Intuition in Management Research: A Historical Review
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this historical review we chart the progress of intuition research over the past eight decades. We highlight the distinction between intuition research in management and intuition research in base disciplines and related fields, and offer a critical commentary on the ways in which the dynamic between these two historical threads has affected progress in the study of intuition in organizations. We conclude by identifying several promising new directions for intuition research, and offer a number of recommendations to intuition researchers in management which may help in taking this topic forward in ways that do not recapitulate previous errors, diversions or digressions.
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Cites
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Influential
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The art of crafting a systematic literature review in entrepreneurship research
Kraus, S., Breier, M., & Dasí-Rodríguez, S. (2020) · International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal · doi:10.1007/s11365-020-00635-4 · Cited by 1,319
The Why and How of the Integrative Review
Cronin, M. A., & George, E. (2023) · Organizational Research Methods · doi:10.1177/1094428120935507 · Cited by 677
Extending Signaling Theory to Rhetorical Signals: Evidence from Crowdfunding
Steigenberger, N., & Wilhelm, H. (2018) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2017.1195 · Cited by 326
The Interplay between Intuition and Rationality in Strategic Decision Making: A Paradox Perspective
Calabretta, G., Gemser, G., & Wijnberg, N. M. (2017) · Organization Studies · doi:10.1177/0170840616655483 · Cited by 324
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George, J. M., & Dane, E. (2016) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2016.06.004 · Cited by 300
Metadata
- Authors
- Akinci, C., & Sadler‐Smith, E.
- Venue
- International Journal of Management Reviews
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-06-14
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 104-122
- ISSN
- 1460-8545 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2370
- OpenAlex
- W1789975608
- Cited by
- 206
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 5.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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