The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Distortion of Related Beliefs
Abstract
When forming beliefs about themselves, politics, and how the world works more generally, people often face a tension between conclusions they inherently wish to reach and those which are plausible. And the likelihood of beliefs about one variable (e.g., the performance of a favored politician) depends on beliefs about other, related variables (e.g., the quality and bias of newspapers reporting on the politician). I propose a formal approach to combine these two forces, creating a tractable way to study the distortion of related beliefs. The approach unifies several central ideas from psychology (e.g., motivated reasoning, attribution) that have been applied heavily to political science. Concrete applications shed light on why successful individuals sometimes attribute their performance to luck (“imposter syndrome”), why those from advantaged groups believe they in fact face high levels of discrimination (the “persecution complex”), and why partisans disagree about the accuracy and bias of news sources.
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“They would engage in motivated reasoning, i.e., update their beliefs in a way that is consistent with their initial views (Druckman and McGrath 2019; Little 2019) rather than integrate information in a way that leads to accurate conclusions.”
From Yellow Vests, Pessimistic Beliefs, and Carbon Tax Aversion (2022) · cites this paper as Little 2019
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Cited by
Yellow Vests, Pessimistic Beliefs, and Carbon Tax Aversion
Douenne, T., & Fabre, A. (2022) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.20200092 · Cited by 364
KALLA, J. L., & BROOCKMAN, D. E. (2020) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055419000923 · Cited by 310
Sometimes Less Is More: Censorship, News Falsification, and Disapproval in 1989 East Germany
Gläßel, C., & Paula, K. (2020) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12501 · Cited by 98
Motivated reasoning and democratic accountability
LITTLE, A. T., SCHNAKENBERG, K. E., & TURNER, I. R. (2022) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055421001209 · Cited by 41
“See also Bullock et al. (2015) and Roush and Sood (2020) for work on partisan knowledge gaps.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationNordbrandt, M. (2022) · Frontiers in Political Science · doi:10.3389/fpos.2022.921188 · Cited by 5
“…social psychologists have pointed out that the processing of counter-attitudinal information is cognitively and emotionally challenging, and that it may activate biased information processing that reinforces prejudice and polarization (Festinger, 1954; Druckman and McGrath, 2019; Little, 2019).”
BackgroundInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Little, A. T.
- Affiliations
- University of California Berkeley
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2019-05-28
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 675-689
- ISSN
- 0092-5853
- 1540-5907
- Cited by
- 38
- References
- 8
- Language
- en
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