (2012) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1219681 · Cited by 238
Hutcherson, C. A., Plassmann, H., Gross, J. J., & Rangel, A. (2012) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.6387-11.2012 · Cited by 227
Rights, Restitution, and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory.
Smith, H. M., Thomson, J. J., & Parent, W. A. (1989) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185034 · Cited by 210
Wout‐Frank, M. V. ‘., Kahn, R. S., Sanfey, A. G., & Aleman, A. (2005) · Neuroreport · doi:10.1097/01.wnr.0000183907.08149.14 · Cited by 193
Young, L., & Koenigs, M. R. (2007) · British Medical Bulletin · doi:10.1093/bmb/ldm031 · Cited by 182
Prehn, K., Wartenburger, I., Mériau, K., Scheibe, C., Goodenough, O. R., Villringer, A., van der Meer, E. E., & Heekeren, H. R. (2007) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsm037 · Cited by 180
Influence of bodily harm on neural correlates of semantic and moral decision-making
Heekeren, H. R., Wartenburger, I., Schmidt, H., Prehn, K., Schwintowski, H.-P., & Villringer, A. (2004) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.09.026 · Cited by 152
Rights, Restitution, and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory.
Naylor, M. B., Thomson, J. J., & Parent, W. A. (1989) · Noûs · doi:10.2307/2215496 · Cited by 148
Single-Neuron Mechanisms Underlying Cost-Benefit Analysis in Frontal Cortex
Hosokawa, T., Kennerley, S. W., Sloan, J., & Wallis, J. D. (2013) · Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.2221-13.2013 · Cited by 140
Sela, T., Kilim, A., & Michal Lavidor, B. (2012) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2012.00022 · Cited by 137
Implicit and explicit social mentalizing: dual processes driven by a shared neural network
Overwalle, F. V., & Vandekerckhove, M. M. P. (2013) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00560 · Cited by 121
Do abnormal responses show utilitarian bias?
Kahane, G., & Shackel, N. A. (2008) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06785 · Cited by 90
Decision value computation in DLPFC and VMPFC adjusts to the available decision time
Sokol‐Hessner, P., Hutcherson, C. A. C., Hare, T. A., & Rangel, A. (2012) · European Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1111/j.1460-9568.2012.08076.x · Cited by 89
Cho, S. S., Pellecchia, G., Ko, J. H., Ray, N. J., Obeso, I., Houle, S., & Strafella, A. P. (2012) · Brain stimulation · doi:10.1016/j.brs.2012.03.007 · Cited by 86
Minati, L., Campanhã, C., Critchley, H., & Boggio, P. S. (2012) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588928.2011.628382 · Cited by 67
Essex, B. G., Clinton, S. A., Wonderley, L. R., & Zald, D. H. (2012) · Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.6106-11.2012 · Cited by 63
Cushman, F. A., Murray, D., Gordon-McKeon, S., Wharton, S., & Greene, J. D. (2011) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsr072 · Cited by 62
Rights, Restitution, and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory
Thomson, J. J. (1986) · DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) · Cited by 31
Mullette-Gillman, O. A., Detwiler, J. M., Winecoff, A., Dobbins, I. G., & Huettel, S. A. (2011) · Brain Research · doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2011.04.026 · Cited by 20
Koenigs, M. R., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F. A., HAUSER, M. D., & Damásio, A. R. (2008) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06804 · Cited by 6
Flagged first, then by citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The Functional Role of Dreaming in Emotional Processes
Scarpelli, S., Bartolacci, C., D'Atri, A., Gorgoni, M., & De Gennaro, L. (2019) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00459 · Cited by 190
“Moreover, it is worth noting that lesion, imaging and stimulation data revealed that the TPJ is related to emotional processing and especially to the “theory of mind,” empathy and social cognition in the waking state (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Young et al., 2010; Santiesteban et al., 2012; Van Overwalle and Vandekerck…”
BackgroundReduced empathic concern leads to utilitarian moral judgments in trait alexithymia
Patil, I., & Silani, G. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00501 · Cited by 174
Reasoning supports utilitarian resolutions to moral dilemmas across diverse measures.
