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Cited by 370

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 135 of the 135 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

TESTING ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES IN THE FIELD: THREAT, MORAL APPEAL AND SOCIAL INFORMATION

Open access
Fellner, Gerlinde, Sausgruber, Rupert, Traxler, Christian·2013·Journal of the European Economic Association
DOI 10.1111/jeea.12013
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Abstract

We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailings, a threat treatment which makes a high detection risk salient has a significant deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others’ behavior enhances compliance on aggregate. However, the information condition has a weak positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common.

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Crossref · 10.1111/jeea.12013

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Citations

Cites

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Fellner, G., Sausgruber, R., & Traxler, C.
Venue
Journal of the European Economic Association
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2013-06
Volume
11
Issue
3
Pages
634-660
ISSN
1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1111/jeea.12013
OpenAlex
W1920751234
Cited by
370
References
135
FWCI
65.94
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.