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Testing Pendleton's Premise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse Bureaucrats?

Lewis, David E. · 2007 · The Journal of Politics
Cited by 216

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

In this paper I use the Bush Administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) scores—a numerical measure of federal program performance—to analyze the relationship between political appointees and management. I find that federal programs administered by politically appointed bureau chiefs get systematically lower PART evaluations than programs run by bureau chiefs drawn from the civil service. I find that career managers have more direct bureau experience and longer tenures, and these characteristics are significantly related to performance. Political appointees have higher education levels, more private or not-for-profit management experience, and more varied work experience than careerists but these characteristics are uncorrelated with performance. I conclude that reducing the number of appointees or increased sensitivity to appointee selection based upon certain background characteristics could improve federal bureau management.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00608.x

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Metadata

Authors
Lewis, D. E.
Venue
The Journal of Politics
Published
2007-11
Volume
69
Issue
4
Pages
1073-1088
ISSN
  • 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-2508
OpenAlex
W2145595890
Cited by
216
References
27
FWCI
21.03
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Testing Pendleton's Premise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse Bureaucrats? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00608.x
The paper
Lewis, D. E. (2007). Testing Pendleton's Premise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse Bureaucrats? The Journal of Politics. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00608.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.