Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access from the perspective of capacity-unlimited working memory
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Theories of consciousness divide over whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse in specific representational content and whether it requires cognitive access. These two issues are often treated in tandem because of a shared assumption that the representational capacity of cognitive access is fairly limited. Recent research on working memory challenges this shared assumption. This paper argues that abandoning the assumption undermines post-cue–based ‘overflow’ arguments, according to which perceptual consciousness is rich and does not require cognitive access. Abandoning it also dissociates the rich/sparse debate from the access question. The paper then explores attempts to reformulate overflow theses in ways that do not require the assumption of limited capacity. Finally, it discusses the problem of relating seemingly non-probabilistic perceptual consciousness to the probabilistic representations posited by the models that challenge conceptions of cognitive access as capacity-limited. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism
Millikan, R. G. (1984) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4124.001.0001 · Cited by 4,758
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364
Experimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing
Dehaene, S., & Changeux, J.-P. (2011) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.03.018 · Cited by 2,573
Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy
Dehaene, S., Changeux, J.-P., Naccache, L., Sackur, J., & Sergent, C. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.03.007 · Cited by 2,067
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation
Woodward, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195155270.001.0001 · Cited by 1,302
Object perception as Bayesian inference
Kersten, D., Mamassian, P., & Yuille, A. (2004) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142005 · Cited by 1,269
Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
Block, N. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002786 · Cited by 1,146
Rosenthal, D. M. (2005) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198236979.001.0001 · Cited by 993
Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness
Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009 · Cited by 869
‘Activity-silent’ working memory in prefrontal cortex: a dynamic coding framework
Stokes, M. G. (2015) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.05.004 · Cited by 850
Probabilistic models of cognition: exploring representations and inductive biases
Griffiths, T. L., Chater, N., Kemp, C., Perfors, A., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2010) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.05.004 · Cited by 568
Consciousness cannot be separated from function
Cohen, M. A., & Dennett, D. C. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.06.008 · Cited by 542
How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness
Lamme, V. A. F. (2010) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588921003731586 · Cited by 487
Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience.
Bowers, J. S., & Davis, C. J. (2012) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0026450 · Cited by 436
Factorial comparison of working memory models.
van den Berg, R., Awh, E., & Ma, W. J. (2014) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0035234 · Cited by 311
Neural Coding of Uncertainty and Probability
Ma, W. J., & Jazayeri, M. (2014) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev-neuro-071013-014017 · Cited by 290
Consciousness and the Brain: The Thalamocortical Dialogue in Health and Disease
LLINÁS, R., & RIBARY, U. (2001) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2001.tb05715.x · Cited by 227
Brain Mechanisms Underlying the Brief Maintenance of Seen and Unseen Sensory Information
King, J.-R., Pescetelli, N., & Dehaene, S. (2016) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2016.10.051 · Cited by 206
Griffiths, T. L., Chater, N., Norris, D., & Pouget, A. (2012) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0026884 · Cited by 192
Bayesian sampling in visual perception
Moreno-Bote, R., Knill, D. C., & Pouget, A. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1101430108 · Cited by 182
Beyond the Grand Illusion: What Change Blindness Really Teaches Us About Vision
Noe, A., Pessoa, L., & Thompson, E. (2000) · Visual Cognition · doi:10.1080/135062800394702 · Cited by 147
Reappraising the relationship between working memory and conscious awareness
Soto, D., & Silvanto, J. (2014) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2014.06.005 · Cited by 121
If perception is probabilistic, why does it not seem probabilistic?
Block, N. (2018) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0341 · Cited by 91
Attention as inference: Selection is probabilistic; responses are all-or-none samples.
Vul, E., Hanus, D., & Kanwisher, N. (2009) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/a0017352 · Cited by 86
Jacobs, C., & Silvanto, J. (2015) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2015.06.003 · Cited by 42
Consciousness doesn't overflow cognition
Brown, R. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01399 · Cited by 16
Cited by
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367
Safron, A. (2020) · Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.3389/frai.2020.00030 · Cited by 133
“…and Huang, 2017) The ability of SOHMs to select aligned patterns may help explain how seemingly definite experiences could emerge from probabilistic world models (Wiese, 2017; Block, 2018; Clark, 2018; Gross, 2018), as opposed to generating a “Bayesian blur,” or superposition of possibilities.”
BackgroundIf perception is probabilistic, why does it not seem probabilistic?
Block, N. (2018) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0341 · Cited by 91
Metadata
- Authors
- Gross, S.
- Venue
- Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2018-07-30
- Volume
- 373
- Issue
- 1755
- Pages
- 20170343
- ISSN
- 0962-8436 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-2970
- OpenAlex
- W2885856302
- Cited by
- 39
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 4.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.