Patil, I., Zucchelli, M. M., Kool, W., Campbell, S., Fornasier, F., Calò, M., Silani, G., Cikara, M., & Cushman, F. (2021) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/pspp0000281 · Cited by 133
Noninvasive stimulation of the temporoparietal junction: a systematic review
Donaldson, P. H., Rinehart, N. J., & Enticott, P. G. (2015) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2015.05.017 · Cited by 128
Mai, X., Zhang, W., Hu, X., Zhen, Z., Xu, Z., Zhang, J., & Liu, C. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00380 · Cited by 99
Aesthetic preference recognition of 3D shapes using EEG
Chew, L. H., Teo, J., & Mountstephens, J. (2015) · Cognitive Neurodynamics · doi:10.1007/s11571-015-9363-z · Cited by 98
The neuroscience of moral cognition: from dual processes to dynamic systems
Van Bavel, J. J., FeldmanHall, O., & Mende-Siedlecki, P. (2015) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.08.009 · Cited by 95
The neurobiology of human aggressive behavior: Neuroimaging, genetic, and neurochemical aspects
Cupaioli, F. A., Zucca, F. A., Caporale, C., Lesch, K., Passamonti, L., & Zecca, L. (2020) · Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/j.pnpbp.2020.110059 · Cited by 94
Nihonsugi, T., Ihara, A. S., & Haruno, M. (2015) · Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.3885-14.2015 · Cited by 93
Business Ethics: The Promise of Neuroscience
Robertson, D. C., Voegtlin, C., & Maak, T. (2016) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-016-3312-6 · Cited by 90
Empathy Mediates the Effects of Age and Sex on Altruistic Moral Decision Making
Rosen, J. B., Brand, M., & Kalbe, E. (2016) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2016.00067 · Cited by 63
A causal role for right temporo-parietal junction in signaling moral conflict
Obeso, I., Moisa, M., Ruff, C. C., & Dreher, J. (2018) · eLife · doi:10.7554/elife.40671 · Cited by 61
Griffin, A. S., Callen, A., Klop‐Toker, K., Scanlon, R. J., & Hayward, M. W. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01139 · Cited by 58
Ye, H., Chen, S., Huang, D., Zheng, H., Jia, Y., & Luo, J. (2015) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2015.00659 · Cited by 57
Ferrari, C., Nadal, M., Schiavi, S., Vecchi, T., Cela‐Conde, C. J., & Cattaneo, Z. (2017) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsx002 · Cited by 54
Papazova, I., Strube, W., Becker, B., Henning, B., Schwippel, T., Fallgatter, A. J., Padberg, F., Palm, U., Falkai, P., Plewnia, C., et al. (2018) · Schizophrenia Research · doi:10.1016/j.schres.2018.06.032 · Cited by 47
Kuehne, M., Heimrath, K., Heinze, H.-J., & Zaehle, T. (2015) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0127061 · Cited by 45
Moral Enhancement Using Non-invasive Brain Stimulation
Darby, R. R., & Pascual‐Leone, Á. (2017) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2017.00077 · Cited by 45
Neville, I. S., Hayashi, C. Y., Hajj, S. A. E., Zaninotto, A. L., Sabino, J. P., Júnior, L. D. M. S., Nagumo, M. M., Brunoni, A. R., Shieh, B. D. F. S., de Amorim, R. L. O., et al. (2015) · Trials · doi:10.1186/s13063-015-0944-2 · Cited by 39
Dai, Z., Shao, J., Zhou, H., Chen, Z., Zhang, S., Wang, H., Jiang, H., Yao, Z., & Lü, Q. (2021) · Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/j.pnpbp.2021.110475 · Cited by 39
tDCS Over DLPFC Leads to Less Utilitarian Response in Moral-Personal Judgment
Zheng, H., Lu, X., & Huang, D. (2018) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2018.00193 · Cited by 31
Han, H. (2016) · International Journal of Ethics Education · doi:10.1007/s40889-016-0016-9 · Cited by 31
Benign Biological Interventions to Reduce Offending
Choy, O., Focquaert, F., & Raine, A. (2018) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-018-9360-0 · Cited by 30
Langenbach, B. P., Savic, B., Baumgärtner, T., Wyss, A. M., & Knoch, D. (2021) · Cortex · doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2021.11.006 · Cited by 30
TMS as a Tool for Examining Cognitive Processing
Nevler, N., & Ash, E. L. (2015) · Current Neurology and Neuroscience Reports · doi:10.1007/s11910-015-0575-8 · Cited by 29
Zhou, C., Cheng, X., Liu, C., & Li, P. (2022) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2022.119028 · Cited by 28
Shedding Light on Social Reward Circuitry: (Un)common Blueprints in Humans and Rodents
Grimm, C., Balsters, J. H., & Zerbi, V. (2020) · The Neuroscientist · doi:10.1177/1073858420923552 · Cited by 26
