Testing Pendleton's Premise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse Bureaucrats?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this paper I use the Bush Administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) scores—a numerical measure of federal program performance—to analyze the relationship between political appointees and management. I find that federal programs administered by politically appointed bureau chiefs get systematically lower PART evaluations than programs run by bureau chiefs drawn from the civil service. I find that career managers have more direct bureau experience and longer tenures, and these characteristics are significantly related to performance. Political appointees have higher education levels, more private or not-for-profit management experience, and more varied work experience than careerists but these characteristics are uncorrelated with performance. I conclude that reducing the number of appointees or increased sensitivity to appointee selection based upon certain background characteristics could improve federal bureau management.
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Cites
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Cited by
Policy Preferences and Policy Change: Dynamic Responsiveness in the American States, 1936–2014
CAUGHEY, D., & WARSHAW, C. (2018) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055417000533 · Cited by 340
Lee, S.-Y., & Whitford, A. B. (2013) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mus050 · Cited by 169
Defining Bureaucratic Autonomy
Bersch, K., & Fukuyama, F. (2023) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051921-102914 · Cited by 58
Metadata
- Authors
- Lewis, D. E.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2007-11
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1073-1088
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W2145595890
- Cited by
- 216
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 21.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Lewis, D. E. (2007). Testing Pendleton's Premise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse Bureaucrats? The Journal of Politics. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00608.x
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