Social Capital and Community Governance
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 66 of the 66 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Community governance is the set of small group social interactions that, with market and state, determine economic outcomes. We argue (i) community governance addresses some common market and state failures but typically relies on insider‐outsider distinctions that may be morally repugnant and economically costly; (ii) the individual motivations supporting community governance are not captured by either selfishness or altruism; (iii) communities, markets and states are complements, not substitutes; (iv) when poorly designed, markets and states crowd out communities; (v) some distributions of property rights are better than others at fostering community governance; and (vi) communities will probably increase in importance in the future.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bowles, S., & Gintis, H.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2002-11-01
- Volume
- 112
- Issue
- 483
- Pages
- F419-F436
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0297
- OpenAlex
- W2107132802
- Cited by
- 1,538
- References
- 66
- FWCI
- 142.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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