Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Evolutionary debunking arguments move from a premise about the influence of evolutionary forces on our moral beliefs to a skeptical conclusion about those beliefs. My primary aim is to clarify this empirically grounded epistemological challenge. I begin by distinguishing among importantly different sorts of epistemological attacks. I then demonstrate that instances of each appear in the literature under the ‘evolutionary debunking’ title. Distinguishing them clears up some confusions and helps us better understand the structure and potential of evolutionary debunking arguments.
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Citations
Cites
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value
Street, S. (2006) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-005-1726-6 · Cited by 1,247 · cited 4×
“1 See Bedke (2009), Greene (2008), Joyce (2007), Kitcher (2007), Ruse andWilson (1986), Ruse (1998), and Street (2006).”
BackgroundInfluentialEvolutionary Debunking Arguments
Kahane, G. (2011) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00770.x · Cited by 282
The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism
Cuneo, T., & Shafer-Landau, R. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0277-5 · Cited by 270
Enoch, D. (2010) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9333-6 · Cited by 224
Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism and Moral Knowledge
Shafer-Landau, R. (2013) · Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy · doi:10.26556/jesp.v7i1.68 · Cited by 177
Evolution and Normative Scepticism
Schafer, K. (2010) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048400903114219 · Cited by 44 · cited 1×
“58 Schafer (2010) and Vavova (2014) suggest arguments along these lines.”
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Cited by
The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism
Cuneo, T., & Shafer-Landau, R. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0277-5 · Cited by 270
Sauer, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108529181 · Cited by 72
Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments
Korman, D. Z., & Locke, D. (2020) · Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15 · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198859512.003.0014 · Cited by 58
Metadata
- Authors
- Vavova, K.
- Venue
- Philosophy Compass
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2015-01-28
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 104-116
- ISSN
- 1747-9991 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1512166434
- Cited by
- 106
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 69.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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