The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Agency Conflicts and Cash: Estimates from a Dynamic Model
Open accessAbstract
Which agency problems affect corporate cash policy? To answer this question, we estimate a dynamic model of finance and investment with three mechanisms that misalign managerial and shareholder incentives: limited managerial ownership of the firm, compensation based on firm size, and managerial perquisite consumption. We find that perquisite consumption critically impacts cash policy. Size‐based compensation also matters, but less. Firms with lower blockholder and institutional ownership have higher managerial perquisite consumption, low managerial ownership is a key factor in the secular upward trend in cash holdings, and agency plays little role in small firms' substantial cash holdings.
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Metadata
- Authors
- NIKOLOV, B., & WHITED, T. M.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2014-09-12
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1883-1921
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2165014400
- Cited by
- 363
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 122.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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