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Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: The Incentive to Be Engaged
Open accessAbstract
This paper studies institutional investors’ incentives to be engaged shareholders. In 2017, the average institution gains an extra $129,000 in annual management fees if a stockholding increases 1% in value, considering both the direct effect on assets under management and the indirect effect on subsequent fund flows. The estimates range from $19,600 for investments in small firms to $307,600 for investments in large firms. Institutional shareholders in one firm often gain when the firm's competitors do well, by virtue of institutions’ holdings in those firms, but the impact of common ownership is modest in the most concentrated industries.
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Metadata
- Authors
- LEWELLEN, J., & LEWELLEN, K.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2021-10-21
- Volume
- 77
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 213-264
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3204386880
- Cited by
- 278
- References
- 51
- FWCI
- 25.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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