Cited by 750Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in DataSecurity and Verification in Computing

Certified Robustness to Adversarial Examples with Differential Privacy

Open access
Lecuyer, Mathias, Atlidakis, Vaggelis, Geambasu, Roxana, Hsu, Daniel, Jana, Suman·2019·2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

Abstract

Adversarial examples that fool machine learning models, particularly deep neural networks, have been a topic of intense research interest, with attacks and defenses being developed in a tight back-and-forth. Most past defenses are best effort and have been shown to be vulnerable to sophisticated attacks. Recently a set of certified defenses have been introduced, which provide guarantees of robustness to norm-bounded attacks. However these defenses either do not scale to large datasets or are limited in the types of models they can support. This paper presents the first certified defense that both scales to large networks and datasets (such as Google's Inception network for ImageNet) and applies broadly to arbitrary model types. Our defense, called PixelDP, is based on a novel connection between robustness against adversarial examples and differential privacy, a cryptographically-inspired privacy formalism, that provides a rigorous, generic, and flexible foundation for defense.

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/sp.2019.00044

Cites

63 of 63 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Fully decentralized variants of SGD and other optimization algorithms have recently been considered in machine learning both for improved scalability in datacenters and for decentralized networks of devices.

    “fully decentralized variants of SGD and other optimization algorithms have recently been considered in machine learning both for improved scalability in datacenters [29] as well as for decentralized networks of devices [127, 459, 443, 59, 278, 291, 173].”

    From Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning (2021) · cites this paper as [459]

    The Architecture section says PixelDP training can use an optimizer such as stochastic gradient descent, but does not discuss fully decentralized SGD. Searches for decentralized device networks, distributed optimization, and datacenter scalability found no passage addressing the attributed claim; page numbers were unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.76)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • A reliable and powerful central server may not always be available or desirable in more collaborative learning scenarios.

    “While large companies or organizations can play this role in some application scenarios, a reliable and powerful central server may not always be available or desirable in more collaborative learning scenarios [459].”

    From Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning (2021) · cites this paper as [459]

    The Introduction and Conclusion discuss certified defenses against adversarial examples, not the availability or desirability of a central server. Searches for the quoted claim and for central servers in collaborative or distributed learning found no passage addressing that point. (LLM, conf=0.75)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Fully decentralized algorithms have been introduced to collaboratively learn a personalized model for each client by smoothing model parameters across clients that have similar tasks.

    “The work of [459, 59] introduces fully decentralized algorithms to collaboratively learn a personalized model for each client by smoothing model parameters across clients that have similar tasks (i.e., similar data distributions).”

    From Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning (2021) · cites this paper as [459]

    The Introduction describes PixelDP as a certified defense against adversarial examples, and the Differentially Private ML section describes its goal as making predictions robust to changes in input features. Neither section addresses fully decentralized learning, client-specific models, or smoothing parameters across clients with similar tasks. Searches for those terms and their paraphrases found no supporting passage in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.77)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Recent work demonstrates that DP can reduce susceptibility of models to back-door attacks, attributable to increased robustness from regularising properties of noise addition.

    “recent work demonstrates that DP can reduce the susceptibility of models to other adversarial interference such as back-door attacks26, which can be attributed to the increased robustness of DP models imparted through the regularising properties of noise addition27.”

    From Medical imaging deep learning with differential privacy (2021) · cites this paper as [26]

  • TEE is applicable in FL and multiparty machine learning in general to mainly defend against algorithmic attacks.

    “TEE is applicable in FL [100], [101] and multiparty machine learning in general [102] to mainly defend against algorithmic attacks.”

    From Vulnerabilities in federated learning (2021) · cites this paper as [100]

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 9

  1. [10]10. Chuan Guo, Mayank Rana, Moustapha Cisse, Laurens van der Maaten. Countering adversarial images using input transformations. International Conference on Learning Rep- resentations, 2018.
  2. [11]11. Cihang Xie, Jianyu Wang, Zhishuai Zhang, Zhou Ren, Alan Yuille. Mitigating adversarial effects through randomization. International Conference on Learning Representations, 2018.
  3. [12]12. M. Cisse, P. Bojanowski, E. Grave, Y. Dauphin, and N. Usunier. Parseval networks: Improving robustness to adversarial examples. In Proceedings of the 34th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2017.
  4. [21]21. I. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. In Proceedings of the 3rd ICLR, 2015.
  5. [23]23. Guneet S. Dhillon, Kamyar Azizzadenesheli, Jeremy D. Bernstein, Jean Kossaifi, Aran Khanna, Zachary C. Lipton, Animashree Anandkumar. Stochastic activation pruning for robust adversarial defense. International Conference on Learning Representations, 2018.
  6. [40]40. F. McSherry and I. Mironov. Differentially private rec- ommender systems: Building privacy into the netflix prize contenders. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, 2009.
  7. [50]50. K. Pei, Y. Cao, J. Yang, and S. Jana. Deepxplore: Automated whitebox testing of deep learning systems. In Proceedings of the 26th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP), 2017.
  8. [51]51. Pouya Samangouei, Maya Kabkab, Rama Chellappa. Defense-GAN: Protecting classifiers against adversarial at- tacks using generative models. International Conference on Learning Representations, 2018.
  9. [56]56. C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan, I. Goodfellow, and R. Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Learning Representations, 2014.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Lecuyer, M., Atlidakis, V., Geambasu, R., Hsu, D., & Jana, S.
Affiliations
Columbia University (US)
Venue
2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2019-05
Pages
656-672
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2883108656
Cited by
750
References
63
Citations by year
2026: 45 · 2025: 58 · 2024: 92 · 2023: 117 · 2022: 91 · 2021: 169 · 2020: 125 · 2019: 47 · 2018: 6
FWCI
40.43
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
  • Scientific Programming
Funders
  • National Science Foundation (1740833, 1514437, 1351089)
  • Office of Naval Research (ONR-N00014, N00014-17-1, N00014, N00014-17)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
adversarial examples, certified robustness, differential privacy, adversarial defense, deep neural network, Inception network, ImageNet, robustness guarantees

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review