The price of your soul: neural evidence for the non-utilitarian representation of sacred values
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Sacred values, such as those associated with religious or ethnic identity, underlie many important individual and group decisions in life, and individuals typically resist attempts to trade off their sacred values in exchange for material benefits. Deontological theory suggests that sacred values are processed based on rights and wrongs irrespective of outcomes, while utilitarian theory suggests that they are processed based on costs and benefits of potential outcomes, but which mode of processing an individual naturally uses is unknown. The study of decisions over sacred values is difficult because outcomes cannot typically be realized in a laboratory, and hence little is known about the neural representation and processing of sacred values. We used an experimental paradigm that used integrity as a proxy for sacredness and which paid real money to induce individuals to sell their personal values. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we found that values that people refused to sell (sacred values) were associated with increased activity in the left temporoparietal junction and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, regions previously associated with semantic rule retrieval. This suggests that sacred values affect behaviour through the retrieval and processing of deontic rules and not through a utilitarian evaluation of costs and benefits.
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Citations
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Self-citation
Cited by
Religious and Sacred Imperatives in Human Conflict
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InfluentialThe Moral Roots of Partisan Division: How Moral Conviction Heightens Affective Polarization
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Metadata
- Authors
- Berns, G. S., Bell, E., Capra, C. M., Prietula, M. J., Moore, S., Anderson, B., Ginges, J., & Atran, S.
- Venue
- Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2012-03-05
- Volume
- 367
- Issue
- 1589
- Pages
- 754-762
- ISSN
- 0962-8436 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-2970
- OpenAlex
- W2169132019
- Cited by
- 194
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 5.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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