Wu, C., Zheng, Y., Li, J., Zhang, B., Li, R., Wu, H., She, S., Liu, S., Peng, H., Ning, Y., et al. (2017) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2017.00107 · Cited by 26
Ni, J., Yang, J., & Ma, Y. (2024) · PLoS Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.3002545 · Cited by 24
The role of prefrontal cortex in a moral judgment task using functional near‐infrared spectroscopy
Dashtestani, H., Zaragoza, R., Kermanian, R., Knutson, K. M., Halem, M., Casey, A., Karamzadeh, N. S., Anderson, A. A., Boccara, C., & Gandjbakhche, A. (2018) · Brain and Behavior · doi:10.1002/brb3.1116 · Cited by 24
Social and Affective Neuroscience of Everyday Human Interaction
Boggio, P. S., Wingenbach, T. S. H., Coêlho, M. L. D. S., Comfort, W. E., Marques, L. M., & Alves, M. V. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-08651-9 · Cited by 23
Zheng, Y., Wu, C., Li, J., Wu, H., She, S., Liu, S., Wu, H., Mao, L., Ning, Y., & Li, L. (2015) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s0033291715001828 · Cited by 23
Bilevicius, E., Kolesar, T., & Kornelsen, J. (2016) · Brain Sciences · doi:10.3390/brainsci6020014 · Cited by 22
How Brain Stimulation Techniques Can Affect Moral and Social Behaviour
Nuzzo, C. D., Ferrucci, R., Gianoli, E., Reitano, M., Tedino, D., Ruggiero, F., & Priori, A. (2018) · Journal of Cognitive Enhancement · doi:10.1007/s41465-018-0116-x · Cited by 20
Christian, P., & Soutschek, A. (2022) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2022.108393 · Cited by 18
Leloup, L., Miletich, D. D., Andriet, G., Vandermeeren, Y., & Samson, D. (2016) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2016.00355 · Cited by 18
Yang, Q., Shao, R., Zhang, Q., Li, C., Li, Y., Li, H., & Lee, T. (2019) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2019.01.020 · Cited by 18
Capraro, V. (2019) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/432yw · Cited by 17
Blair-West, L. F., Hoy, K. E., Hall, P. J., Fitzgerald, P. B., & Fitzgibbon, B. M. (2018) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2018.00258 · Cited by 15
Brunyé, T. T. (2020) · Journal of Cognitive Enhancement · doi:10.1007/s41465-020-00186-0 · Cited by 14
The roles of empathy, shame, and guilt in violence decision-making
Trivedi‐Bateman, N. (2015) · Apollo (University of Cambridge) · doi:10.17863/cam.16553 · Cited by 13
Improved Video Emotion Recognition With Alignment of CNN and Human Brain Representations
Fu, K., Du, C., Wang, S., & He, H. (2023) · IEEE Transactions on Affective Computing · doi:10.1109/taffc.2023.3316173 · Cited by 11
Making moral decisions with artificial agents as advisors. A fNIRS study
Fabre, E. F., Mouratille, D., Bonnemains, V., Palmiotti, G. P., & Causse, M. (2024) · Computers in Human Behavior Artificial Humans · doi:10.1016/j.chbah.2024.100096 · Cited by 11
Are People Altruistic When Making Socially Responsible Investments? Evidence From a tDCS Study
Yang, X., Meng, W., Chen, S., Gao, M., & Zhang, J. (2021) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2021.704537 · Cited by 9
Wu, S., Cai, S., Dong, Z., & Zhang, H. (2023) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2022.1047593 · Cited by 8
The involvement of rTPJ in intention attribution during social decision making: A TMS study
Panico, F., Ferrara, A., Sagliano, L., & Trojano, L. (2024) · Cognitive Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3758/s13415-024-01188-7 · Cited by 7
Electrophysiological Mechanisms Underlying Time-Dependent Assessments in Moral Decision-Making
Yun, J. H., Zhang, J., & Lee, E. (2019) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2019.01021 · Cited by 7
Chou, Y.-J., & Chen, T.-Y. (2021) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2021.107858 · Cited by 7
Wu, S., Cai, S., Li, Y., Xiong, G., & Zhang, H. (2023) · Brain and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2023.106061 · Cited by 7
Jin, W.-J., Zhu, X.-X., Luo, K.-T., Wang, S., Li, J., Qian, L.-F., & Xu, G. (2024) · Physiological Research · doi:10.33549/physiolres.935330 · Cited by 7
Neurociencia y fe: El sistema de creencias como lugar de encuentro interdisciplinar
Semper, J. V. O. (2014) · Scientia et Fides · doi:10.12775/setf.2014.021 · Cited by 7
Wang, T., de Graaf, T. A., Williams, J., Wang, Z., Schuhmann, T., Duecker, F., & Sack, A. T. (2023) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105437 · Cited by 6
Self-citationKurshan, E. (2024) · International Journal of Semantic Computing · doi:10.1142/s1793351x24300073 · Cited by 6
Moral Judgment: An Overlooked Deficient Domain in Multiple Sclerosis?
