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Board Dynamics over the Startup Life Cycle

EWENS, MICHAEL, MALENKO, NADYA·2026·The Journal of Finance
DOI 10.1111/jofi.70072

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Abstract

We explore the dynamics of venture capital (VC)‐backed startup boards using novel data on director entry, exit, and characteristics. At formation, a typical board is entrepreneur‐controlled. Independent directors join the median board after the second financing and hold a tie‐breaking vote. Their presence is particularly likely when potential VC‐entrepreneur conflicts are larger. At later stages, control switches to VCs and independent director characteristics change. These patterns align with key financial contracting theories, but also highlight unique roles of independent directors over the life cycle: mediation followed by advising. Independent directors thus represent another potential source of value‐add to startup performance.

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Metadata

Authors
EWENS, M., & MALENKO, N.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2026-08-02
Volume
81
Issue
5
Pages
2543-2594
ISSN
  • 0022-1082
  • 1540-6261
DOI
10.1111/jofi.70072
Cited by
2
References
1
Language
en
Licence

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Board Dynamics over the Startup Life Cycle. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/jofi.70072
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EWENS, M., & MALENKO, N. (2026). Board Dynamics over the Startup Life Cycle. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70072

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