The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation
Open accessAbstract
Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. Unlike other animals, people frequently cooperate with non-relatives in large groups. Evolutionary models of large-scale cooperation require not just incentives for cooperation, but also a credible disincentive for free riding. Various theoretical solutions have been proposed and experimentally explored, including reputation monitoring and diffuse punishment. Here, we empirically examine an alternative theoretical proposal: responsibility for punishment can be borne by one specific individual. This experiment shows that allowing a single individual to punish increases cooperation to the same level as allowing each group member to punish and results in greater group profits. These results suggest a potential key function of leadership in human groups and provides further evidence supporting that humans will readily and knowingly behave altruistically.
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Metadata
- Authors
- O'Gorman, R., Henrich, J., & Van Vugt, M.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2008-09-23
- Volume
- 276
- Issue
- 1655
- Pages
- 323-329
- ISSN
- 0080-4649 (ISSN-L)
- 0962-8452
- 1471-2954
- OpenAlex
- W2159303103
- Cited by
- 280
- References
- 45
- FWCI
- 20.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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