Collective Action in Action: Prosocial Behavior in and out of the Laboratory
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Experiments have become a popular method to study altruism and cooperation in laboratory and, more recently, in field settings. However, few studies have examined whether behavior in experiments tells us anything about behavior in the “real world.” To investigate the external validity of several common experimental economics games, we compare game behavior with prosocial behavior among Tsimane forager‐horticulturalists of lowland Bolivia. We find that food‐sharing patterns, social visitation, beer production and consumption, labor participation, and contributions to a feast are not robustly correlated with levels of giving in the economics games. Payoff structure and socioecological context may be more important in predicting prosocial behavior in a wide variety of domains than stable personality traits. We argue that future experimental methods should be tailored to specific research questions, show reduced anonymity, and incorporate repeat measures under a variety of conditions to inform and redirect ethnographic study and build scientific theory. [Keywords: altruism, cooperation, experimental economics, Tsimane]
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Cites
Altruistic punishment in humans
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“10 This conclusion is consistent with the observation that social institutions sometimes make it too costly for cooperators to cooperate or conversely for defectors to not cooperate (Fehr and Gächter 2002).”
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Self-citationCostly Punishment Across Human Societies
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BackgroundResultSelf-citationThe evolution of altruistic punishment
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Getting to Know You: Reputation and Trust in a Two-Person Economic Exchange
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Self-citationThe impact of personality on behavior in five Prisoner's Dilemma games
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Cited by
The weirdest people in the world?
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x0999152x · Cited by 12,641
Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment
Henrich, J., Ensminger, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N., et al. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1182238 · Cited by 1,387
Self-citationA mutualistic approach to morality: The evolution of fairness by partner choice
Baumard, N., André, J.-B., & Sperber, D. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11002202 · Cited by 668
Beyond WEIRD: towards a broad-based behavioral science
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10000725 · Cited by 631
Conditional Cooperation and Costly Monitoring Explain Success in Forest Commons Management
Rustagi, D., Engel, S., & Kosfeld, M. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1193649 · Cited by 575
Metadata
- Authors
- GURVEN, M., & WINKING, J.
- Venue
- American Anthropologist
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2008-06
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 179-190
- ISSN
- 0002-7294 (ISSN-L)
- 1548-1433
- OpenAlex
- W1990355722
- Cited by
- 130
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 19.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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