Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Abstract

Over the past few years, in a series of important articles,1 Daron Acemoglu and Jim Robinson have developed an influential theory about the creation and consolidation of democracy. In this book they summarise and extend their analytical results within a unified, coherent and elegant framework, and illustrate their insights with historical examples. Acemoglu and Robinson seek to reach beyond economists and formal political scientists who are already familiar with their articles. Their ambition is to convince a broader audience of political scientists, sociologists, historians, and other scholars that the ‘economic’ approach, based on stylised and simplified analytical models, brings valuable insights and a deeper understanding of complex political phenomena. The authors want to convince a potentially sceptical audience that heroic generalisations about democracy are good– a challenging task in an area of study in which ‘it seems that the ‘‘general propositions’’ are that there are no general propositions’ (p. 81). As a card‐carrying economist who shares their love for parsimonious and general models, I warmly endorse their methodological approach. In fact, I have been reading this book like a fan sitting on the sidelines and rooting for his favoured team, rejoicing when they score a spectacular goal, and suffering when they hit a post or send the ball out. Now I am ready to engage in what American football commentators call ‘Monday morning quarterbacking’ (‘il processo del lunedì’, for Italian readers).