Cited by 686Electoral Systems and Political ParticipationMedia Influence and PoliticsSurvey Methodology and Nonresponse

Partisan bias in factual beliefs about politics

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Bullock, John G., Gerber, Alan S., Hill, Seth J., Huber, Gregory A.·2015·Quarterly Journal of Political Science

Abstract

Partisanship seems to affect factual beliefs about politics. For example, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say that the deficit rose during the Clinton administration; Democrats are more likely to say that inflation rose under Reagan. What remains unclear is whether such patterns reflect differing beliefs among partisans or instead reflect a desire to praise one party or criticize another. To shed light on this question, we present a model of survey response in the presence of partisan cheerleading and payments for correct and “don’t know” responses. We design two experiments based on the model’s implications. The experiments show that small payments for correct and “don’t know” answers sharply diminish the gap between Democrats and Republicans in responses to “partisan” factual questions. Our conclusion is that the apparent gulf in factual beliefs between members of different parties may be more illusory than real. The experiments also bolster and extend a major finding about political knowledge in America: we show (as others have) that Americans know little about politics, but we also show that they often recognize their own lack of knowledge.

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  • In the cheerleading account, partisans are in fact well informed, but prefer to act misinformed in surveys.

    “In this view, partisans are in fact well informed, but prefer to act misinformed in surveys.”

    From Partisan Gaps in Political Information and Information-Seeking Behavior: Motivated Reasoning or Cheerleading? (2019) · cites this paper as Bullock et al., 2015

    The Abstract says partisan survey answers may reflect expressive cheerleading rather than sincere beliefs. But the Conclusion says cheerleading can be either informed or uninformed, so the claim overstates the account by saying partisans are well informed. (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • The persistence of partisan divides in factual beliefs among incentivized groups is noticeably higher than in previous work.

    “The persistence of partisan divides in factual beliefs among the groups provided with incentives is noticeably higher than in previous work.”

    From Partisan Gaps in Political Information and Information-Seeking Behavior: Motivated Reasoning or Cheerleading? (2019) · cites this paper as Bullock et al. (2015, 521)

    Experiment 1 reports that about 45% of the partisan gap remained when participants were incentivized to answer correctly. The Theory and Prior Evidence section says earlier incentive research did not examine partisan patterns in responses, so the paper does not establish that this persistence was higher than in previous work. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Political scientists have found that partisan bias effects on question-answering accuracy are significantly reduced when respondents are offered a monetary bonus for correct answers.

    “Political scientists have found that partisan bias effects on questionanswering accuracy [Bartels, 2002] are significantly reduced when respondents are offered a monetary bonus for correct answers [Bullock et al., 2015, Prior et al., 2015].”

    From Talk Isn't Always Cheap: Understanding Failure Modes in Multi-Agent Debate (2025) · cites this paper as Bullock et al., 2015

  • Even beliefs about measurable political and economic indicators can reflect partisan bias.

    “According to Bullock et al. (2015), even beliefs about measurable political and economic indicators can reflect partisan bias.”
  • The treatment effects of incentives across these studies are of similar magnitude to those observed in Bullock et al. (2015).

    “While the treatment e↵ects of incentives across these studies are of similar magnitude to those observed in Bullock et al. (2015), the initial partisan gap on these items is much larger than previously obtained in incentive-based designs.”

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 25

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Authors
Bullock, J. G., Gerber, A. S., Hill, S. J., & Huber, G. A.
Affiliations
  • Northwestern University (US)
  • Yale University (US)
  • University of California San Diego (US)
Venue
Quarterly Journal of Political Science
Publisher
Emerald
Published
2015-12-17
Volume
10
Issue
4
Pages
519-578
ISSN
  • 1554-0626 (ISSN-L)
  • 1554-0634
OpenAlex
W1559877068
Cited by
686
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 45 · 2025: 57 · 2024: 48 · 2023: 86 · 2022: 74 · 2021: 84 · 2020: 76 · 2019: 59 · 2018: 88 · 2017: 24 · 2016: 17 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 3
FWCI
80.35
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Quarterly Journal of Political Science (publishedVersion)
  • National Bureau of Economic Research (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
  • eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Survey Methodology and Nonresponse
Keywords
partisan bias, political knowledge, Democrats and Republicans

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