Ayache, S. S., & Chalah, M. A. (2018) · Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.3390/bs8110105 · Cited by 6
Combinatorial approaches for treating neuropsychiatric social impairment
Don, W., Tsheringla, S., McPartland, J. C., & Allsop, S. A. (2022) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2021.0051 · Cited by 6
Resting-state neural signatures of moral injury: associations with rumination
Fulton, T. M., Guelfo, A., Elbasheir, A., McDermott, T. J., Lee, J., Ahluwalia, V., Ely, T. D., Lathan, E. C., & Fani, N. (2026) · Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging · doi:10.1016/j.bpsc.2025.08.001 · Cited by 5
Mosca, A., Miuli, A., Mancusi, G., Chiappini, S., Stigliano, G., Pasquale, A., Petta, G. D., Bubbico, G., Pasino, A., Pettorruso, M., et al. (2023) · Social Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17470919.2023.2242096 · Cited by 5
Daley, R. T., & Kensinger, E. A. (2021) · Aging Neuropsychology and Cognition · doi:10.1080/13825585.2021.2019183 · Cited by 5
Changing Brain Activity, Increasing Intelligence: Transcranial Electrical and Magnetic Stimulation
Jaušovec, N., & Pahor, A. (2017) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-809407-5.00004-x · Cited by 4
Wang, G., Tang, J., Yin, Z., Yu, S., Shi, X., Hao, X., Zhao, Z., Pan, Y., & Li, S. (2024) · Neurobiology of Stress · doi:10.1016/j.ynstr.2024.100622 · Cited by 4
Li, Q., Cao, D., Li, Y., & Tang, Y. (2017) · PubMed Central · doi:10.7507/1001-5515.201606048 · Cited by 4
Zhang, H., Xiong, G., Cai, S., & Wu, S. (2023) · Neuroscience · doi:10.1016/j.neuroscience.2023.12.008 · Cited by 4
Mielacher, C., Scheele, D., & Hurlemann, R. (2015) · Der Nervenarzt · doi:10.1007/s00115-015-4324-7 · Cited by 3
Neural and Linguistic Considerations for Assessing Moral Intuitions Using Text-Based Stimuli
Bretl, B. L. (2020) · The Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1080/00223980.2020.1832034 · Cited by 3
Zhang, H., Dong, Z., Cai, S., Wu, S., & Zhao, J. (2022) · Neuroscience · doi:10.1016/j.neuroscience.2022.11.023 · Cited by 3
Cyborg Virtues: Using Brain Stimulation for Moral Enhancement
Hughes, J. J. (2023) · Advances in neuroethics · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-26801-4_9 · Cited by 3
Reduced empathic concern leads to utilitarian moral judgments in trait alexithymiaPreprint
Patil, I., & Silani, G. (2018) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/xekc9 · Cited by 3
Li, Y., Zhang, M., Chen, Y., Xie, Y., Li, S., Yu, Q., & Zhao, Q. (2025) · Neuroreport · doi:10.1097/wnr.0000000000002185 · Cited by 2
Causal role of temporo-parietal junction for social behavior: A meta-analysis
Soutschek, A., & Mattes, R. (2025) · Brain stimulation · doi:10.1016/j.brs.2025.10.024 · Cited by 2
Deng, Z., Wang, D., Cai, J., Jiang, X., & Chen, Z. (2020) · Chinese Science Bulletin (Chinese Version) · doi:10.1360/tb-2019-0654 · Cited by 2
Qian, Y., Takimoto, Y., & Yasumura, A. (2024) · Behavioural Brain Research · doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2024.114891 · Cited by 2
Reasons and biological causes. Some reflections on Boudon’s Theory of Ordinary Rationality
Medina, F. J. L. (2014) · Papers Revista de Sociologia · doi:10.5565/rev/papers.2091 · Cited by 2
Neural Control of Social Decisions
Ugazio, G., & Ruff, C. C. (2016) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-805308-9.00019-1 · Cited by 2
Moral Reasoning: A Network Neuroscience Perspective
Anderson, E. D., & Barbey, A. K. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108580298.025 · Cited by 1
Perceptions of Human-Animal Relationships and their Impacts on Animal Ethics, Law and Research
Sueur, C., Pelé, M., Matsuzawa, T., & Georges, J. (2021) · Frontiers research topics · doi:10.3389/978-2-88966-470-2 · Cited by 1
Jin, S., Liu, S., Li, S., Liu, Z., & Guo, X. (2025) · Advances in Psychological Science · doi:10.3724/sp.j.1042.2025.2182 · Cited by 1
