The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
CEO Overconfidence and Management Forecasting
Abstract
This paper examines how overconfidence affects the properties of management forecasts. Using both the “over‐optimism” and “miscalibration” dimensions of overconfidence to generate our predictions, we examine three research questions. First, we examine whether overconfidence increases the likelihood of issuing a forecast. Second, we examine whether overconfidence increases the amount of optimism in management forecasts. Third, we examine whether overconfidence increases the precision of the forecast. Using both options‐ and press‐based measures to proxy for individual overconfidence, we find support for all three research questions.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
1 retracted
Self‐Serving Attribution Bias, Overconfidence, and the Issuance of Management Forecasts
LIBBY, R., & RENNEKAMP, K. (2012) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2011.00430.x · Cited by 261
RetractedSample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
Heckman, J. J. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912352 · Cited by 28,779
Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics
Maddala, G. S. (1983) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511810176 · Cited by 13,240
The economic implications of corporate financial reporting
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.01.002 · Cited by 6,316
Investor Psychology and Security Market Under‐ and Overreactions
Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., & Subrahmanyam, A. (1998) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00077 · Cited by 5,682
The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers
Roll, R. (1986) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296325 · Cited by 3,751
CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment
MALMENDIER, U., & TATE, G. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x · Cited by 3,669
Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction☆
MALMENDIER, U., & TATE, G. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002 · Cited by 2,754
Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analyst Behavior.
Lang, M. H., & Lundholm, R. J. (1996) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/tar-9611271989 · Cited by 2,633
Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News
Skinner, D. J. (1994) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491386 · Cited by 2,427
Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach
Camerer, C., & Lovallo, D. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.306 · Cited by 2,226
Volume, Volatility, Price, and Profit When All Traders Are Above Average
Odean, T. (1998) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00078 · Cited by 1,979
Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?
HIRSHLEIFER, D., LOW, A., & TEOH, S. H. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01753.x · Cited by 1,765
MALMENDIER, U., TATE, G., & YAN, J. (2011) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01685.x · Cited by 1,724
Gervais, S., & Odean, T. (2001) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/14.1.1 · Cited by 1,615
Management's Incentives to Avoid Negative Earnings Surprises
Matsumoto, D. A. (2002) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2002.77.3.483 · Cited by 1,613
AJINKYA, B., BHOJRAJ, S., & SENGUPTA, P. (2005) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2005.00174.x · Cited by 1,389
On the Association between Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings Management
Kasznik, R. (1999) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491396 · Cited by 1,216
Experimental research in financial accounting
Libby, R., Bloomfield, R., & Nelson, M. W. (2002) · Accounting, Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/s0361-3682(01)00011-3 · Cited by 1,201
What’s My Style? The Influence of Top Managers on Voluntary Corporate Financial Disclosure
Bamber, L. S., Jiang, J. (., & Wang, I. Y. (2010) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2010.85.4.1131 · Cited by 1,165
Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance
Heaton, J. B. (2002) · Financial Management · doi:10.2307/3666221 · Cited by 1,070
Executive overconfidence and the slippery slope to financial misreporting
Schrand, C. M., & Zechman, S. L. C. (2012) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.09.001 · Cited by 1,035
Credibility of Management Forecasts
Rogers, J. L., & Stocken, P. C. (2005) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2005.80.4.1233 · Cited by 909
CEO optimism and forced turnover
Campbell, T. C., Gallmeyer, M., Johnson, S. A., Rutherford, J., & Stanley, B. W. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.004 · Cited by 784
Ben-David, I., Graham, J. R., & Harvey, C. R. (2013) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjt023 · Cited by 759
Managerial Overconfidence and Accounting Conservatism
AHMED, A. S., & DUELLMAN, S. (2013) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2012.00467.x · Cited by 719
Internal control and management guidance
Feng, M., Li, C., & McVay, S. (2009) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.09.004 · Cited by 678 · cited 9×
“Feng et al. (2009) find that firms with material internal control weaknesses are 16 The argument that firms issue preannouncements to preempt litigation is less likely to apply in our setting because 1) earnings preannouncements are not included in our sample and 2) such disclosures are likely to…”
InfluentialDiscretionary disclosure and stock-based incentives
Nagar, V., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. (2003) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(02)00075-7 · Cited by 610
Management Earnings Forecasts: A Review and Framework
Hirst, D. E., Koonce, L. L., & Venkataraman, S. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.921583 · Cited by 602
CEO Reputation and Earnings Quality*
Francis, J., Huang, A. H., Rajgopal, S., & Zang, A. Y. (2008) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1506/car.25.1.4 · Cited by 583
Earnings Performance and Discretionary Disclosure
Miller, G. S. (2002) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.00043 · Cited by 582
Bamber, L. S., & Cheon, Y. S. (1998) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491473 · Cited by 565
Speculation Duopoly with Agreement to Disagree: Can Overconfidence Survive the Market Test?
