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Quantum Cryptography in 5G Networks: A Comprehensive Overview

Mehic, Miralem, Michalek, Libor, Dervisevic, Emir, Burdiak, Patrik, Plakalovic, Matej, Rozhon, Jan, Mahovac, Nerman, Richter, Filip, Kaljic, Enio, Lauterbach, Filip, Njemcevic, Pamela, Maric, Almir, Hamza, Mirza, Fazio, Peppino, Voznak, Miroslav · 2024 · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Cited by 113

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Every attempt to access to the Internet through a Web browser, email sent, VPN connection, VoIP call, instant message or other use of telecommunications systems involves cryptographic techniques. The most commonly applied technique is asymmetric cryptography, which is generally executed in the background without the user even being aware. It establishes a cryptographic code based on the computational complexity of mathematical problems. However, this type of cryptography, which is widely used in today’s telecommunications systems, is under threat as electronics and computing rapidly develop. The development of fifth-generation cellular networks (5G) is gaining momentum, and given its wide field of application, security requires special attention. This is especially true faced with the development of quantum computers. One solution to this security challenge is to use more advanced techniques to establish cryptographic keys that are not susceptible to attack. An essential part of quantum cryptography, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) uses the principles of quantum physics to establish and distribute symmetric cryptographic keys between two geographically distant users. QKD establishes information-theoretically secure cryptographic keys that are resistant to eavesdropping when they are created. In this paper, we survey the security challenges and approaches in 5G networks concerning network protocols, interfaces and management organizations. We begin by examining the fundamentals of QKD and discuss the creation of QKD networks and their applications. We then outline QKD network architecture and its components and standards, following with a summary of QKD and post-quantum key distribution techniques and approaches for its integration into existing security frameworks such as VPNs (IPsec and MACsec). We also discuss the requirements, architecture and methods for implementing the FPGA-based encryptors needed to execute cryptographic algorithms with security keys. We discuss the performance and technologies of post-quantum cryptography, and finally, examine reported 5G demonstrations which have used quantum technologies, highlighting future research directions.

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Metadata

Authors
Mehic, M., Michalek, L., Dervisevic, E., Burdiak, P., Plakalovic, M., Rozhon, J., Mahovac, N., Richter, F., Kaljic, E., Lauterbach, F., Njemcevic, P., Maric, A., Hamza, M., Fazio, P., & Voznak, M.
Venue
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Published
2024
Volume
26
Issue
1
Pages
302-346
ISSN
  • 1553-877X (ISSN-L)
  • 2373-745X
OpenAlex
W4386231919
Cited by
113
References
18
FWCI
9.93
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Funders
  • Ministry of Science, Higher Education and Youth of Canton Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (27-02-35-35137-29/22, 27-02-35-35143-6/22)
  • Ministerstvo Vnitra ?esk? Republiky (VJ01010008 - Network Cybersecurity in Post-Quantum)
  • NATO SPS "Quantum Cybersecurity in 5G Networks (QUANTUM5)" (G5894)
  • H2020 OPENQKD (857156)
  • Ministarstvo Civilnih Poslova Bosne i Hercegovine (10-33-11-7111/22)

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