redacció, E. D. (2014) · Papers Revista de Sociologia · doi:10.5565/rev/papers.2158 · Cited by 1
Exploring the Anatomy of Human Emotion and Social Conduct
Nevler, N. (2018) · Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology · doi:10.1097/wnn.0000000000000170
Neurological explanations of decision making in humans: A review
Rao, T. K. (2022) · World Journal of Advanced Research and Reviews · doi:10.30574/wjarr.2022.14.1.0265
Modulating the Social and Affective Brain with Transcranial Stimulation Techniques
do Rêgo, G. G., Marques, L. M., Coêlho, M. L. D. S., & Boggio, P. S. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-08651-9_15
Bases neurales de la representación del valor. Una axiología neurocognitiva
Rodiles-Hernández, J. (2023) · Kranion · doi:10.24875/kranion.m23000067
Wang, T. (2024) · Research Publications (Maastricht University) · doi:10.26481/dis.20240229tw
Alcohol attention bias modulates neural engagement during moral processing
Fede, S. J., Kisner, M. A., Dean, S., Buckler, E., Chholak, P., & Momenan, R. (2024) · Social Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17470919.2024.2377666
On the Relationship Between the Intentional Stance and Robot Responsibility
O’Reilly, Z., & Marchesi, S. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-65483-1_7
The Criminal Brain: Neurointerventions and Mental Freedom
Craig, J. N. (2024) · doi:10.11575/prism/46400
Molinero Moles, I. (2025) · University of Valladolid Documentary Repository (University of Valladolid)
Cenka, K., Spaccasassi, C., Petkovic, S., Pezzetta, R., Vicario, C. M., Arcara, G., & Avenanti, A. (2026) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2026.121885
Kurshan, E. (2026) · ACM International Conference on Computing Frontiers (CF) · doi:10.1145/3801487.3802805
Shu, L., Zheng, X., Chen, J., Huang, J., Yu, J., Zhang, F., & Zhang, S. (2026) · Current Psychology · doi:10.1007/s12144-026-09735-w
The neural architecture of first-person moral choice: a demand-dependent working model
Arrouet, A., Chandler, J. A., Laureys, S., & Hoyer, R. S. (2026) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2026.107017
Metadata
- Authors
- Jeurissen, D., Sack, A. T., Roebroeck, A., Russ, B. E., & Pascual-Leone, A.
- Affiliations
- Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience (NL)
- Maastricht University (NL)
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Jeurissen, Danique
- Venue
- Frontiers in Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2014
- Volume
- 8
- Pages
- 18-18
- ISSN
- 1662-453X (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC3923146
- OpenAlex
- W2137510927
- Semantic Scholar
- 21061f7cac84682cabce844e30df3e045490481e
- Cited by
- 93
- References
- 40
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 4
- FWCI
- 4.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Frontiers in Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Research Publications (Maastricht University) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- KNAW Research Portal (The Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Research Publications (Maastricht University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- Harvard University
- Harvard Catalyst (UL1-RR025758, NIH UL1 RR-025758, RR025758)
- National Institutes of Health
- National Center for Research Resources (UL1RR025758)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Neurology › Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation Studies
- Keywords
- moral judgment, transcranial magnetic stimulation, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junction, ethical dilemmas, dual-process theory, emotional reasoning, cognitive reasoning, regret, decision-making, emotional processing
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-11-09, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-11-09 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review