KYLE, A. S., & WANG, F. A. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02751.x · Cited by 552
Expectations Management and Beatable Targets: How Do Analysts React to Explicit Earnings Guidance?*
Cotter, J., Tuna, I., & Wysocki, P. D. (2006) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1506/fj4d-04un-68t7-r8ca · Cited by 508
Managerial myopia: Self-serving biases in organizational planning.
Larwood, L., & Whittaker, W. (1977) · Journal of Applied Psychology · doi:10.1037/0021-9010.62.2.194 · Cited by 490
Earnings Volatility and Voluntary Management Forecast Disclosure
Waymire, G. (1985) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2490919 · Cited by 368
Endogenous overconfidence in managerial forecasts
Hilary, G., & Hsu, C. (2011) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.01.002 · Cited by 226
Prior Forecasting Accuracy and Investor Reaction to Management Earnings Forecasts
Hutton, A. P., & Stocken, P. C. (2021) · Journal of Financial Reporting · doi:10.2308/jfr-2020-005 · Cited by 158
Effect of personal taxes on managers’ decisions to sell their stock
Jin, L., & Kothari, S. P. (2008) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.05.002 · Cited by 112
Overconfidence in Psychology and Finance - An Interdisciplinary Literature Review
Skała, D. (2008) · Bank i Kredyt · Cited by 101
Public information and heuristic trade
Fischer, P. E., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1999) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(98)00046-9 · Cited by 99
CEO and CFO Career Penalties to Missing Quarterly Analysts ForecastsPreprint
Mergenthaler, R. D., Rajgopal, S., & Srinivasan, S. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1152421 · Cited by 92
Overconfidence in Psychology and Finance – an Interdisciplinary Literature Review
Skała, D. (2008) · Munich Personal RePEc Archive (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich) · Cited by 86
Guidance Frequency and Guidance Properties: The Effect of Reputation-Building and Learning-by-DoingPreprint
Bhojraj, S., Libby, R., & Yang, H. I. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1545864 · Cited by 25
Self-citation
Cited by
CFO Narcissism and Financial Reporting Quality
HAM, C., LANG, M., SEYBERT, N., & WANG, S. (2017) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12176 · Cited by 420
Big Egos Can Be Green: A Study of CEO Hubris and Environmental Innovation
Arena, C., Michelon, G., & Trojanowski, G. (2018) · British Journal of Management · doi:10.1111/1467-8551.12250 · Cited by 412
Behavioral CEOs: The Role of Managerial Overconfidence
Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2015) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.29.4.37 · Cited by 371
Narcissism is a bad sign: CEO signature size, investment, and performance
Ham, C., Seybert, N., & Wang, S. (2018) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-017-9427-x · Cited by 314
Plöckinger, M., Aschauer, E., Hiebl, M. R. W., & Rohatschek, R. (2016) · Journal of Accounting Literature · doi:10.1016/j.acclit.2016.09.002 · Cited by 269
Metadata
- Authors
- Hribar, P., & Yang, H.
- Venue
- Contemporary Accounting Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2015-06-12
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 204-227
- ISSN
- 0823-9150 (ISSN-L)
- 1911-3846
- OpenAlex
- W3121173541
- Cited by
- 531
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 135.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.